Cyprus, the National Issue and Nationalism
A Libertarian Analysis

PLEASE NOTE: You may republish part or all of this document, provided that the source is mentioned, which is: “FILLA PORIAS”, Issue No. 4, published by Leonidas Christakis, Athens 1984.

it is published — issue by issue — without the obligation of a regular date. Responsible for their publication and circulation: Leonidas Christakis. P.O. Box: P.O. Box. 21028, 114 10 ATHENS.

bibliographic note

Most of the writings before ’74 on Cypriot history are classic nationalist texts with the main aim of convincing people of the Greek identity of Cyprus. It is a history where everyone adds and subtracts what they like, since the goal is well established in the social imaginary. Not that these stories are completely stupid or a bunch of lies. But it is precisely in these histories and texts that you have to look behind the words and between the silences. There is of course Hill’s history (which as far as I know is not translated yet), which is quite interesting, but of course it has its own biases and the problem of interpreting foreign consulate documents that Hill uses a lot. From ’74 onwards (and in the context of the crisis of the Greek-Christian imaginary), several works with interesting elements start to come out. Several books are also being written abroad both on recent events and on the more modern history of the island. (I am using two or three extracts from one such book “Cyprus: a case study”, written by various scholars of Cypriot reality).

The bomb that is Graikos’ “History” explodes in 1980. Mr. Graikos, an AKEL supporter and one of the intellectual fathers of the Neo-Cypriot consciousness, by collecting various information and making a “Marxist” critical analysis of the classical nationalist texts, proposes a historical foundation-justification of the Neo-Cypriot consciousness and the Cypriot state. The positive thing about Graikos and those who followed him is that he brings together various elements and builds another pole vis-à-vis the Greek-Christian one, which can also lead to the birth of a discussion-study on Cypriot history. Apart from this, the history of Graikos needs its own critical interpretation, since here the goal (ideological-historical support of the Cypriot state and of AKEL) determines the analysis and presentation of events.

This text is an attempt to intervene beyond the two poles (Greek-Christian — Neo-Cypriot). The elements, which support my historical analysis, come partly from a critical analysis of what the above ideologists or historians cite. And I mention all this in case anyone is willing to look at the sources, but also so as not to create any illusion that the following analysis is based on a history that has been fully written. Cypriot history as facts, documents and evidence is only now being discovered and written. We note this, so that anyone reading this text or anything else on Cyprus may retain their doubts and reservations.

And one last note: various topics (e.g. education, state, etc.) appear in various analyses — this is not a repetition. Rather, it is an attempt to bring out the dimensions of a phenomenon in its totality and to look at the interactions of various structures.

Not dedicated to Makarios or the heroes of EOKA

This text was written with the main aim (and hope) to provoke some dialogue through disagreements and exchanges of views. From this point of view, it is a personal attempt to form some kind of reflection and critique on Cypriot reality. Within the framework of a libertarian analysis, which places class structure, patriarchy and the state as the main social contradictions, an attempt is made to construct an alternative reflection on the historical and contemporary Cypriot reality. The centring on nationalism is done because this ideology has had and continues to have a decisive influence in Cyprus, and as I try to show in the first part it has played and continues to play a decisive role in the development of various groups and individuals in the non-institutionalised left. And to a certain extent, this is the milieu to which the text is addressed, which is why there are also several references to Trotskyists and Marxists. Not because they have played or are playing a decisive role in Cypriot reality, but because they are the only counter-positions that this ‘milieu’ has offered and has been offered. Now, to tell the truth, I don’t expect any substantial response from the pure blooded Trotskyists or Marxists, since they don’t seem ready for anything other than pressuring you to agree with them.

The hope for a response goes more to people who are positioned in the libertarian milieu, or to those who are unaffiliated and wandering. Beyond the hope for some discussion, the text does not offer itself as the positions or final conclusions of any group or individual. This is an exploration, it is neither a history textbook nor static political positions. The only useful political function this text can serve is to be overcome.

Methodologically, one might get the impression from reading this text that I am proposing a critical analysis, based on the structural dynamics of power relations, with minimal influence from those in power either as groups or as individuals. And this is possible, by the very nature of the text-critique of the ideological hegemony of nationalism and the processes it promotes. In this context, the emphasis falls asymmetrically on structural changes. My understanding, which is evident in various parts of the text, is that structural changes are results of the dialectic between the autonomous dynamics of power structures and of those subordinated to them. In other words, the present evolution is the result of the prevalence of power, insofar as this evolution was determined by the need to eliminate or assimilate social conflict. The dynamics of structures are altered by the intervention of people, and an analysis of today’s reality as a whole (and not only of nationalism) must look at the hidden contradictions in structures as a result of previous social conflicts that were defeated. Another point to emphasize in this context is that the defeat or assimilation of social conflict in different historical periods is not inevitable. That is, the historical course could have been different if the subordinated won in the social conflict. This is why I call structural changes the “defeat of social conflict” — unlike Marxists, I don’t think capitalist or state-socialist modernization is the inevitable path of social evolution.

A special note is also needed on the role of the individual in these processes — if nothing else, because the tendency to avoid responsibility of the individual is predominant in Cyprus. The victimization and simultaneous exoneration of the Greek Cypriot community after ’74 is typical of this funny, as well as sappy, tendency to avoid responsibility. Blame the imperialists, the Turks, EOKA B, the whole world except the “poor”, “as it should be” Cypriot normie. In fact, alongside all of them, a large part of the responsibility lies with the Greek Cypriots as individuals. For 14 years they sat on their eggs or ran like sheep to the rallies, and in the coup most of them went home even though they ‘knew what would happen next’. The responsibility is immediate and the only way to avoid it is to blame it on others or “divine fate”.

And some preliminary clarifications on terminology and dealing with various issues:

By the nature of the subject, but also because of the alienating separation of knowledge, there was a constant problem from the beginning, that the text should not become an exercise in intellectual self-gratification. I have made an attempt to more extensively articulate various issues at a few points, to avoid clichéd expressions that need a dictionary to be understood. On another level, I have tried to avoid substituting familiar terms (e.g. neo-colonialism, national issue, etc.) even though my understanding of a topic may be slightly different or even often contrary to common usage. The term “national issue” is an example. Although I question the term “nation” itself, I use the expression “nationa issue” to express general dangers facing a group of people. Further, the wording of expressions such as Cypriots, Greeks, Turks, etc. is used in the everyday sense of the term, people who reside in an easily distinguishable geographical area (e.g. Cypriots) or who reside on the borders policed by the homonymous state. Although one could (and to a certain extent I think rightly) accuse me of reproducing alienation in the language in this way, however, I think that at this stage there are important things to discuss rather than getting bogged down in terminology.

And a final note on the choice of topics:

1. Although there are sporadic references to Turkish Cypriots and Turks, when the text deals with nationalism, it basically refers to the Greek Cypriot variant. Apart from the outward hysterics of Turko-centric nationalism, very little is known about the processes it has promoted within the Turkish Cypriot community, in Turkey and the power groups that have promoted and are promoting it.

