In the panorama of studies of Stirner there are many silences — silences that, as often happens, communicate more than words. One such silence surrounds Stirner’s reflections on the theme of interpersonal relationships, reflections that form a genuine theory of life together. As is known, his considerations on relationships are contained in that section of *The Unique and Its Property* entitled “My Intercourse.” Stirner attributed great importance to the description of the relations that the Unique maintains with others, as the vast amount of space he dedicates to the topic shows (it is in fact the largest section in the book). Nonetheless, “My Intercourse” has been and is perhaps the least explored part of Stirner’s work. In any case, it is the least understood; a misunderstanding that Stirner himself already emphasized in the response to the critiques that Szeliga, Feuerbach and Hess had made of *The Unique and Its Property*.¹

¹Max Stirner, *Stirner’s Critics*
In my opinion, a deep examination of the question of relationships in Stirner means not only studying what may be the most important part of his thought, but also confronting Stirner’s most significant themes from an anarchist point of view (a point of view that obviously doesn’t exhaust their complexity). “My Intercourse” contains his description of property (thus the critiques of the state, of Proudhon and of the communists), associative proposal of the union of egoists (thus the judgment of the party, society and, more generally, hierarchical order), and the distinction between rebellion and revolution (thus the difference between demolition and the reformation of what exists).

For the same sort of reasons, it would be useful to spend some time on some of the more important and recurrent criticisms of Stirner’s conception of relationships. In fact, though Stirner’s thought is the object of such criticisms, much of their content could be referred more generally to any conception that radically affirms the centrality of the individual.

In Stirner, the awareness is clear that an extreme defense of individuality itself, before being a way of life, is way of understanding. When Stirner, drawing off Protagoras’ motto, maintains that “the individual is the measure of all things,” he means precisely that. One cannot understand his way of thinking about relationships between Uniques, if one doesn’t first understand his way of conceiving the world of the Unique. In the same way, one cannot understand the coming together of individual owners — the union of egoists — if one doesn’t first understand what Stirner means by individual owner. “Everyone is the center of his own world. World is only what he himself is not, but what belongs to him, is in a relationship with him, exists for him.

It’s important to note that both the Italian word “unione,” which Passamani uses, and the German word “Verein,” which Stirner uses have no connection whatsoever to labor unions. — Translator’s note.
“Everything turns around you; you are the center of the outer world and of the thought world. Your world extends as far as your capacity, and what you grasp is your own simply because you grasp it. You, the Unique, are ‘the Unique’ only together with ‘your property.’”

In my opinion, this passage summarizes The Unique and Its Property as a whole. Stirner’s way of understanding relationships between individuals, meaning mutual utilization, is only its logical and necessary consequence. Affirming that everyone is the center of his own world means denying any sort of authority and hierarchy, insofar as they claim to impose their centrality, and imposing a perspective different and opposed to that of the individual, despoil him of his property.

Emphasizing the universality of uniqueness (in the sense that everyone is unique), Stirner does not set himself as the center, but as a center. Thus, uniqueness is closely connected to mutuality.

When Stirner speaks of a world, he means the collection of relationships that the Unique maintains with those other than himself, be they things or persons. The centrality with respect to the world is therefore centrality with respect to his relationships, and these latter being the “mutuality, action, commercium among individuals,” we see once again how centrality and mutuality presuppose each other.

If everyone is “unique” only together with his “property,” then everyone is “unique” only together with his relationships (with his world). The term uniqueness therefore excludes absoluteness, in that absolute — ab-solutum — means precisely the lack of relationships, of connections. Thus the critique made against Stirner that he transformed the I of Fichte into an equally absolute individual collapses. In fact, the Fichtean I, like Feuerbach’s human being, is an essence outside of the partic-

\[3\text{Stirner, op.cit.}\]
\[4\text{Max Stirner, The Unique and Its Property, in “My Intercourse.”}\]
cular individual, not the flesh and blood individual, “transient and mortal.” It is a transcendent being that presupposes perfect community among human beings, whereas Stirner speaks of a Unique whose community with others is only thinkable, not real. In reality, we, as Uniques, are irreducibly different. We come to be equal only if we pose a “third,” external and transcendent — like Humanity, God or the State — that mediates relationships between us. And hierarchy consists precisely of this “third”; I no longer value the other for what my relationship with him is, meaning what he is for me, but rather in relation to an entity that contains us and links us together.5

