#title Anarchism
#subtitle some theoretical foundations
#author Alan Carter
#LISTtitle Anarchism: some theoretical foundations
#SORTauthors Alan Carter
#SORTtopics introduction, theory, introductory
#date October 11, 2011
#source *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 16:3, 245–264. DOI:10.1080/13569317.2011.607291
#lang en
#notes Alan Carter (2011): Anarchism: some theoretical foundations, Journal of Political Ideologies, 16:3, 245–264 Philosophy, School of Humanities, University of Glasgow, Oakfield Avenue, Glasgow, G12 8QQ, Scotland, UK ISSN 1356–9317 print;
ISSN 1469–9613 online/11/030245–20 q 2011 Taylor & Francis.
#pubdate 2019-08-08T06:04:02
*** Abstract
This article considers two different, yet related, theoretical
approaches that could be employed to ground the anarchist critique of Marxist-
Leninist revolutionary practice, and thus of the state in general: the State-Primacy
Theory and the Quadruplex Theory. The State-Primacy Theory appears to be
consistent with several of Bakunin’s claims about the state. However, the
Quadruplex Theory might, in fact, turn out to be no less consistent with Bakunin’s
claims than the State-Primacy Theory. In addition, the Quadruplex Theory seems
no less capable of supporting the anarchist critique of Marxism-Leninism than the
State-Primacy Theory. The article concludes by considering two possible
refinements that might be made to the Quadruplex Theory
*** I
Anarchists have, on the whole, been highly critical of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary
practice, which has traditionally been willing to employ centralized and authoritarian
means in order to bring about a post-capitalist society. [1] In its willingness to employ
such means, Marxism-Leninism, of course, explicitly assumes that those means will
not adversely shape the form taken by post-capitalism—an assumption that anarchists
have consistently rejected. The reason Marxist-Leninists are so seemingly cavalier
(at least from an anarchist perspective) in their attitude to post-revolutionary political
power is their reliance on Karl Marx’s political theory—in particular, his theory of the
state. But if anarchists are to provide a cogent critique of Marxism-Leninism, then
they require a compelling political theory of their own in contradistinction to Marxist
theory in order to ground that critique. They also require a cogent reason for rejecting
Marx’s political theory.
In what follows, I adumbrate two different, yet related, political theories that
may suffice to justify the anarchist rejection of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary
practice and of the state in general: the State-Primacy Theory and the Quadruplex
Theory. In addition, during the course of discussing those theories, a reason will
emerge for rejecting Marx’s theory of the state.
*** II
The most famous anarchist critic of Marx is, without doubt, Mikhail Bakunin. [2] So
allow me to begin by noting some of Bakunin’s arguments that are either direct or
implied criticisms of Marx and his collaborator Friedrich Engels—fellow
revolutionary figures whom Bakunin judged to be potentially authoritarian, centralist
and elitist—for those criticisms can readily be deployed to target Marxist-Leninist
revolutionary practice.
Now, it is worth observing first of all that, although Marx and Bakunin shared a
similar ideal of an egalitarian post-capitalist society, there are certainly grounds for
Bakunin’s suspicions regarding Marx’s and Engels’ authoritarianism, centralism
and elitism, especially regarding the process of revolutionary transformation. For
example, with respect to the Paris Commune, in a draft of a letter that Engels wrote
to Carlo Terzaghi, he writes:
If there had been a little more authority and centralization in the Paris Commune, it would
have triumphed over the bourgeoisie. After the victory we can organize ourselves as we like,
but for the struggle it seems to me necessary to collect all our forces into a single band and
direct them on the same point of attack. And when people tell me that this cannot be done
without authority and centralization, and that these are two things to be condemned outright,
it seems to me that those who talk like this either do not know what a revolution is, or are
revolutionaries in name only. [3]
Engels’ lament, here, for what he clearly perceived to be a lack of authority and
centralization within the course of a potentially revolutionary transformation of
society assumes, of course, that such authority and centralization would pose no
substantial political problems after the hoped-for revolution. But as Bakunin
acutely asks: ‘Has it ever been witnessed in history that a political body ...
committed suicide, or sacrificed the least of its interests and so-called rights for the
love of justice and liberty?’ [4] In short, can it safely be assumed that those enjoying
centralized and authoritarian power will simply relinquish it?
Moreover, Marx and Engels professed that their variety of socialism was
scientific, rather than utopian. [5] Unfortunately, in Bakunin’s view:
A scientific body to which had been confided the government of society would soon end by
devoting itself no longer to science at all, but to quite another affair; and that affair, as in the
case of all established powers, would be its own eternal perpetuation by rendering the society
confided to its care ever more stupid and consequently more in need of its government and
direction. [6]
Yet, as Marx makes clear in his marginal notes to Bakunin’s Statism and Anarchy,
the dictatorship of the proletariat, which Marx and Engels predicted and advocated,
would utilize a form of centralized governmental power. [7] Bakunin, in contrast,
regards any assumption that a centralized government would hand power to the
masses after a revolution as itself highly utopian.