2. There are certain topics, which, although extremely important (e.g. the divide and rule policy of the English in the 1950s, the American interference and the financing of the CIA, etc.) are not much mentioned. And the reason is simple. These topics have been so much analysed (every year there is a book or a bunch of articles on them) that it would be pointless to repeat them. I repeat, however, that these are given in this analysis.

3. Various topics (e.g. education, state, etc.) appear in various analyses, this is not a repetition. Rather, it is an attempt to bring out the dimensions of a phenomenon in their entirety and to look at the interactions of various structures.

Although the responsibility for the final opinions is of course mine, however, in shaping the ideas and writing, I had a lot of help from 4–5 people who for various reasons might not want their names here.

And one last note for Cypriot pro-Enosis Marxists: the fact that our views differ diametrically and that there is a (strong or not) criticism of their views in the text, it would be a complete mistake to misinterpret this criticism of political positions as a criticism of the morality and consistency of these people.

Useful terms

AKEL — Progressive Party of Working People, the Communist Party.

EDEK — Socialist Party of Vassos Lyssarides.

DISY — Democratic Rally led by Clerides and a party covering the space of the old Unionists [Enosis].

DIKO — Democratic Party, led by President Kyprianou and for now the “Party of the State”.

TMT — Terrorist Turkish Cypriot Nationalist Organization.

EOKA — “National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters”, struggle of ’55-’59.

The terms “Neo-Cypriots” and “Neo-Greek-Cypriots” are used in the same sense, since the mass expression of identification with the Cypriot state is expressed at the level of the Greek Cypriot state and consciousness.

short historical outline

~ The reference to the events is made in relation to the following analysis ~

1571 The Turks occupy Cyprus from the Latins. In the early years, trying to gain access to the island, they treat the Orthodox favourably. Their administration thereafter depends on the rulers of the day and the various phases the Ottoman Empire goes through. There are various pro-Latin revolts at the beginning, which diminish with the passage of time.

1660 The church becomes co-administrator, if not actual governor of Cyprus, with the granting of special privileges by the Sultan. There are local rebellions by members of both communities.

1765 Joint mass uprising of Orthodox Christians and Muslims under the leadership of Khalil agha (governor of Kyrenia) against the economic misery and the new taxes imposed. The rebellion is crushed by troops sent from outside. It should be noted that during this period Muslims show more pronounced tendencies to revolt, perhaps because there is strong downward class mobility in their community.

1804 A new uprising begins as a common one among the popular strata. The intervention of the church, which mediates the arrival of troops to suppress it, creates intercommunal antagonisms and incidents.

1821 Greek revolution and settlement of accounts between the elites. Archbishop Kyprianos is hanged.

1833 Three uprisings (of Theseus, monk Ioannikios and Gavür Imam) that start from popular discontent with the economic situation. There are attempts at cooperation between the various “leaders”. Gavür Imam occupies Paphos for 4 months. This is followed by repression with troops coming from outside. Ioannikios and Gavür Imam are executed. Theseus escapes through foreign consulates.

1878 Cyprus is ceded to England. The English restructure the administration of the island on a political basis and slowly lay the foundations of the modern state. At the same time there is a rapid rise in education. In the meantime, the first calls for Enosis [union with Greece] begin to be made by bourgeois intellectuals and the church. The Turkish Cypriot elite calls for a return to Turkey.

1900–1910 Church crisis with multifaceted implications. Intransigent nationalists vs. moderates, bourgeois vs. clergy, metropolises vs. archbishopic, etc.

1912 Intercommunal incidents in various villages and towns at the time of the Balkan wars. Although the incidents were not massive, they nevertheless show that nationalism is becoming entrenched and divisive. The first (even small) movements of inhabitants out of their residences in 2–3 villages take place.

1914 England annexes Cyprus (until then Cyprus had theoretically belonged to Turkey and England administered it by special agreement) and proposes to Greece Enosis so that the latter can enter the war. Greece, with a pro-German government, refuses.

1926 Crushing defeat of the intransigent nationalists in the elections. Formation of the CPC (Communist Party) by intellectuals and workers. Though fiercely persecuted, the party gains some influence in some areas.

1931 Oktovriana [October Incidents]. Popular uprising against the new taxes. The uprising quickly takes on an Enosis character. The English respond with repression.

1931–1940 The English impose a dictatorship and proceed with the effective establishment of the receptive Cypriot state. It is within the framework of the bureaucracy, which is created during this period, that the interests of various elites (bourgeois, gentry, etc.) converge. The oppression of Greek-Enosis nationalism makes it an anti-colonial symbol.

1941 The English relax the dictatorship. AKEL is founded by illegal cells of the CPC, liberal politicians and popular strata. AKEL appears as an inter-communal party (although it too has Enosis as its goal). At first it looks like a broad popular movement against colonialism, the old bureaucracy (the “appointed ones”) and social inequality. The degeneration is gradual but rapid in the years to come.

1943–1947 Period of intense mobilisation of AKEL and of its spectacular rise. It crushes the right in the municipal elections and elects Leontios as archbishop, with a large majority.

1947 Leontios dies soon after his election. The new AKEL candidate loses the election in a climate of increasing polarisation and mass fraud. The English propose a constitution of self-government. AKEL tries to achieve abstention and calls on right-wing leaders to resign from government posts. The right of course refuses and AKEL takes part in the talks which fail. Thus, AKEL already has a double defeat. It fails to gain access to both centres of power in Cyprus (the church and the state). Although AKEL followed a tactic of national “popular-front unity” even then, since ’47 it puts this line above all else and follows the choices of the power centres, looking for the right opportunity to establish itself in their eyes and gain access to them.

1948 Period of intense strikes. The English, the church and the right mobilize against the last mass movement of class conflict. Many strikes are intercommunal. Despite small material gains, the defeat is decisive. The defeat in the factory and on the street ensures the imposition of the AKEL leadership on large layers of the popular strata. The party’s political choices become the only hope for these strata who want to get out of misery and defeat. In the same year and under the influence of the civil war in Greece, a frightening polarisation of left and right is created in Cyprus, the effects of which are still evident. Different football clubs etc. are formed. While the Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot rift is barely discernible, the left-right rift erupts sharply and breaks the Greek Cypriot community in two. The hatred between left and right has for many years been much more intense than that between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.

1949 New leadership in AKEL. The slogan is emphasised: ENOSIS AND ONLY ENOSIS with any Greek government. The new leadership of AKEL is the same one that exists today and which of course does not want to hear about Enosis.

1950 Referendum on Enosis. 97% of Greek Cypriots voted for Enosis. While the signatures were being made public, 15,000 Turkish Cypriots demonstrated against Enosis in Nicosia.