If everyone, as unique, is exclusive and exclusivist, his existence cannot incline toward community, but rather toward one-sidedness. No longer having anything that unites us, we no longer have anything that separates us or makes us enemies. In fact, “the opposition disappears in complete — separateness or uniqueness.”6 It is precisely the awareness of our one-sidedness (of having our own perspective) that allows us to rise up against hierarchy, against the order of dependence on which every state is based, and to lay the foundations for a new associative form — the union — based on radically different presuppositions. “Let’s not seek the most comprehensive community, ‘human society,’ but let’s seek in others only means and organs that we use as our property!”7

In the “reduction” of the other to means, some have wanted to see a defense of exploitation8, the negation of every form of non-conflictual relationship, the legitimation of a war that opens the way to “collective suicide.”9 If one instead inserts it into Stirner’s conception of the world, one realizes that it is can guarantee liberty and those who instead affirm that from liberty alone can order be born.

It is a matter, if you will, of the eternal conflict between synthesis and balance, between authority and liberty. And there should be no more doubt about where to place Stirner in this conflict.

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5It’s no accident that Stirner emphasized the mediating nature of the state seen as one of the greatest expressions of hierarchy.
6Ibid., in “My Power.”
7Ibid., in “My Intercourse.”
8M. Hess, The Last Philosophers.
9Albert Camus, The Rebel.
Well, you are still wrong, because there are only slaves: where no one obeys, no one commands.”

Stirner notes how domination and hierarchy, along with (or perhaps before) being a structuring of inter-individual power, are forms of intra-individual alienation, the process of internalizing the “sacred.” It is in social customs, seen as forms of the “compulsion to repeat,” that he identifies the continuous reproduction of alienation.

Thus, between individual owners who refuse subordination before any social order — with its customs, its models of behavior — the only possible relationships are those based on the — contrived, precarious, and always changeable — balance between the egoisms of individuals. Associative relations cannot be based on the imposition of a fictitious equality, nor can a higher synthesis be created between the individual powers. Stirner radically negates any theory of the identification of the individual with the collectivity, of the supersession of the individual in the social. Every individual conscious of his uniqueness will always be ready to rise up against any attempt to settle, through whatever form of authoritarian “fixed idea,” the antagonism between individuals. Rebellion, then, is not just a transitional phase from society to the union, but rather an attitude of constant insurrection against every power, against every heaven, that debases one’s inalienable exclusivity. Without a continuous, extremist of one’s autonomy, there could certainly be a revolution, but it would still just be a reform of the existent.

At the basis of Stirner’s ideas on relationships, there is the clear awareness of the irreconcilability between the conception of those who hold that only the establishment of order

the only form of relationship that doesn’t deny the centrality of the individual and that is based on real mutuality.

The typical form of religious alienation consists in attributing value to a person or a thing in the absolute sense, meaning independently of our relationship to it. The belief in a being that has value in itself and for itself, thus, worthy of our “enthusiasm,” absolutely interesting (i.e., an interesting object without and interested subject), presupposes the ideological “fixed idea” of a hierarchical order. In fact, I can consider a person absolutely deserving of love, respect, etc., only if I don’t consider her for herself, but place her in relation (and thus subordinate her) to a higher being — let’s say God, the state, or society — and consider as “part” of it. Thence, it is not the particular individual in its unrepeatable uniqueness with whom I enter into relationship, but rather the citizen, the member of society.

Contrarily, seeking the value of every thing and every person within and not outside myself, I affirm my centrality in relation to the world, to my world. In this way, “If I cherish and care for you, because I love you, because my heart finds nourishment in you and my desire finds satisfaction in you, this is not for the sake of some higher being,... but out of egoistic pleasure: you yourself with your own being have value to me, because your essence is not a higher being, is not higher or more general than you, is unique as you yourself, because you are it.”

The awareness of one’s egoism, thus of one’s use of the other, comes to be the only way of recognizing and appreciating his value, those properties of his that, even though they don’t exhaust his uniqueness, communicate something — however non-essential — about him to me. And being, as I said, mutual use, each individual, each Unique, is the beginning and end of his relational activity.

10Stirner, The Unique and Its Property, in “The Possessed.”
Precisely because, even from a biological point of view, I cannot take as a reference anything different from myself; what is other than me, I can only think of (and for Stirner, thought in its universality cannot grasp the peculiarity of the bodily and momentary) as subject, but in the very moment that it crosses my path, it exists for me, and all that I seem to owe to it, I owe only to myself. Saying therefore that “For me you are nothing but my food, even as I too am fed upon and consumed by you,” is not the expression of a paranoiac desire to crush (a relationship between “ruminants” as Kuno Fischer described it), but rather a calm affirmation of our centrality and our one-sidedness.