Furthermore, Marx quite clearly believed that he knew where the interests of the
working class lay better than the working class itself, for as he explicitly admitted
in 1850:
I have always defied the momentary opinions of the proletariat. If the best a party can do is
just fail to seize power, then we repudiate it. If the proletariat could gain control of the
government the measures it would introduce would be those of the petty bourgeoisie and not
those appropriate to the proletariat. Our party can only gain power when the situation allows
it to put its own measures into practice. [8]
Given such seeming elitism, it is hardly surprising, therefore, that Bakunin should
observe:
it is clear why the dictatorial revolutionists, who aim to overthrow the existing powers and
social structures in order to erect upon their ruins their own dictatorship, never are or will be
the enemies of government, but, on the contrary, always will be the most ardent promoters of
the government idea. They are the enemies only of contemporary governments, because they
wish to replace them. They are the enemies of the present governmental structure, because it
excludes the possibility of their dictatorship. At the same time they are the most devoted
friends of governmental power. For if the revolution destroyed this power by actually freeing
the masses, it would deprive this pseudo-revolutionary minority of any hope to harness the
masses in order to make them the beneficiaries of their own government policy. [9]
What is more, according to Bakunin:
men who were democrats and rebels of the reddest variety when they were a part of the mass
of governed people, became exceedingly moderate when they rose to power. Usually these
backslidings are attributed to treason. That, however, is an erroneous idea; they have for their
main cause the change of position and perspective. [10]
However, there is an alternative, or a supplementary, explanation that could be
mooted to account for this phenomenon. Hierarchical state structures might be
such that only those who are, at least to some degree, ruthless in their striving for
political power will eventually succeed in attaining it or in retaining that power.
But what is most important for our present concern is that Bakunin’s
disagreement with Marx and Engels was fundamentally theoretical in nature.
Marx tended to reduce political power to the power of an economic class—the
dominant class—which is partly why he referred to it as the ruling class. [11]
For example, in The Communist Manifesto, Marx confidently declares that
‘[p]olitical power, properly so called, is merely the organized power of one class
for oppressing another’, [12] thereby deducing that
[i]f the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of
circumstances, to organize itself as a class, if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself the
ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will,
along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class
antagonisms and classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a
class. [13]
And from this, Marx concludes that, with the establishment of a communist
economic structure, ‘[i]n place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and
class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of
each is the condition for the free development of all’. [14] In a nutshell, the crucial
implication of Marx’s conceptualization of political power is that once an egalitarian economic structure has arisen, all problems of political power will
vanish. [15]
Later, we shall see that there seems to be historical evidence for holding Marx’s
theory of the state to be woefully inadequate at this point. Bakunin, clearly, viewed
acting on such a theoretical presumption as being fraught with danger; for
reducing political power to economic power is to disregard the highly significant
and malign influence that the state can assert. As he writes:
To support his programme for the conquest of political power, Marx has a very special
theory, which is but the logical consequence of [his] whole system. He holds that the political
condition of each country is always the product and the faithful expression of its economic
situation; to change the former it is necessary only to transform the latter. Therein lies the
whole secret of historical evolution according to Marx. He takes no account of other factors
in history, such as the ever-present reaction of political, juridical, and religious institutions
on the economic situation. He says: ‘Poverty produces political slavery, the State’. But he
does not allow this expression to be turned around, to say: ‘Political slavery, the State,
reproduces in its turn, and maintains poverty as a condition for its own existence; so that to
destroy poverty, it is necessary to destroy the State’! And strangely enough, Marx, who
forbids his disciples to consider political slavery, the State, as a real cause of poverty,
commands his disciples in the Social Democratic party to consider the conquest of political
power as the absolutely necessary preliminary condition for economic emancipation. [16]
Bakunin is certainly being uncharitable in caricaturing Marx as taking no account
of other historical factors, ‘such as the ever-present reaction of political, juridical,
and religious institutions on the economic situation’. This notwithstanding,
Bakunin offers a very interesting suggestion here, namely that ‘[p]olitical slavery,
the State, reproduces ... and maintains poverty as a condition for its own
existence’, for such a claim sounds very much like a functional explanation.
In other words, Bakunin appears to be arguing that states choose economic
inequality because it serves their interests—in short, because it is functional for
them. This is especially interesting insofar as the most sophisticated defender of
Marx’s theory of history—G. A. Cohen—found it necessary to deploy functional
explanations in order to present Marx’s theory in a non–self-contradictory form. [17]
And given that, with today’s hindsight, we can see how prescient were Bakunin’s
observations regarding the course of an authoritarian revolution, it would surely be
odd to see no merit whatsoever in his political theory.
*** III
In order to develop Bakunin’s suggestion further, let us distinguish between, on the
one hand, political and economic categories, and, on the other, between forces, and
relations. From this pair of distinctions, we can derive four components of a modern
society that can be combined to form a complex functional explanation. The four
components are: the political forces, the political relations, the economic forces, and
the economic relations (Table 1). The political forces and political relations together
comprise the state, whereas the economic forces and economic relations together
comprise what has, since Hegel’s time, been traditionally referred to as civil society.
***** Table 1. The state and civil society.
[[a-c-alan-carter-anarchism-1.png f]]
Following Cohen’s lead, we can define the economic structure of a society as
consisting of the set of its economic relations; and we can specify those relations
as comprising relations of, or relations presupposing, effective control over
production. Such relations of production can be defined as relations of, or as
relations that presuppose, effective control of the forces of production. These
economic forces—the forces of production—can be defined as comprising
economic labour-power (that capacity which the agents of production supply in
return for wages) and the means of production (e.g. tools and machinery).