1955 The EOKA struggle begins. The struggle goes through several phases. Makarios is exiled to the town of Mahé in the Seychelles Islands, which were under English colonial rule. There are repeated truces. Some of the most liberal members of the EOKA are heroically killed (and under strange circumstances of betrayal). Afxentiou, Matsis etc.

1958 Grivas and the Terrorist Turkish Cypriot Nationalist Organization start assassinating leftists and afterwards there are widespread intercommunal riots with unprecedented, for the relations between the two communities, massacres. The English are fostering division in the usual divide and rule manner.

1959–1960 The Zurich-London agreements are signed and the Cypriot state is declared. During the signing, the English, in order to put pressure on Makarios, revealed to him that they knew where Grivas was hiding in Cyprus.

1963–1964 The Constitution does not function smoothly, while nationalists from both communities form task forces. Makarios tries to revise the Constitution. The Turkish Cypriots refuse. In late ’63, clashes break out in Nicosia. There are widespread massacres of civilians. Sampson, the post-coup president, leads the massacres of Turkish Cypriots in Omorfita. Turkish intervention is threatened and clashes break out from time to time. (August ’64, clashes in Tillyria). The end of ’64 finds the Turkish Cypriots confined to ghettos, while their elite leave the government.

1967 New clashes instigated by Grivas in Kofinou and Agios Theodoros. There are again accusations by Turkish Cypriots of violence against civilians. Meanwhile Makarios begins to promote theories of “feasibility”. Enosis is the goal, but the practical aim at the moment is independence.

1968 The first moves against Makarios by right-wing extremists begin.

1971 EOKA B is formed by Grivas and a guerrilla war begins with bombs, assassinations, kidnappings, reverse state violence and reverse violence against members or followers of EOKA B. The junta’s support of EOKA B is well known and the factionalism of Athens was also at work in Cyprus. It appears from published CIA documents that there was also an American funding of anti-Cypriot activities.

1974 Coup d’état — Invasion. Occupation of Northern Cyprus by the Turkish army. The war lasts very briefly. Mass exodus of Greek Cypriots to the south.

1977 Death of Makarios.

The crisis continues.

The text is divided into 4 parts:

1. The first is an attempt at a first approach and clarification, analysing the function of the national issue, and of nationalism on the general development and constitution of the Greek Cypriot far left. It is to some extent also a personal journey that leads to this text.

2. The second part is an introduction to the real dimensions of this phenomenon that could be called the national issue.

3. The third, which is perhaps the largest, is a critical analysis of Greek Christianity (and by this I mean all the ideological fanfare of Greekness, whether it is called that or is described in more sophisticated terms) as an ideology of the historical approach to the Cypriot context and as an ideological cover for various processes of reconstruction of power structures (class structure — patriarchal politics — state centralization). This text is at the same time an attempt to analyse the historical developments of the last decades.

4. The last part is a critical analysis of Greek Cypriot consciousness.

1. The “national issue”, the far left and “milieu”

The “national issue” (which in this case expresses the occupation of Northern Cyprus by the army of the Turkish state and the “plots of the imperialists” against us) has been a key pole of reference of the Cypriot far left, which has timidly emerged after ’74 and which for some parts of it is still of course the PROBLEM.

In a first phase, immediately after ’74 and in a situation that smelled of general upheaval, the slogan of “conscription” of society, for a “popular defence” etc. was raised. Talking about a far left movement at this time is a bit of a stretch, of course. But the first processes had begun among various individuals and groups, both within EDEK, which strongly expressed these currents at that time, and among AKEL members and unionists. It is also the period of efforts to constitute the CPC.

EDEK, which also had the tradition of “resistance” to the coup, expressed for a time this willingness to reject any compromise with timid proposals for state socialist measures, in the face of the policy of social peace and appeasement adopted by AKEL and the state.

The contradictions of the ideology of conscription as a panacea for all problems (external and internal) did not take long to appear. The bourgeois, Makarios, the state, AKEL, used the same logic, but for exactly opposite goals. The workers accepted not only the freeze, but also the reduction of wages, the refugees were appeased, the whole society started to take the path of conformation again within the framework of “national unity” for the long-term struggle.

In the end, the argument of the promotion of entertainment and social peace was identical to that adopted by the “subversives”. Yes, we need “conscription”, but conscription without “national unity” is not possible, and of course “national unity” and “social conflict” are mutually exclusive.

The contradictions of the EDEK1] as soon as it was forced to take a “responsible” position were indicative of the situation. In this context (and with the simultaneous decline of some of the “militant” mood that existed among the youth), frustration, and the realization that much of that whole ideology of “conscription” was determined by the ruling ideology, led several individuals to reject the whole issue. In particular, the realization of our personal misery (sexual, psychological, etc.) led to a rejection that carried with it a demand for a life that seemed completely unrelated to the political schizophrenia of the politicians. Of course this development was not general. Within EDEN a “rearguard battle” continued for a time, until the party left all pretext behind and threw out the Trotskyists, “entryists” and other leftists en masse.

“Aristeri Pteriga [The Left Wing]” followed its own disintegrating course afterwards, to finally leave the “pure-bloods” to publish “Sosialistiki Ekfrasi [Socialist Expression]“. “Conscription” still plays a key role in this group, only now charged with a more explicit “class” and at the same time “internationalist” component. The issue for them is to unite with the Turkish Cypriot workers and to take on the bourgeoisie and the occupiers all together in unity.

In the spectacular “left-right” polarisation, the Trotskyist spokesmen have aligned themselves with the so-called left (AKEL — EDEK) and have tried to “re-revolutionise” it with their entryism and party units[2].

From another point of view, various individuals passing from the effort for the reconstitution of the CPC or other Marxist-Leninist groups or carrying an Enosis tradition or discovering the light of truth in Psyroukis, jumped to the other extreme, and started looking for the revolutionary subject among the far right unionists[3]. This milieu presented at one stage an interesting intervention, as it brought together people from the left (but not from AKEL) and from the former far right, thus presenting itself as an attempt to break the whole spectacular left-right polarisation. However, it was a game played on the ideological sophistry of the AKEL-Enosis polarisation. AKEL once supported Enosis, e.g. which means that Enosis is a demand of the popular movement (hence revolutionary) and that the popular movement was revolutionary at the time. In these contexts the national issue held the key status, but at the same time it had new dimensions. These Marxists put the problem of Enosis as a national problem and made various attempts to tie it to the occupation and the “imperialists”. In a first step they argued, for example, that the coup and the invasion would not have taken place if the Union had taken place. In a newer step, the view of “what’s done is done” was thrown out, but because the “Turkish bourgeoisie” is aggressive, the only way to save ourselves is Enosis (even if it is a double one).

What is amazing about this situation is the impression that something terribly new has been discovered. In fact, apart from the Marxist sauce that adorns the arguments, the substance is essentially the same as what we have all heard thousands of times in the schools of Greek-Christian education. As for dual Enosis, which is going to become a revolutionary solution for some, it was proposed by the Turkish state since the 1950s and by the Americans since ’63.