It is important to note how Stirner, when he states that “we have a single relationship with one another, that of *usability*, utility, use,” he emphasizes again and again the mutuality inherent in such relationships (as opposed to the hierarchical relationship that, posing absolute values, negates it).

If I consider the other as “an object for which I may feel something or also nothing, a usable or non-usable subject,” with which to get on and reach an agreement “so as to increase my power through this alliance and be able to succeed, by uniting our forces, where one alone would fail,” I realize that it is not only a matter of a mutual utilization, but also of a utilizable mutuality.12

The deliberate stress that Stirner places on the usability of the relationships that the Unique maintains with the other only aims to emphasize how in the relationship between individual owners there is a mutual interest in the person and not, as morality and religion claim, a mutual renunciation. Real love, as opposed to idealized love, is a self-interested emotion and not an act of self-denial. In fact, “we want to love because we feel love, because love is pleasant to our heart and our senses, consists of the pleasure of prevailing over others, i.e., the effort of escaping a condition that one perceives as equality. If, instead, one is aware of one’s own exclusivity, of one’s being irredubly different from every one else, one can only reject the craving for “superiority” as a homogenizing principle. The power of which Stirner speaks is the capacity to place oneself before others as an individual, without having recourse to the “convenient bulwark of authority.” In fact, one is quite weak (and incomplete) if one must summon (or needs to be) an authority.40 Only in the negation of authority can the individual reject the alienated life of the docile, usable citizen, the ruler’s subject who leads an existence that moves to the rhythms of service.

There’s no need to emphasize how many similarities there are between Stirner’s union and anti-authoritarian associational conceptions. It’s no accident that the anarchist thinkers who have most consistently harked back to Stirner are the ones who have perhaps contributed the most to the description of acratic contractualism. The notion — for example — of ”the method of equal liberty” recalls much that is close to Stirner’s thesis of the equal inequality in the relations between Uniques.

Drawing on a theme already developed by E. de La Boetie, that of voluntary servitude, Stirner affirms that “When sub-servience ceases to be, it will be all over rulership as well!” and after proposing insurrection as the sole solution to the “social question,” he adds in reproach: “If the rich exist, it is the fault of the poor.” A few years later, the anarchist Bellagarigue wrote: “Have you believed that up to today there have been tyrants?

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11Ibid., in “My Intercourse.”
12The preceding passages are all to be found in “My Intercourse” in Stirner’s book.
40Stirner’s refusal of the principle of authority is contained in the essay *The False Principle of Our Education or Humanism or Realism.*
41I am referring specifically to Benjamin Tucker, Stephen Byington and Emile Armand.
The Unique of whom Stirner speaks is not moved in her relations with others by the "pleasure of being rude" that characterizes Dostoevsky’s character from the underground. What drives her is not at all the need for the impossible of that inexorable *appétit d'être* that leads Camus’ Caligula to state that “One is always free at someone else’s expense.” Also foreign to Stirner is that fear of death which, in Canetti’s account, the sultan of Delhi is striving to defeat when he decides to raze the city to the ground in order to enjoy an instant of that “solitary *uniqueness*” that comes from the “feeling of having survived all men.”

Stirner “doesn’t defend the power of the individual to dominate others.” since he shows in an extremely significant way that the exercise of domination is a strongly de-individualizing practice. And since “whoever has to count on the lack of will in others in order to exist, is a shoddy product of these others, as the master is a shoddy product of the slave” domination comes to be a form of individual disempowerment. And this disempowerment is also accompanied by a process of alienation in that the force of the individual gets subordinated to the proof of the inferiority of others. The desire to dominate

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13 See Dostoevsky, *Notes from the Underground*; Camus, *Caligula*; Canetti, *Power and Survival*. Stirner’s influence on Dostoevsky’s characters, as well as on Camus’ *The Rebel and Caligula*, have been pointed out by other authors. For the Dostoevsky-Stirner connection, see R. Calasso, “The Artificial Barbarian” in *The Ruin of Kasch*; J. Carroll *Breakout from the Crystal Palace: The Anarcho-psychological Critique: Stirner, Nietzsche, Dostoevsky*; F. Andolfi, *op.cit.* For the Camus-Stirner connection, see F. Andolfi; G. Penzo, *Max Stirner: la rivolta esistenziale* (Max Stirner: The Existentialist Revolt); R. Escobar, *op.cit.* But it seems to me that no one has pointed out Canetti’s references to Stirner. And yet in his way of presenting the figure of the sultan, it seems to me that there is a clear reference to Stirner.