We might also find it advantageous to go beyond the majority of Marxist theorists
by including within the set of economic relations those relations of, or
presupposing, effective control over economic exchange. [18]
Given that, at least in modern societies, the ability to control effectively the economic forces depends, in part, on the accepted legality of the economic
relations and, perhaps even more importantly, on the ability of the political
forces to preserve them, control of the forces of production requires relations
of, or relations presupposing, political power—in short, political relations.
We might then define the political structure of a society as consisting of the set of
its political relations. And the relevant aspects of political power might be argued
to include: the power to introduce legislation, especially legislation that is
viewed by a sufficient number of people as legitimate; the power to enforce that
legislation; and the power to defend the political community against external
threats. [19]
These political relations are embodied in the various legal and political
institutions of a society. To be more specific, political institutions comprise
relations of, or relations presupposing, effective control of the society’s ‘defensive’
forces. In the modern state, these forces of ‘defence’ (which are usually more
offensive than defensive) take a coercive form—such coercive forces comprising
political labour-power (that capacity which the agents of coercion supply, namely
the work offered by policemen and policewomen, military personnel, etc., in return
for wages) and the means of coercion (e.g. weaponry and prisons). And political
labour-power and the means of coercion together constitute a society’s political forces. [20]
Before fitting the political forces, the political relations, the economic forces and
the economic relations into a complex functional explanation, we need to be clear
about the nature of functional explanations. According to Cohen, [21] functional
explanations are a subset of consequence explanations; and consequence explanations are justified by consequence laws. Consequence laws take the form:
(1) If (if Y at t1 , then X at t2 ), then Y at t3 ,
where ‘X’ and ‘Y’ are types of events, and where ‘t1 ’ is some time not later than t2,
and where ‘t2’ is some time not later than time t3 . A consequence explanation such
as
(2) b at t3 because (a at t2 because b at t1),
where ‘b’ is a token of type Y, and ‘a’ is a token of type X, is justified by (1). And if b
is functional for a, then (2) is a functional explanation.
So, consider the following consequence law:
(3) If it is the case that if predators were to develop better camouflage then
they would be able to hunt better, then they would come to develop better
camouflage.
This would justify the following consequence explanation:
(4) Tigers developed stripes because they were better hunters as a result of
having stripes.
Given that having stripes that provide better camouflage is functional for better
hunting, (4) is a functional explanation.
Now, a consequence law such as (3) might seem implausible on its own. But with
the addition of some elaboration it becomes extremely plausible. For if we add a
theory of natural selection, where those most fitted to survive within their
environment are the ones naturally selected, as well as adding a theory of genetics
that allows chance variation, then something like the following story can be told:
Due to chance variation, tigers will have some offspring that are better camouflaged
than others. Those with better camouflage will be better hunters. And those that are
better hunters will, because of competition for food, be the ones that tend to survive
and have offspring, some of whom, due to chance variation, being better
camouflaged than their parents and some having poorer camouflage. Those with
even better camouflage than their parents will be even better hunters, and so on. In
short, over time, tigers will become better camouflaged because better camouflage
is functional for being a more successful hunter.
So, now consider this complex consequence law:
(5) If it is the case that if the political relations were to select economic
relations that better develop the economic forces that better develop the
political forces that better empower the political relations, then those
economic relations would come to be selected.
This would justify the following consequence explanation:
(6) A particular set of economic relations was selected because the political
relations were better empowered as a result of having such economic
relations.
Given that having economic relations that better develop the economic forces that
better develop the political forces that better empower the political relations is
functional for the political relations, (6) is a functional explanation.
Moreover, (5) could be elaborated by reference to the fact that states ordinarily
exist within a world of competing states. [22] Because novel weaponry—a political
force—is occasionally invented, those states that develop better weaponry will tend
to be the ones that survive. But in order to develop better weaponry, a more
productive economy is required. Hence, those states that tend to survive will be ones
where their political relations selected economic relations that better developed the
economic forces that better developed the political forces. The mooted
revolutionary process from one epoch to another whereby political relations select
new economic relations that develop the economic forces that develop the political
forces that empower the political relations is represented in Figure 1. Figure 1 also
models the stabilization of the economic relations by the political relations within
an epoch because, in developing the economic forces that are required to
develop the political forces that empower the political relations, those economic relations are, at that time, functional for the political relations. It is when the
prevailing economic relations become dysfunctional for the political relations that
new economic relations are selected. But while they remain functional for the
political relations, the prevailing economic relations are stabilized.
***** Figure 1. A State-Primacy Model.
[[a-c-alan-carter-anarchism-2.png f]]
Now, when the political relations display political inequality, as they ordinarily
do, and when the economic relations also display economic inequality, as they, too,
ordinarily do, then this can be hyperbolically described as a case where ‘[p]olitical
slavery, the State, reproduces ... and maintains poverty as a condition for its own
existence; so that to destroy poverty, it is necessary to destroy the State’. The
complex functional explanation modelled in Figure 1 could thus be regarded as
explicating Bakunin’s very interesting suggestion. And the terminological
clarifications supplied above could be regarded as filling in the requisite detail to
make adequate sense of the model. Call the political theory thus modelled—the
theory, that is, which claims that political relations select and/or stabilize economic
relations that develop the economic forces that develop the political forces that
empower the political relations, because that is functional for the political
relations—‘the State-Primacy Theory’. [23]
*** IV
But does the State-Primacy Theory actually provide a plausible explanation of
epochal transitions? Well, consider the transition from feudalism to capitalism.