The phenomenon has its funny side, especially when Trotskyists or pro-Enosis Marxists complain that the “Cypriot people” have lost their historical memory. There is, however, a serious — and sad — side. The far left, born and still trying to survive with the national issue as the PROBLEM, has made itself comfortable under the sun of Cypriot ideology and the imaginary left-right polarization. Arteriosclerosis, scaremongering and national, social, class, etc. unity created two more shops of this ideology.

The group that publishes the magazine[4], which anyway belongs to the libertarian space — not the leftist one, having taken a clear, negative position on the reduction of the national issue as the most basic problem of our existence, found itself in a dead end when it started an attempt to analyse the Cypriot reality two years ago. Given the lack of many in-depth libertarian analyses of such situations and the complete lack of any evidence in Cyprus to draw on, the search often turned into ‘sailing’.

This text — which may well be another ‘sailing’ — emerged from last year’s discussions as a first attempt at some kind of analysis. At the same time, it also expresses a personal opinion of mine on the disagreement, expressed within the group, as to whether it is worth dealing with nationalism and the national issue.

First of all, some clarification of terms is needed. “National issue” expresses a problem facing a set of humans (people, nation, etc.) regardless of the internal divisions (communal, class) and the power relations of this set (class, patriarchal, state). The problem usually stems from external intervention, dependence, exploitation, etc. Thus, e.g. the invasion of the Turkish state in ’74 affected refugees as a whole, regardless of the power relations that had previously defined them ( the recreation of the same relations is another story).

Nationalism in any form projects this problem as the main and defining problem of all social life. Nationalism answers the national problem at the level at which the problem is posed. Ignoring internal divisions and power relations, it tries to put forward a resistance to an unknown, threatening Other. In this sense, nationalism reproduces, promotes and institutionalizes in new contexts already existing power relations.

Nationalism functions as a status quo ideology within society. To some extent, this is also due to the frequent discovery and projection of an Other within the country[5], e.g. traitors, conspirators, etc. It is a practical method for the state to get rid of any nuisance, while at the same time intensifying the pressure on society for unification-homogenization, suspending social conflicts and leveling out differences.

However, the equation “nationalism” is bullshit, oversimplifies the situation and avoids the problem. Because apart from the fact that nationalism is presented as at least an alienated response to a nonetheless real problem, there is also the fact that people take the issue seriously and believe it. The appeal of nationalism as an ideology reflects to some extent the importance of the problems it tends to address. But at the same time, this resonance is tied to the power relations that permeate society and are reproduced by nationalism.

In this context, the distinction between the “national issue” and nationalism is important. The national issue must be seen in its real dimensions as a real problem, while nationalism as an ideology needs to be analysed and criticised in order to be able to articulate an alternative discourse.

But not to confuse things, what I’m essentially saying is that the “national issue” is a problem imposed on us by various power structures (internal and external). Nationalism is the ideology that institutionalizes the problem internally, projecting it distorted through the power structures that exist. If there is an immediate need, it is to revalorise the national issue and critique nationalism, so that we can see the true dimensions of the problem and how much it concerns us.

Nationalism is an ideology that legitimizes the status quo, but to understand it, you have to try to analyze it, not exorcise it. Criticism of ideology, no matter how exhaustive it has to be, must at some point find reality and will need to propose alternatives. This, of course, does not mean that we will immediately run with magic recipes, getting into the rhythm of power, “if it were us we would do this” or “this is what must be done”. Instead, a critique of reconstruction may be needed (and in Cyprus this is what is needed after all). A critique and activity on specific issues that will allow the creation of an autonomous space and discourse. But a critique that will know that as long as its discourse and its counter-power cannot counter those of the institutionalised voluntarism at all levels, it will be more or less captive to the power of the state and other mechanisms in times of crisis. In a war, the solution will be to flee or fight under the state for the state. And for a refugee the dilemma will be played between who will return and how strong the central state will be.

2. dimensions of a problem that can be called national

Speaking today about the Cyprus problem — or the national issue- there is often a sense in the discussion of things being “self-evident”. And yet, this “self-evident” aspect is not at all obvious if one looks at what the “national issue” has meant for various groups of people in this area over the last decades.

For the Greek Cypriot far right, for example, it was not only the demand for Enosis, but also a strong anti-communism and anti-Turkism, for AKEL suporters it used to express an anti-colonial struggle with an extension of Enosis, while after independence the problem moved to the need to protect the Cypriot state. On the other hand, for the Turkish Cypriot far right, the problem was expressed more as a struggle against the “Greeks and the communists” and of course between these extremes there was a whole range of other confrontations (the danger of the Greek or Turkish state depending on the community or faction to which each belonged, imperialism, etc.).

This mosaic of approaches to the national issue is characteristic both of the complexity of the issue and of the ideological charge of nationalism, which, by fragmenting reality and its problems and projecting its separated fragments on the imaginary level, has laid and continues to lay the foundations of Cypriot ideological hegemony.

We will deal below with the ideological (and structural) function of nationalism. For now, we will attempt a brief analysis of the “national issue” in this geographical area, trying to see its real dimensions. In this context, the analysis is not limited to “communal or national” boundaries — a term I find quite questionable anyway, as seen elsewhere in this paper, when its interpretation identifies large groups of people with the nations and states that police them.

The national issue (or the Cyprus problem) expresses (for the purposes of the following analysis) the dangers that the communities of people living on the island of Cyprus face from ‘external forces’. Ostensibly, some ‘external dangers’ appear to favour some communities or political factions (e.g. Enosis or the Turkish invasion) or even the whole (e.g. tourism). However, with the international institutionalization of nation-states as local mechanisms for the structuring of social power and of imperialism-neocolonialism as an international structuring mechanism, the relatively short-term benefits of a community from state or imperialist intervention gradually take on a negative flavour in the face of the leveling and exploitation of the ‘former protectors’. Short-term gains gradually become long-term wounds. The experience of Greek Cypriots before the coup and Turkish Cypriots after the invasion is typical in this respect. In this context we will look at the “national issue” on 3 different levels.

1. The problem of the strategic — geographical space of the Middle East.

2. The neo-colonial dependence.

3. The imperialism of the Greek-Turkish states in the Cypriot area and the competition between them.

1. the strategic space (Middle East), the interventions and peace

This seems an issue solved and overblown before we even start. Cyprus in the Middle East, oil, the Arab-Israeli conflict, American machinations and so on. Although this analysis has enough truths, it nevertheless has a deliberately limited field of vision (which is basically reinforced by our tearful solidarity with the Arab states and their chauvinism and in the absolution of Russian imperialism for what is going on in the region). The aim of course for the Russians and the Americans is oil and political control of the region. In this context, the role of Cyprus remains what it has been since the English took over the island, an extreme “gendarmerie station”, helping whoever owns it to police their dependencies and prevent opponents from entering the region. The crucial role that this geographical location has played in the modern history of the island (in terms of foreign interventions, direct or indirect) is quite obvious. The English bases and the American radars are typical of these developments. Cyprus for the moment is a gendarmerie station of Western imperialism.