14 J. Carroll, *op.cit.*

15 Max Stirner, *The Unique and Its Property*, in "My Power.”

16 According to Camus, a “désir de domination” is what drives Stirner (see *The Rebel*).
ing of society — as Proudhon himself does — as a collective sub-
ject, as an “ethical person,” means condemning the particular indi-

gual individual, in the name of a religious general interest, to one
of the worst forms of despotism. The Unique doesn’t want to be
made the object of collective ends, becoming a tool of society,
but rather considers society as one of his means. As B. R. Tucker
rightly maintained: “Society is not a person nor a thing, but a re-
lation; and a relation can have no rights,” nor — I would add —
can it impose duties. But since, for Stirner, established society
cannot block the individual from making value of herself, nor can the future societies promised by socialists and communists expropriate him of his property, the separation from the social order must be so complete and decisive as to “bring about the end of separation itself” and be overturned in federation.

In the union of egoists, exploitation (“assertion at the ex-
pense of others”) is eliminated as soon as the co-associates,
equally aware egoists, “no longer want to be such fools as to
let anyone live at their expense.”

In a careful reading of Stirner’s thought, it also seems obvi-
ous that one cannot associate the interests of the Unique with
liberal utilitarianism. Bentham’s arithmetic of pleasures still
consists of a belief in a thing that is interesting in the abso-
lute sense, meaning a belief in a “sacred” thing. And we know
how for Stirner, any behavior toward something as interesting
in itself and for itself is always religious behavior.

For Stirner, self-interest is not a principle, it is “a mere name,
a concept empty of content, utterly lacking any conceptual de-
velopment.” In the eyes of our philosopher, “the moral system
of self-interest condemns the real self-interest of particular in-
dividuals, in much the same way as the supposed universality
of reason forces ‘private reason’ to submit.”

From this obviously incomplete picture I’ve drawn of rela-
tionship and association as found in Stirner one can, I think,
understand how it isn’t possible to transform the union of ego-
ists into a bellum omnium contra omnes that does nothing but
again propose the domination of human being over human be-

18Before Stirner, the American anarchist, Josiah Warren, summarized his
thought using the formula of “individual sovereignty” as opposed to the
liberal formula of “popular sovereignty,” the foundation of the 1776 dec-
laration of independence. Not randomly. The ideological appearance of
domination always revolves around an abstract collective being; thus, the
only way to eliminate archism in all its forms is to bring the notions of lib-
erty, autonomy, independence back to the particular individual. The ba-
sis of all modern dictatorship is represented by Rousseau’s “general will.”
It could only be something concrete if it was the product of all the indi-

gual wills. But for Rousseau, the general will is not the will of everyone,
but rather something transcendent, right and infallible, independent of
individual wills. Appropriately, Rocker described it as a form of political
Providence. The Jacobin, marxist and Nazi dictatorships are merely dif-
ferent methods for using the same instrument of power: the cult of the
general good. The usefulness of Stirner’s thought for demystifying the
hierarchical blackmail of the democratic system seems obvious.

19Benjamin Tucker, Individual Liberty.

20Stirner, The Unique and Its Property. In the same way, Warren maintained
that the sole terrain on which acratic relations can be established is that
of “disassociation, disunion, individualization.”

21Stirner, Stirner’s Critics

22Marx and Engels portrayed Stirner’s thought as the final, degenerated
landing-place of liberal utilitarianism. See The German Ideology.

23Stirner, Stirner’s Critics.

24Ibid.

25F. Andolfi, “Egoismo e solidarietà sociale: riflessioni su Stirner” (“Egoism and
Social Solidarity: Reflections on Stirner”), in Nietzsche-Stirner, pg. 163.

maintains that if one had a more aware egoism, one would take
into account that “cooperation is more useful than isolation”
and that the abandonment of “competition” — that hidden con-

flict, as mediated by the state — is nothing but a response to a
higher feeling of our uniqueness.

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be, between existence and essence. Precisely by not creating a new heaven, a new mission, Stirner holds that the contents of the union, the rules of play, will be the exclusive property of the Uniques. If Stirner’s “political” dimension can seem like a utopia, it remains, as the relational world of the Unique, thence of a “who” that cannot be described, an “empty” utopia.