Robert Brenner has pointed to the growing need of feudal political relations to
develop their political forces. As he observes:
In view of the difficulty, in the presence of pre-capitalist property relations, of raising returns
from investment in the means of production (via increases in productive efficiency), the lords
found that if they wished to increase their income, they had little choice but to do so by
redistributing wealth and income away from their peasants or from other members of the
exploiting class. This meant they had to deploy their resources towards building up their
means of coercion by investment in military men and equipment. Speaking broadly, they
were obliged to invest in their politico-military apparatuses. To the extent they had to do this
effectively enough to compete with other lords who were doing the same thing, they would
have had to maximize both their military investments and the efficiency of these
investments. They would have had, in fact, to attempt, continually and systematically, to
improve their methods of war. Indeed, we can say the drive to political accumulation, to state building, is the pre-capitalist analogue to the capitalist drive to accumulate capital. [24]
And as Samuel Finer writes:
Military forces call for men, materials, and, once monetization has set in, for money, too.
To extract these has often been very difficult. It has become easier and more generally
acceptable as the centuries have rolled on .... Troops extract the taxes or the forage or the
carts, and this contribution keeps them in being. More troops—more extraction—more
troops: so a cycle of this kind could go on widening and deepening. [25]
And we might conjecture that when the state’s coercive capacity had been
developed to a sufficient degree, the political relations would have been able to secure the capitalist economic relations that succeeded feudalism. Moreover,
given the greater productivity of capitalism, it would be more functional for the
political relations than the preceding feudal economic relations. [26]
In a similar vein, Samuel Huntington observes with respect to European history
that
[t]he prevalence of war directly promoted political modernization. Competition forced the
monarchs to build their military strength. The creation of military strength required national
unity, the suppression of regional and religious dissidents, the expansion of armies and
bureaucracies, and a major increase in state revenues. [27]
In a word: ‘War is the great stimulus to state building .... The need for security
and the desire for expansion prompted the monarchs to develop their military
establishments, and the achievement of this goal required them to centralize and to
rationalize their political machinery’. [28] But this required new economic
relations—more productive ones—in order that state revenues could be increased.
So, as Huntington notes:
The centralization of power was necessary to smash the old order, break down the privileges
and restraints of feudalism, and free the way for the rise of new social groups and the
development of new economic activities. In some degree a coincidence of interest ...
exist[ed] between the absolute monarchs and the rising middle classes. [29]
Now, as the selection and then preservation of new economic relations that offered
greater revenue to the state would also serve the interests of whichever class most
benefited from the new economic relations, there would be a correspondence of
interests between what would become the new dominant class and those occupying
dominant positions within the political relations. But that would not make a dominant
economic class a ruling class. Rather, the contingent correspondence between state
interests and those of any dominant economic class is the reason why that class has the
appearance of being a ruling class. Importantly, the fact that states can act so as to
facilitate the rise of a new class that better serves state interests shows the notion of a
‘ruling class’ to be misguided.
But even more interesting, perhaps, than the transition from pre-capitalism to
capitalism is the transition from capitalism to post-capitalism. Recall the theoretical
dispute between Marx and Bakunin, outlined in Section II, above. Engels
characterizes the disagreement as follows:
Bakunin ... does not regard capital, and hence the class antagonism between capitalists and
wage workers which has arisen through the development of society, as the main evil to be
abolished, but instead the state. While the great mass of the Social-Democratic workers hold
our view that state power is nothing more than the organization with which the ruling classes—landowners and capitalists—have provided themselves in order to protect their social
privileges, Bakunin maintains that the state has created capital, that the capitalist has his
capital only by the grace of the state. And since the state is the chief evil, the state above all
must be abolished; then capital will go to hell of itself. We, on the contrary, say: abolish capital,
the appropriation of all the means of production by the few, and the state will fall of itself. The
difference is an essential one: the abolition of the state is nonsense without a social revolution beforehand; the abolition of capital is the social revolution and involves a change in the whole
mode of production. [30]
In other words, the introduction of egalitarian economic relations will ostensibly
suffice for problematic political relations to disappear, which is precisely what we
would expect Engels to argue, given the theoretical difference between Bakunin and
Marx.
But the disappearance of problematic political relations following the
introduction of egalitarian economic relations is certainly not what happened in
the 1917 Russian Revolution. But this is not because egalitarian economic relations
failed to arise. For they did: a form of egalitarian economic relations was introduced
in 1917 when the workers set up their own factory committees. But after Lenin
seized power late that year, he replaced those committees with ‘one-man
management’. And in 1918 he explained why: ‘All our efforts must be exerted to the
utmost to ... bring about an economic revival, without which a real increase in our
country’s defence potential is inconceivable’. [31] In other words, the political
relations selected inegalitarian economic relations (shaped by Lenin’s personal
admiration for Taylorism) that developed the economic forces so as to develop the
political forces, because that was functional for the political relations. But this is
precisely what the State-Primacy Theory asserts. Moreover, also consistent with the
State-Primacy Theory and wholly at odds with Marxist theory, the political
relations themselves became increasingly authoritarian. [32]
Ironically, then, an actual historical event that is near-universally regarded as a
Marxist revolution, by friend and foe of Marxism alike, seems patently to contradict
Marx’s theory of history. And this can only be because of Marx’s inadequate theory
of the state. It is far from surprising, therefore, that formerly committed Marxists
should have given up on their ‘grand theory’ and embraced postmodernism. But
given the explanatory power of the State-Primacy Theory, the relatively recent
widespread rejection of theory building was surely premature. For the historical
event that has proved so troubling to Marxist political theory simultaneously
provides clear corroboration for an alternative, anarchist theory.