However, this is where we need to start to clarify things, because this is where the similarity of analysis with that problematic (so dear to our leftist “anti-imperialists”) ends, which, seeing the above, draws its line of confrontation with “American and Zionist imperialism” and places us on the side of “Arab anti-imperialism” etc.

Seeing the fate of the Palestinians (slaughtered for 30 years by Israel and the Arab states), the fascist structure and ideology of the Arab states, the growing expansionism of Israel (and of course not only Israel) and the intensity of the competition between the superpowers, there is a sense that the problem does not fit into the comfortable and beloved clichés of “good and evil” that have suited and suit the left.

The problem is not simply “Western imperialist intervention”, but the whole game of superpower competition. Furthermore, the states of the region themselves have started to develop a relatively autonomous imperialism (within the framework of their growing economic power), which makes the situation in the region even more explosive and at the same time, of course, leads to an increasing oppression within themselves, showing in this process the real face of nationalism in this region.

In a first consideration of the issue there is a need to take responsibility. Because when 30–40 miles from your house there are bombs that can blow up the whole region, or radars that guide one faction in these massacres called wars in the Middle East, you have a responsibility for your tolerance. Still, when you sell hypocritical support (as the Cypriot state does), expressed in practice by heroizing every dictator of the Arab states and Soviet imperialism, you are in fact avoiding the problem and your responsibility.

This view (tolerating practically the use of your space by one opponent and tearing your ass apart in favor of the other) so characteristic of Cypriot ideology, makes guilt comfortable to a certain extent, while at the same time seeing the world in black and white, avoids any reflection[6].

However, beyond the moral responsibility and the ideological needs served by avoiding reflection on what is happening in the Middle East, there is another dimension to the issue. For the strategic interests of the superpowers, we belong to the Middle East and, consequently, developments in this area directly determine us. It has already been mentioned that the West’s interest in Cyprus stems to a large extent from its geographical position. In this context, Cyprus will continue to be the target of direct or indirect intervention by the superpowers depending on developments in the Middle East. For the time being, AKEL and the DISY express a balance on indirect interventions. The suppression of even a basic “political dialogue” (even within the framework of a bourgeois democracy) or even the determination of their position on the Cyprus problem according to the interests of their patrons is a typical aspect of the results of these interventions.

These interventions, however, express only one aspect of the problem, beyond which there is a basic issue of physical survival. The over-armament of the states in the region, the vital interests of the superpowers and the volatile situation that prevails create serious risks of generalised war. Any dictator can declare even more stupid wars than the one between Iraq and Iran. And in a generalised war, Cyprus, as an enclave of one coalition, could become a battlefield for the missiles of the superpowers and their minions. And in this context, it is chilling to think that 65%[7] — at least — of Cypriots vote for affiliate parties that if they were in power alone would fill this place with the missiles of their patrons.

In this context, there is an immediate need for an autonomous peace movement, opposing both the two imperialisms and the nationalism-imperialism of the states of the region. The danger of war has become so real and its technology so dangerous that the problem of peace has become a basic problem of “natural survival” for the peoples of the region — and in this respect I can place it in this category of problems which I call “national”.

2. forms of “neo-colonial” dependence

The increasing bureaucratisation of professions, foreign financial aid as a permanent support for the economy (in exchange for our wandering whining)[8] and the touristification of everything interconnectively create another form of dependency — neo-colonial dependency.

Before we go any further, however, we need to make one thing clear, because there is a critique (quite popular on the far left), which in its anti-consumerist fury gives you the impression for hours on end that it would prefer people to be hungry, rather than stupid consumers.

For me at least, the fact that the standard of living has gone up dramatically, the fact that people are not freezing their asses off, is both pleasant and positive.

However, this rise in living standards and the resulting consumerism became not only an end in itself and a mechanism for the reproduction of the spectacle, but also eliminated any trace of economic self-sufficiency and autonomy.

With the war in Lebanon we are slowly becoming a centre for “offshore businesses” (already the government announced last summer that this is one of its objectives after granting a licence to 4 international banks in two months). Our already over-stretched bureaucracy is getting a new boost as offices of European firms are popping up everywhere. The aftermath of this development has already begun to be seen at home, an arteriosclerosis of all thinking, an intensification of conformity in the context of being ‘settled’.

In the international arena, the evolution is more underlying and of a longer term. Losing all productive capacity, this island is totally dependent on international capital for its economic well-being. It is a form of dependence that does not need “gunboat politics” to convince it of its will. Economic blackmail will work just as effectively.

And if the economic competition between European and American capital becomes intense in the region, we will be one of the possible centres of a conflict. And to the extent that these international interests serve not only the bureaucracies of their party-dependencies, but also economic elites, they create external pressures and blackmails, but also internal tensions (DIKO and the DISY seem to a certain extent to be predetermined schemas of these conflicts). And of course, no one should underestimate the Soviet economic interests, expressed in a network of private and state-owned enterprises and transactions, and of course the central role of AKEL as an intermediary. The economic aid[9] which largely set us on our feet after ’74 has an ambiguous character. It was useful in the short term, but the fact that this economy has learned to live with these injections of stimulus in the long term creates such problems of dependency that our choices as a society are limited to the level of how many steps we take on the tightrope of our various (and often rival) benefactors. Tourism is a third aspect, an aspect of this problem that, while helping us economically, has also created a network of dependence and bondage to the various metropolitan centres.

With tourism, of course, various internal problems are already starting to be seen with the destruction of the natural environment, fenced beaches etc.

The peculiarity of tourism is perhaps the fact that the selling off of this area is taking place in broad daylight before our eyes. (Of course, tourism also has an enormous social impact as a lever for modernization. However, the analysis of this aspect and of tourism in general and its ideological function would require a separate analysis-discussion). In this complex set of problems, which increase dependency and at the same time rape the internal social and physical space, there is no alternative — except a stupid anti-tourism, as if tourists are to blame for our bullshit. Not to mention the fantasies of the pro-Enosis Marxists who see the root of evil — where else — in the non-realisation of Enosis. You see, the Greek state would have reservations about making us a resort island (as the Cypriot state is doing now).

3. Greece — Turkey — Cyprus

The Greek state (like the others created in the region with the gradual disintegration of the Ottoman Empire) for most of its modern history was characterised by a strong tendency towards geographical expansionism. Of course, this expansionism always had the cover of “liberation of ancestral lands” and Cyprus was of course no exception. State expansionism (which is both an expansion and a process of centralisation of the structure of the state) goes hand in hand in these contexts with an attempt at cultural leveling that crushes the autonomous cultures of various communities, integrating them into the homogenised ‘national culture’ of the intellectuals of the state. Below is an analysis of the negative effects of these processes within the community and their role in the formation of ideological hegemony. For now it will express a “cultural imperialism” of the Greek state towards the Cypriot communities.