The one-sidedness, the separateness of each Unique still remains (or rather, only becomes complete) in the union. Thus, one cannot make uniqueness correspond with isolation. The individual who associates is no less an egoist than the one who prefers to “stand alone”; what changes is the object of her egoism.28 If one unites with others, it is because he finds in their company a reason for interest, for enjoyment. If one prefers to isolate himself, it means that human beings no longer have anything to offer her. “Remaining is no less egoistic than isolating oneself.” The distinction is therefore not between egoism and non-egoism, but, if you will, between a “poor” egoism and a “rich” egoism. “One who loves a human being,” Stirner says, “through this same love is richer than another who doesn’t love anyone,” since she has one more “property.” Stirner’s egoism is thus full participation in life, in relationships with others.

Alongside the charge that he wanted to “atomize” individuals, the charge that Stirner, with his union of egoists, limits himself to proposing only a variant in terminology of capitalist society, a mirror image, however extreme, of the bourgeois order,30 also shows all its inconsistencies. Stirner, after showing the ideological “glue” of capitalist society is humanistic morality (an internal “sanctimonious priest” who preaches sacrifice),

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28 Isolating oneself and associating are only different forms of relationships. Even solitude — Ortega y Gasset maintained — is a relationship, in which one participates in the form of absence.
29 Stirner, Stirner’s Critics
30 This is Moses Hess’ thesis, taken back up by Marx and Engels in The German Ideology, and later repeated by (almost) all marxist scholars who are interested in Stirner.

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21 See ibid., in “My Intercourse.”
the differences between a form of relationship that guarantees to everyone the expression of their exclusivity (and doesn’t limit their freedom except with those rules that are inherent to the relationship itself)\textsuperscript{22} and a communitarian order which — as something sacred — is based on subjection and the lack of individual self-valorization.

Since the union, unlike society, the state or the church has no existence autonomous from the particular individuals who compose it, its duration is determined by the interests of the “participants.” It is therefore a “unceasing coming-back-together” as opposed to the “already-being-together” typical of (and foundational to) every hierarchical relationship. A “taking-part” in a game to which one contributes to establishing the rules, as opposed to a “being-part” of a social order that presents itself as authority and imposes its laws.

The union is not only an alternative to society, but also a tool for rising up, for rebelling against hierarchy, authority, the state (a word which Stirner often uses to indicate the entire existing order). Considered both as a relational form and as a counter-association, the union is closely connected to rebellion.

If “my egoism has an interest in liberating the world so that it becomes — my property,”\textsuperscript{23} the demolition of what exists, the overturning of given conditions, while being inevitable consequences of rebellion, don’t exhaust my incentive for insurrection, which is the only way to affirm my centrality in the world, and thus in my relations. Without insurrection I cannot create relations that are not mediated, by God or by the state, “mutual relationships such that everyone..., in these relationships, can be truly what he is.”\textsuperscript{24} Equally, without my egoistic will to rise up, the union against authority and hierarchy ceases to be my tool and ends up becoming — “just as from a thought a fixed idea arises” — a higher being, a party. Only a form of relationship that affirms the uniqueness of the particular individual is able to avoid reproducing the order of dependence within itself. The Unique cannot oppose hierarchy through a means — the party — that is only “a state within the state,” “a ready-made society” for which he is supposed to renounce his own individuality.

This battle can also take place with “millions of people together,”\textsuperscript{25} what matters is that the multitude is not transformed into the subject, into that “all” which preserves the traits of transcendence and, thus, of mediation. What opposes mutuality — the Mann gegen Mann\textsuperscript{26} relationship that, alone, can confirm uniqueness — to hierarchy is not the number, either positively or negatively. In fact, and I think this is very important, a “collective” dimension (in the sense of I+I+I…) with an individualistic character can be created, just like an individual dimension with a collectivist and alienating character can be created. What distinguishes the defense of individual autonomy from the formation of domination is the associative method. But Stirner, when he speaks of the relationship, of the union of Uniques, refers only to the “form” of such relations: a form that is able to guarantee the centrality of each one. “For Stirner, going beyond the ‘formal’ moment means going back to creating spooks, legitimizing domination, making space for the magic circle,”\textsuperscript{27} meaning that moment of alienation that gets created in the dichotomy between being and having-to-

\textsuperscript{22}The limits consist in relational, not moral, obligations, methodological obligations, not duties.

\textsuperscript{23}The Unique and Its Property, in “My Intercourse.”

\textsuperscript{24}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{25}So much so that there have been those who, by jerking his thought around quite a bit, have made of Stirner a precursor of revolutionary syndicalism.

\textsuperscript{26}In German in the original. Literally “man against man.” — Transalator’s note.