*** V
But does anarchism have to rely on a State-Primacy Theory if its rejection of
Marxist-Leninist revolutionary practice is to be adequately grounded? As we have
seen, it seems quite possible that the political relations select economic relations
that develop the economic forces that develop the political forces, because that is
functional for the political relations. But it seems, in principle, possible that,
simultaneously, the economic relations develop economic forces that both
increase returns to those dominant within the economic relations and develop the
political forces that stabilize the political relations, because that is functional for
the economic relations insofar as they require those particular political relations
for support. Such a theory would incorporate two principal functional
explanations. Call a theory that incorporates more than one functional explanation
a ‘Multiple-Explanatory Theory’ or ‘Multiplex Theory’ for short. Call a theory that incorporates only two functional explanations a ‘Duplex Theory’. Would such
a Duplex Theory provide adequate grounding for the anarchist rejection of
Marxist-Leninist revolutionary practice?
It would appear that it would not. For even though inegalitarian political
relations might be able to select inegalitarian economic relations that were
functional for those particular political relations, if egalitarian economic relations
were able to select political relations that were functional for them, then
Marxist –Leninist revolutionary strategy might be justified after all. And this is
because egalitarian economic relations might well select egalitarian political
relations; and they might do so because they may well not require authoritarian
political relations to stabilize them.
So, if such a Duplex Theory will not suffice, let us consider a different Multiplex
Theory, for it also seems, in principle, possible that:
1. the political relations select and stabilize economic relations that develop the economic forces that develop the political forces, because that is functional for those political relations (as modelled in Figure 1); while, simultaneously,
1. the political forces empower political relations that select and stabilize economic relations that develop the economic forces, because that is functional for the development of those political forces (as modelled in Figure 2); while, simultaneously,
1. the economic forces develop political forces that empower political relations
that select and stabilize certain economic relations, because that is functional
for the development of the economic forces (as modelled in Figure 3);
and, simultaneously,
1. the economic relations develop economic forces that develop the political
forces that empower certain political relations, because that is functional for
those economic relations (as modelled in Figure 4).
***** Figure 2. A model emphasizing the explanatory role of the political forces.
[[a-c-alan-carter-anarchism-3.png f]]
Call such a Multiplex Theory containing four functional explanations a
‘Quadruplex Theory’. Such a theory is, at least in its effects, modelled in Figure
5, although it should be remembered that it is built out of the four complex
functional explanations modelled in Figures 1 through 4. Would such a
Quadruplex Theory provide adequate grounding for the anarchist rejection of
Marxist-Leninist revolutionary practice?
Here the answer would appear to be Yes. And this is because, while the
economic relations would have some power to develop different economic forces,
if those particular economic forces were dysfunctional either for the present
political forces or for the present political relations, then they would receive
support from neither (as represented in Figure 6). However, if the present political
relations were functional for both the present political forces and the present
economic forces, then they could expect support from both (as represented
Figure 7). In other words, the political relations would likely have more power to transform altered economic relations into those more suited to their requirements
than the economic relations would be of transforming the whole social structure. [33]
***** Figure 3. A model emphasizing the explanatory role of the economic forces.
[[a-c-alan-carter-anarchism-4.png f]]
***** Figure 4. A model emphasizing the explanatory role of the economic relations.
[[a-c-alan-carter-anarchism-5.png f]]
***** Figure 5. A Quadruplex Model.
[[a-c-alan-carter-anarchism-6.png f]]
***** Figure 6. Unsupported economic relations.
[[a-c-alan-carter-anarchism-7.png f]]
In addition, it would take a considerable period of time for the economic
relations to develop and introduce new economic forces, whereas the political relations, by enacting a change in legislation, could transform the economic
relations relatively quickly. This, too, indicates that the political relations would
be more likely to transform effectively any altered economic relations into ones
that are more suited to the needs of the political relations than the economic
relations would be of transforming the rest of society. Thus, such a Quadruplex
Theory provides clear grounding for the anarchist rejection of Marxist-Leninist
revolutionary practice, given that if egalitarian economic relations fail to provide
sufficient surplus to finance the development of the political forces that empower
the political relations, then the political relations will effectively transform those
economic relations into inegalitarian ones that would more likely provide
sufficient surplus.