Beyond the ideological and structural function of expansionism, there was also an economic dimension to the interest in Cyprus. The island (almost on the coast of the Middle East) began to become increasingly important, as Greek shipping capital gained an increasingly decisive position in the economic life of the country. Cyprus could have been a unique centre of traffic and trade for the ships and businesses of the shipowners. At the same time, in Cyprus the reconstituted ideological hegemony managed for a time (1930–57) to mobilise large masses through the nationalist imaginary. The Greek state, however, bound by its dependencies and internal pressures, was unable to take advantage of the opportunities (1914, 1945) and when it was finally half-dragged by those it had intoxicated with fairy tales in Cyprus, all it could do was to patch it up as it did in Zurich. Turkey’s entry into the Cyprus conflict in the 1950s began to complicate the problem, gradually creating tension between the two states, tension that took on new dimensions after ’74 and extended beyond the Cyprus problem, into the Aegean, etc. In the context of the evolution of the structures and ideology of the two states, the Cyprus problem acquired at times a particular function (either as a space of expansion or as a space of ideological discharge and cultivation of hatred towards the objectified Other, the enemy of the race).

In this context, the national issue is expressed at four (at least) levels:

a) On the one hand, it exists as a problem of expansionism and state annexation. By this problem, however, I do not mean the risk of annexation of one state (Cypriot) by the other (Greek). The prospect of nation-state creation is an inherent characteristic of nationalism and as such creates the problem of denying any liberating edge of nationalism. The prospect of the state denies the self-determination of communities and as such is (for me at least) a negative phenomenon in any form. However, annexation by an already large and constituted state increases the leveling, exploitation and dependence on the metropolitan centre. ’74 was largely the result of that period when Cyprus resembled a colony of the ‘national centre’ of Athens and Ankara, depending on the community[10].

b) On another level, the cultural leveling promoted by the metropolitan centre not only destroys regional cultures, but also sets the basis of the ideology that undermines all cultural development. The ‘province’ exists as a relic of the past or as a tourist resort.

c) Furthermore, the possibility of state annexation or intervention has always been a central problem for the community that would be the loser of this development. Greek Cypriots have never been concerned with what Enosis meant for Turkish Cypriots. When they did get an answer (at least from a portion of that community) it came out sour. ’74 turned things around, so that Greek Cypriots are now the ones in danger.

d) Another aspect — perhaps the most immediately dangerous — of the problem is the aggravation of Greek-Turkish relations (both for real differences and for internal consumption). However, the way the problem is now positioned, a conflict between the two states for any (external or internal) reason will certainly make us their battleground.

And in such a conflict, apart from the fate of the defeated community, there will again be a problem of survival for all. Ultimately, those who survive after the napalms will hang around in the ruins. A rather interesting aspect of the Cyprus problem is the autonomous dynamic that the problem has acquired (as an ideology) among many people in Greece. And of course, the Cyprus problem and its “national” dimension are but parts of the ideology of “national integration”, which the Greek state has been nurturing since its birth. But the important thing is that the self-sufficient perspective of the ideology among Greeks has always been an easy way of political abuse and exploitation. Thus, the Greek left has played on these feelings in order to emerge from its defeat and present itself as more royal than the king in its proclamations. The “refusal to accept the Zurich agreements” etc. is indicative of the political level at which the matter was played out.

The interference of the Cyprus problem in the Greek political scene was both harmful and disorienting. It was the issue that politicians have always used, either to criticize and gain support without touching other “taboo” issues or to draw people’s attention “beyond the Aegean” and the danger from the “barbarians”.

The junta had played this card heavily and for a while after ’74 the issue seemed to have been abandoned by politicians. But the election of Papandreou quickly changed the scene. The new prime minister came to Cyprus and started selling “co-partisanship”, “struggle” etc. There was nothing new in the story — he just went to play along like others before, anticipating what was in store for him during his years of administration. The Cyprus issue could be a relief valve to unemployment, policing, crisis etc. In the end, he did not succeed, at least for now. He was outflanked by the Cypriot statists when he got in their way. Papandreou’s move, however, shows that although Turkey has the initiative on the island, the return of the Greek state to the conflict is not at all unlikely. (The joke of the affair was the incomprehensible hymns that were being sung at the time by pro-Enosis Marxists about Papandreou and Chrysostomos, a bit prematurely of course, but you never know what might happen.)

If there is an immediate need in this context, it is the development of a dialogue for understanding and peace, a language between people, different from that of the three states (Greece, Cyprus, Turkey).

3. the Greek-Christian — Enosis nationalism and its function

1. ideological components — hellenism as a phenomenon

The “Greek-Christian History”, which has been served to us for years by the intellectuals of the state and of “social peace”, has been based on two main axes.

α) The existence and uniqueness of this phenomenon called “hellenism”.

b) In a conception of history as a straight line, extending from antiquity to the present, and whose unchanging essence was the phenomenon of “hellenism”. In this context, the relationship between the people who were supposed to embody this phenomenon (hellenism) and other peoples and cultural groups was a surprisingly asymmetrical one. The Greeks were “civilizing” or “liberating”, while the rest of the world was corrupting or “barbarically conquering” this now metaphysical phenomenon.

The racism of these views is more than obvious to those who want to see it. It was the same kind of candy that was sipped by those who organized the massacres of Turkish Cypriots in ’63 and ’67. And of course, this bullshit is neither a discovery nor unique to our Greek Christians. What is, however, particularly interesting, and which has a key ideological function, is the linear relationship that is suggested to exist between antiquity and the present. This is because it expresses one of the main components of nationalism — the tendency to level cultural and other differences both temporally and socially — and the simultaneous denial of the opposing interests and perceptions that divide different groups of people within the power structures that govern their relations. Thus, for Greek Christians, various conflicts (local, cultural, etc.), even apparently mutually exclusive concepts, ways of life and philosophical tendencies express parts of a whole, of hellenism.

With various intellectualist stunts, everything is put in the same bag, — along with the aphorisms, of course, for those who still don’t fit us today as “corrupt” etc. The natural and obvious question in the face of this construct is simply: why so? That is, why this whole? Why this area, which the modern geography of states calls “Greece” (which after all includes areas that the “Greeks” of antiquity considered barbarians) and not the Balkans, the Middle East, etc.?

Of course, it is no coincidence that the basic defining element of this whole is its state.

The rise of nationalism on the European and then on the international scene is intertwined with the rise of the modern state and the modernisation of other power structures (class relations, patriarchy, etc.)

2. the pro-Enosis Marxists

Before proceeding to the specific case of Cyprus, it is useful to mention the pro-Enosis Marxist perspective (at least at its theoretical level), which seems to propose a more sophisticated view of the issue.

“The ethnogenesis of peoples begins when the social life of humans begins. But nations begin to crystallize as a complete historical category in the period of decline of the feudal middle ages.”

Ignoring the fact that his views are based on Stalinist definitions (of the nation, for example), and this fact alone (the Stalinist basis of the analysis) should raise concerns for the analysis itself, which smells of a stale Marxism, Psyroukis basically proposes that in the course of ethnogenesis the bourgeoisie gradually loses the leadership of the struggle and it is taken over by the proletariat (who else?).[11]

As far as the Greek area and the Cyprus issue are concerned, Psyroukis finds that this issue becomes a crucial issue for the national liberation struggle of hellenism. As another pro-Enosis Marxist says in summary:

”…the Cyprus problem is the condensation of all the contradictions of Greek society and the regime of subordination and decadence…“[12].

According to this position, the struggle of the Cypriots against colonialism and imperialism (embodied by England) becomes the struggle of the Greek people for independence. The bourgeoisie, which is selling out Greece to foreigners, is betraying the struggle of the Greek Cypriots. (Typical cases for Psyroukis are the refusal of the English offer in ’14, the condemnation of the Oktovriana by Venizelos and the non-inclusion of Cyprus in the “national processes” in ’45.)

Thus, the bourgeoisie loses the leadership in the struggle for ethnogenesis and it must be taken over by the working class. In this context, Enosis could not be achieved simply by ceding the island to Greece. On the contrary, the demand of Enosis (a demand that expresses the dynamic of Greek ethnogenesis and the anti-imperialist struggle of the nation) has an explosive dynamic that overturns the balance and challenges imperialist-capitalist dependence.

And Psyroukis observes that in the 1950s the Cyprus problem was the issue that challenged the nationalist right and gave a new impetus to the movement of the Greek left. And in Cyprus, in the 1940s, AKEL was at the forefront of the struggle for Enosis. Here then, always according to Psyroukis, is the working class slowly taking the lead in the struggle for ethnogenesis.

From a first point of view, it seems that here we have some distinctions (albeit class distinctions) within the flattening unity of the nation. It is, however, disappointing to see that this is only on the surface. Psyroukis is doing his own leveling. Following the Bolshevik analytical formula, Psyroukis sees a worker-peasant alliance led, of course, by the proletariat (through its party). The problem with all of this is that essentially, apart from the evil bourgeois, everyone else belongs to this imaginary unity, called the Greek nation, which has common interests and goals and essentially the historical necessity of national integration.

And the results are that Psyroukis does not ultimately escape from the framework of the classical ideology of hellenism. He ignores or does not take into account the differentiations of various social and cultural groups. There is also here the metaphysical concept of hellenism as a timeless entity (but evolving historically) and that the stumbling block in the Cyprus issue must be overcome in order to complete the national necessity. Of course, in this hypothesis the idiosyncrasies and dispositions of people are relatively indifferent to the interpreter and ideologist of historical necessity. Regardless of what Cypriots think they want, their duty and destiny are historically determined. Psyroukis and various pro-Enosis Marxists, for example, insist to this day on the ‘50s slogan “Self-determination — Enosis”.[13]

The slogan is funny and contradictory, because if Cypriots had self-determination today they would not of course choose Enosis. And yet the slogan is kept within the ideology of historical necessity and “national destinies”. The only way to recognize the decision of the Cypriots as correct (and as self-determination) is when they choose Enosis. Otherwise, Cypriots don’t know what is happening to them. A younger pro-Enosis Marxist tells us this very clearly:

”…but the Cyprus problem is too serious a matter to be left in the hands of lawyers, just as it is too serious a matter to be left in the hands of the Cypriots“[14].

Of course, when we talk about hellenism and its historical necessities, we are going to be concerned with what the Cypriots have say?

To a certain extent, Psyroukis grasps a contradiction, but it is overdrawn and belated. The Cyprus problem acted as a catalyst for developments in Greece in the 1950s. What it essentially did was to contrast the nationalism of the right with its dependency and ridicule it. And this of course gave the left the opportunity to come out of the margins.

But by re-emerging, the left, through the humiliation of the nationalist right, did not manage to overcome the ideology of the latter. The left emerged posing as more royal than the king in its patriotism (patriotism = refined leftist term for nationalism). The result of this story was finally to shift the “national enemy”, instead of being the Bulgarians and Greece “crying” for Northern Epirus[15], the terms were transferred to England first and then (until today) to “NATO Turkey” and “martyred Cyprus” respectively. This not only shifted nationalism, it actually created a nationalism of all Greeks again.

And of course, since then Cyprus played a big role in Greek developments (especially until ’74). Left, right and centre, politicians and colonels quickly understood that the heart of Greek nationalism was beating in Cyprus. And this nationalism became a characteristic “ideological mechanism” of the state, which slowly re-established the state as the pole of reference of “all Greeks” the prelude to the social state of PASOK (to use the phraseology of RIXI). The results of nationalism for the left in particular are very obvious for anyone who wants to see them. The Greek-centric chauvinism about culture (from the exorcisms of Communist Youth of Greece of the youth subculture as an “American way of life”, to the quackery of Greek musical purity of Savvopoulos, Theodorakis, Markopoulos, etc. ), the “sink Hora” and the extreme nationalism of PASOK towards Turkey, the emergence among intellectuals of the Marxist-Orthodox or Neo-Orthodox current, etc. From one point of view, the pro-Enosis Marxist conception of this history, at the level of theory.

Apart from Psyroukis, the group around the magazine RIXI (which has its ideological roots in Psyroukis’ group of ’53) came to dig up the issue recently. Although they regurgitate the same old stuff about “national integration”, their proposal has its innovations. It essentially abandons the demand for “self-determination — Enosis” for all of Cyprus and settles for “Enosis of the remaining part” with Greece. A double Enosis. And the reason is that this is the only way to “save Cypriot hellenism” from annihilation (because the Turkish state is expansionist) and to ensure peace in the region.

Now, why the Turkish state is inherently “expansionist, barbaric, militaristic” (Psyroukis’ expressions etc.), while the Greek one is simply the noble conclusion of the ethnogenetic process of hellenism, has never been explained to us. Just as they never explained to us how these “anti-imperialists” and revolutionaries against the “capital-state” have now decided to fight for the same solution that the imperialists have been proposing for years now (dual Enosis) and to be interested in the “integration” of the state they otherwise want to “overthrow”. If RIXI is really interested in peace, it would be more practical to fight Andreas Papandreou’s nationalism. Instead, they prefer to return again to Psyroukis, get into the logic of hellenism and of course propose responsible and national positions (and not groupthink and fringe positions as they say). And of course, when you propose responsible and national positions, you cannot ignore the need to support and integrate your state.

3. Cypriot history from another perspective

Returning to the Cypriot context, it is necessary to look at history without nationalist lenses, in order to see the extent of the Greek-Christian imaginary (including its pro-Enosis Marxist variant).