***** Figure 7. Multiply supported political relations.
[[a-c-alan-carter-anarchism-8.png f]]
It should also be noted that Bakunin can not only be interpreted as writing in a
manner that is, to some degree, consistent with the State-Primacy Theory but also
be interpreted as writing in a manner that is, to some degree, consistent with
something like the Quadruplex Theory. For recall that he claims both that
‘[p]overty produces political slavery, the State’ and that the ‘[p]olitical slavery, the
State, reproduces in its turn, and maintains poverty as a condition for its own
existence’. [34]
*** VI
All this notwithstanding, there is a refinement that could be made to the
Quadruplex Theory that would enable it to provide even stronger grounding for the
anarchist rejection of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary practice. Thus far we have
only considered a version of the Quadruplex Theory that accords equal weighting
to the four component functional explanations (as modelled in Figures 1 through 4)
that combine to produce the theory as a whole (whose effects are modelled in
Figure 5). But if we had reason for according greater weight to the functional
explanation deployed by the State-Primacy Theory (namely that modelled in
Figure 1), then we would have even stronger reason for expecting the political
relations to play a reactionary role in replacing egalitarian economic relations with
inegalitarian ones that were more functional for the political relations than we
would have for expecting egalitarian economic relations to succeed in
transforming the whole social system into a truly egalitarian one. In short, it
seems, in principle, possible that:
1. the political forces tend to empower political relations that select and stabilize
economic relations that develop the economic forces, because that
is functional for the development of those political forces (as modelled in
Figure 2); while, simultaneously,
1. the economic forces tend to develop political forces that empower political
relations that select and stabilize certain economic relations, because that is
functional for the development of the economic forces (as modelled in
Figure 3); while, simultaneously,
1. the economic relations tend to develop economic forces that develop the
political forces that empower certain political relations, because that is
functional for those economic relations (as modelled in Figure 4); while,
simultaneously,
1. the political relations possess the *greatest explanatory power* within the
system in selecting and stabilizing economic relations that develop the
economic forces that develop the political forces, because that is functional
for those political relations (as modelled in Figure 1).
Call such a complex of functional explanations a ‘Weighted Quadruplex Theory’.
(Such a theory is roughly modelled in Figure 8.)
***** Figure 8. A Weighted Quadruplex Model.
[[a-c-alan-carter-anarchism-9.png f]]
One argument that might be marshalled in support of a Weighted Quadruplex
Theory is an argument that also supports the State-Primacy theory—one which we
encountered earlier, and which can now be developed further: Even if those holding
dominant positions within the political relations were extremely conservative with
respect to the economic forces, then, given that states are usually in military
competition with other states, they will face considerable pressure to select and then
stabilize new economic relations if they would be optimal for providing the state
with the revenue it needs to remain militarily competitive. And any state that failed
to introduce more productive economic relations would fail to survive against a
competitor state that had succeeded in introducing economic relations which, at that
period in history, were optimal for providing the state with revenue.
Hence, we can posit a Darwinian-style explanation for political relations
selecting economic relations that develop the economic forces that develop the
political forces not merely because only those states that, ultimately, succeed in so
doing will eventually survive in an environment of competing states but, in
addition, because states that are defeated by more militarily successful ones can
expect to have their economic relations transformed by the political relations of
the conquering state into ones similar to the economic relations selected and
stabilized by that state. As this is an outcome that any state will want to avoid at all
cost, even the most conservative of state personnel will have an interest in
selecting economic relations that are at least as functional for their military
requirements as the economic relations of competitor states are for their political
relations. In other words, we might think of the functional component within a
Quadruplex Theory that the State-Primacy Theory focuses upon exclusively as
determining ‘in the last instance’ the shape taken by modern societies.
But we could also provide Darwinian-style explanations for the other three
component functional explanations of the Quadruplex Theory. For if the political
forces did not empower the right kind of political relations, then economic relations
that developed the economic forces that developed those political forces would not
be selected and stabilized. And such political forces would then fail to survive as
independent entities in a world of competing states. (They may well end up being
incorporated into the political forces of a conquering state, for example.) Moreover,
if the economic forces did not develop the political forces that empowered the
political relations that selected and stabilized economic relations that were functional
for the development of the economic forces, then they would not survive in such an
environment, either. (For example, they might be replaced by economic forces that
were compatible with the requirements of a conquering state). Finally, if the
economic relations did not develop the economic forces that developed the political
forces that were capable of empowering the political relations, then those political
relations would equally fail to survive in a world of competing states. (And they, too,
might well be transformed by a conquering state into ones capable of selecting and
stabilizing the economic relations that were functional for that conquering state).
Thus, the economic relations that would tend to survive are those that are functional
for the political relations in a world of competing states.
In a nutshell, the political relations, the economic relations, the economic forces
and the political forces that survive will tend to be those that are such that, in the
last instance, the political relations select and stabilize economic relations that
develop the economic forces that develop the political forces that empower the
political relations.
*** VII
Interestingly, just as strong a support for the anarchist rejection of Marxist-Leninist
revolutionary practice could be provided by a Weighted Quadruplex Theory that
accorded additional weighting to the political relations only periodically. This
would be the case if there were reason to add weighting to the political relations at
times of revolutionary transition from one epoch to another, for it is precisely in
times of revolutionary transition that Marx believed that egalitarian economic
relations would transform the whole social structure. [35] If, during periods of
revolutionary transition, the political relations exercised the greatest power within
the system in selecting and stabilizing economic relations that develop the
economic forces that develop the political forces, because that is functional for
those political relations, then egalitarian economic relations that were dysfunctional
for the political relations would be unlikely to survive. Call such a complex of
functional explanations that accords greatest weight to the political relations during
periods of epochal transformation a ‘Temporarily Weighted Quadruplex Theory’.
(Such a theory would be roughly represented by switching from Figure 5—roughly
modelling stable historical epochs—to Figure 8—roughly modelling revolutionary
periods—and back to Figure 5 once the new epoch had been established.)
Now, there are several reasons in favour of a Temporarily Weighted Quadruplex
Theory, for according greater weight to the role of the political relations seems most
appropriate at times of revolutionary transition than within a stable epoch. Why?
Because of some of the ways in which revolutions can be of immense significance
not only for the society that is revolutionized but also for neighbouring states.
First, if a country undergoes a popular revolution, then it might succumb to a
revolutionary fervour to transform neighbouring countries in a similar fashion. [36]
And even if it did not, a neighbouring state might very well fear that a
revolutionary state on its borders would invade in order to transform the rest of the
world into its own image. Hence, a revolutionary state, simply by its presence,
provides reason for neighbouring states to militarize. But once its neighbours
militarize, the revolutionary state will, itself, feel threatened, and it, too, will feel
compelled to militarize. The development of the political forces will thus become
especially crucial during times of revolutionary transition.
Second, even if a state did not fear an actual military invasion from a
neighbouring state that had undergone a revolution, it might well still dread that
its revolutionary ideals would invade its society. In order to safeguard itself
from being infected by the ideals of its revolutionary neighbour, a state might
arm insurgents within the revolutionary society, or assist an invasion by émigrés,
or directly invade the revolutionary society. [37] This would provoke a revolutionary
state to develop its military capacity. Again, we have reason to hold that the
development of the political forces will become especially crucial during times of
revolutionary transition.
Third, the course of a revolutionary transformation of a state might well leave it
temporarily weakened. [38] If this were the case, then this would render a
revolutionary state a more attractive target for invasion by its neighbours than it
would ordinarily have been. But the fear of invasion by opportunistic neighbouring
states would compel a temporarily weakened revolutionary state to develop its
military capacity as fast as it could. Yet again, we have reason to hold that the
development of the political forces will become especially crucial during times of
revolutionary transition.
For reasons such as these, revolutionary transformations are likely to act as a
spur to increased militarization, both within and outside the revolutionary state.
But any such need to develop the political forces will require the development of
the economic forces. But the development of the economic forces requires
economic relations that are especially suited to developing them. Given a widely
perceived need to develop the political forces at such momentous times, those
located within the political forces, the economic forces and the economic relations
are likely to be unusually supportive of the political relations selecting economic
relations that develop the economic forces that, in turn, develop the political
forces. Hence, revolutionary periods might well require that greater weighting be
temporarily accorded to one of the four component functional explanations
comprising the Quadruplex Theory. But that particular component, namely the
one focused upon by the State-Primacy Theory, is precisely the one that best
grounds the anarchist critique of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary practice.
*** VIII
We can thus see that there are at least two related political theories that might well
prove to be independently compelling and that could be deployed by an anarchist
to ground a cogent critique of Marxism-Leninism. The State-Primacy Theory
performs that task well, but so, too, does the Quadruplex Theory, especially when
it takes a weighted or a temporarily weighted form. Moreover, given its arguably
greater explanatory power, the Quadruplex Theory might well come to command
more widespread assent than the State-Primacy Theory.
[1] See, for example, V. I. Lenin, *What is to be Done?* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1975) and V. I. Lenin,
*One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Crisis in Our Party* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1976). For a
critique, see A. Carter, ‘Marxism/Leninism: the science of the proletariat?’ *Studies in Marxism*, 1 (1994),
pp. 125– 141. On whether or not Marxism-Leninism constitutes a deviation from the politics of Marx and
Engels, see A. Carter, ‘The real politics of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels’, *Studies in Marxism*, 6 (1999),
pp. 1 –30.
[2] Bakunin’s politics developed, in part, in response to Marx, while Marx’s political thought developed, in part,
as a response to the anarchists Max Stirner, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Bakunin. As Marx’s correspondence
with Engels makes abundantly clear, he had a personal antipathy towards Bakunin that bordered on hatred.
[3] Frederick Engels to Carlo Terzaghi, draft written after 6th January 1872, in K. Marx and F. Engels,
*Collected Works*, Vol. 44 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1989), p. 293. Clearly, Engels was not alone in
holding this view, for Marx complained that ‘[t]he Central Committee surrendered its power too soon, to
make way for the Commune’. Karl Marx to Ludwig Kugelmann, 12th April 1871, in D. McLellan (Ed.)
*Karl Marx: Selected Writings*, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 641. For one example of
Marx’s authoritarianism, centralism and elitism, see K. Marx, ‘Address to the Communist League’,
in McLellan, ibid., especially pp. 305– 311.
[4] M. Bakunin, The Political Philosophy of Bakunin: Scientific Anarchism, ed. G. P. Maximoff (New York:
The Free Press, 1964), p. 217.
[5] See K. Marx and F. Engels, ‘The Communist Manifesto’, in McLellan, op. cit., Ref. 3, especially pp. 255–
256, 268–270. Also see F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring, Herr Eugen Dühring’s Revolution in Science*
(Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1976).
[6] M. Bakunin, *God and the State* (New York: Dover, 1970), pp. 31–32.
[7] See K. Marx, ‘On Bakunin’s *Statism and Anarchy*’, in McLellan, op. cit., Ref. 3.
[8] K. Marx, ‘Speech to the Central Committee of the Communist League’, in McLellan, op. cit., Ref. 3, p. 327.
[9] M. Bakunin, *Bakunin on Anarchy*, ed. S. Dolgoff (London: Allen and Unwin, 1973), p. 329.
[10] Bakunin, op. cit., Ref. 4, p. 218.
[11] And this is why Marx emphasizes that ‘[t]he executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing
the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie’. Marx and Engels, op. cit., Ref. 5, p. 247.
[12] Marx and Engels, ibid., p. 262.
[13] Marx and Engels, ibid. However, it has to be noted that Marx’s view underwent at least some revision later.
See ‘The eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’, in McLellan, op. cit., Ref. 3.
[14] Marx and Engels, op. cit., Ref. 5, p. 262.
[15] Thus the end is strikingly different from the means, for as Marx counsels: ‘The workers ... must not only
strive for a single and indivisible German republic, but also within this republic for the most determined
centralization of power in the hands of the state authority. They must not allow themselves to be misguided
by the democratic talk of freedom for the communities, of self-government, etc.’, Marx, ‘Address to the
Communist League’, op. cit., Ref. 3, p. 310.
[16] Bakunin, op. cit., Ref. 9, pp. 281–282.
[17] See G. A. Cohen, *Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), passim.
[18] Why include control over economic exchange as well as control of production? One reason is that perhaps
the most important exploitation today is that between the First World and the Third World. And that does not
seem to be adequately theorized in terms of control of production. See A. Carter, ‘Analytical anarchism:
some conceptual foundations’, *Political Theory*, 28(2) (2000), pp. 230 –253, here at p. 251, n. 9.
[19] Carter, ibid., p. 235.
[20] Carter, ibid., pp. 234–235.
[21] See Cohen, op. cit., Ref. 17, Ch. 9.
[22] See T. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 30– 32.
[23] For the fullest explication and defence of the State-Primacy Theory, see A. Carter, *A Radical Green Political Theory* (London: Routledge, 1999).
[24] R. Brenner, ‘The social basis of economic development’, in J. Roemer (Ed.) *Analytical Marxism*
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 32– 33.
[25] S. E. Finer, ‘State- and nation-building in Europe: the role of the military’, in C. Tilly (Ed.) *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 96. Also see
I. Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1974), p. 356.
[26] And it is worth noting that Marx himself accepts that the state, during the period of the absolute monarchy,
‘helped to hasten ... the decay of the feudal system’. Marx, ‘The eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’,
in McLellan, op. cit., Ref. 3, p. 345.
[27] S. P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968),
p. 122.
[28] Huntington, ibid., p. 123.
[29] Huntington, ibid., p. 126. For example, it has been argued that various European monarchies backed the
cities (where capitalist economic relations were developing) in order to subvert the power of feudal lords.
Put another way, the political relations backed a change in the economic relations because it was in their
interests to do so. Moreover, Michael Taylor argues that it was state actors who were responsible for
selecting new relations of economic control in France from the 15th century and this was due to their need to
obtain increased tax revenue because of ‘geopolitical-military competition’. See M. Taylor, ‘Structure,
culture and action in the explanation of social change’, *Politics and Society*, 17(2) (1989), pp. 115– 162, here
at pp. 124–126.
[30] Frederick Engels to Theodor Cuno, 24th January 1872 in Marx and Engels, op. cit., Ref. 3, pp. 306–307. It is
worth comparing Engels’ remarks here with the following statement he co-authored with Marx: ‘The material
life of individuals, which by no means depends merely on their “will”, their mode of production and form of
intercourse, which mutually determine each other—this is the real basis of the State and remains so at all the
stages at which division of labour and private property are still necessary, quite independently of the will of
individuals. These actual relations are in no way created by the State power; on the contrary they are the
power creating it’. K. Marx and F. Engels, ‘The German ideology’, in McLellan, op. cit., Ref. 3, p. 200.
[31] V. I. Lenin, *The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), p. 6.
[32] See, for example, M. Brinton, *The Bolsheviks and Workers’ Control 1917–1921: The State and Counter-Revolution* (Detroit, MI: Black and Red, 1975).
[33] See A. Carter, ‘Beyond primacy: Marxism, anarchism and radical green political theory’,
*Environmental Politics*, 19(6) (2010), pp. 951 –972.
[34] Bakunin, op. cit., Ref. 9, pp. 281 –282.
[35] One reason why Marx presumed that egalitarian economic relations would succeed in
transforming the rest
of society is his belief that ‘the whole of human servitude is involved in the relations of the worker to
production, and all relations of servitude are nothing but modifications and consequences of this relation’.
K. Marx, ‘Economic and philosophical manuscripts’, in K. Marx, *Early Writings*, trans. R. Livingstone and
G. Benton (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975), p. 333. Put another way, ‘the economical subjection of
the man of labour to the monopolizer of the means of labour, that is, the sources of all life, lies at the bottom
of servitude in all its forms, of all social misery, mental degradation, and political dependence’. K. Marx,
‘Provisional rules of the International’, in K. Marx, *The First International and After*, ed. by D. Fernbach
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), p. 82. It is also worth recalling at this point Engels to Cuno, 24th January
1872, op. cit., Ref. 30, pp. 306–307.
[36] Possible examples are the periods of the Napoleonic Wars and the rise of fascism.
[37] Candidate examples being Cuba, Nicaragua and Granada, respectively.
[38] Russia immediately following the 1917 Revolution presents itself as an obvious example.