Because, ultimately, there is another history, which is not written because it does not suit the ideological hegemony and which you have to look behind the words and contradictions of our “historians” to see it.

Cyprus was inhabited for most of its history by various communities divided religiously, culturally and in some cases by class. In the most recent period we have communities of Maronites, Latins, Armenians, Jews, Muslims (Turks), Orthodox Christians (Greeks), Linobambaki (a religious group that believed in both Christianity and Mohammedanism). The rise and fall of these communities depended largely on the treatment they received from the rulers of the day.

In the first centuries AD the Jewish community was strong enough to revolt (115 AD). The rise of Christianity and oppression led to the marginalization of this community. The rise of Christianity was then accompanied by intense communal strife, as the Orthodox priesthood in conjunction with the state waged an intense war on “pagans” and heretics (this for those wondering which wanker beheaded or mutilated most ancient statues). During this period the word “Greek” (much to the dismay of our Greek Christians) was something of a dirty word for orthodoxy since it was charged with this “pagan” past.

The Latin community appeared and developed during the Frankish rule[16] with the help of the state and almost disappeared during the Turkish rule, as this community became the target of the attacks of the new rulers, who went so far as to subordinate the Latin community to the Orthodox Church.

This other History of Cyprus is of course something that has been exorcised from the official or unofficial histories of our Greek-Christians. Insofar as they were historical facts and could not be completely ignored, the solution was easy. They expressed, at worst, a “moral decline”, or more commonly they were the results of the “oppression of the conquerors” (see the History of Zanetos). God forbid for an orthodox Christian (and a Greek one at that) to change his faith or become a heretic on his own. If I dwell on the racism expressed by Greek Christianity (alongside its ideological function), it is because it has so heavily infused our thinking that we take the abstraction of history it presents as true. We need to get behind the ideology to read the History of the lie as such.

Relations between the various communities were for long periods of time apparently quite antagonistic, and this was certainly due to their strong religious character, but also to the various power structures that determined their relations (class differences, who was favoured by the state apparatus, etc.).

The Ottoman period begins with the same facts and the Muslim community develops having support in the power structure.

At the same time, however, the Orthodox community also benefits from the change of rulers. The religious (and basically political) fury of the Ottomans is turned against the Latins, while the Orthodox church regains its rights and even assumes a regulatory role in the administration as the leader of the Orthodox “millet”.

The power of the church also gradually increases after the reforms of 1660 and its power rises sharply. Thus Turner, a former diplomat who visited Cyprus in 1815 observes: “Cyprus, though theoretically subject to the authority of a Bey appointed by the Sultan, is in fact governed by the Greek archbishop and his clergy.”

This created a variety of reactions. On the one hand, there was intense competition at the top of the power structure between the church and the Ottoman political power. At the bottom of the hierarchy there were various reactions. On the other hand, there was a convergence of Christians and Muslims — in class terms, there was the impoverishment of Muslims, culturally and religiously. An interesting element in this regard is the Linobambaki community. The tendency of Christians and Muslims of the time (which continued, however, to a lesser extent until the mid-20^th century) to make joint pilgrimages to each other’s historic temples is well known. The interference of this Christian-Muslim community (which of course for the Greek-Christian historians were merely Christians forced to change religion superficially) is typical of the tendency for symbiosis and political interaction in the context of each community’s autonomy.

In this context, the growing corruption of the church and the Ottoman hierarchy began to lay the foundations for common revolts based on class demands (1765, 1804, 1833) from the middle of the 18^th century.

Muslims and Orthodox Christians ate the same food, wore the same clothes, built houses and churches and mosques in closely related architecture. Islam’s acceptance of polygamy and the prohibition on drinking alcohol did little to separate the two communities. Although the two communities were separated in religious worship, channels of political representation and family law, the division (and contradictions) between urban elites and peasants was socially more significant and the source of violent uprisings. Muslim and Orthodox peasants revolted together on several occasions. The bishops and rulers cooperated in the administration of the island despite their internal conflicts over power. “Case study: Cyprus”.

In this context, the execution of the archbishop and other bishops in 1821 was more an expression of the internal strife of the power elite (since Kyprianos had opposed and condemned any activity on the island), than of national strife etc. However, this picture of coexistence and class confrontation, although typical of the 19^th and early 20^th century, is not unique as neo-Cypriot historians and apologists want to present it[17]. The internal structure of the two communities, with the basic structure of social consensus being communal patriarchy (which underpins and entrenches power relations both in interpersonal relations and in the social whole), the complex political structuring of power (the theoretical power of the Muslim administration and the practical power of the church) and the gradual change in economic relations between the two communities (with the impoverishment of the Muslims and the gradual rise of the Orthodox) always left open the possibility of new communal antagonisms.

A typical case of this possibility is the 1804 rebellion, about which K. Kyrris observes:

“Although the revolt had to a large extent the character of a class conflict between the exploited masses of both communities against the exploiting classes of both, the relatively large number of Turks killed by the Turkish troops serving the interests of the latter (ruling classes) created resentment against the Greek authorities, who had actually had the upper hand in the settlement of the matter and had paid the salaries of the troops. Thus, the conflict soon acquired a national character (K. Kyrris: Symbiotic elements in the history of two communities in Cyprus p. 262 CK).

Communal strife is of course the card that both ruling classes are trying to play to stop the communal uprisings. It is in these contexts that the rise of Greek nationalism begins, the function of which we will discuss below.

It is a fact, however, that the communal strife and the real mass appeal of nationalism as a prospect of liberation come much later. The roots of the conflict, however — the power relations within and between the two communities — existed before.

The arrival of the English, the institutionalization of the economic and political rise of the Orthodox community, the development of Megali Idea in Greece and its introduction into Cypriot society through the schools and the reconstruction of various power structures, gradually lead to the 30 years of nationalism (1930–60).

4. processes of power reconstruction and nationalism

Nationalism is a very complex phenomenon. On the one hand, it expresses an attempt at liberation, of which the Greek state is the conclusion and security. At the same time, in the ideological landscape, nationalism goes hand in hand with and very often expresses processes of social reconstruction. We will try below to see the interaction and the degree of expression of three processes through nationalism:

1. The rise of the bourgeoisie and the attempt to avoid class intercommunal conflicts by the ruling classes.

2. The process of the reconstruction of patriarchy from a private-family phenomenon to a communal one and the decisive relation of patriarchal ideology to nationalist ideology.

3. The process of centralization of power, rationalization of administration, development of bureaucracy and the leveling cultural influence of metropolitan nationalism and the rise of the new ideological hegemony with the state intellectuals as the main interpreters (counterfeiters).

i. class reconstruction and the exorcism of social conflict

The emergence of intense class conflict in the second half of the 18^th and early 19^th century (which would continue on a smaller scale throughout the 19^th century and into the first half of the 20^th) reflects to some extent a process of autonomy of the most oppressed class strata from the ideological hegemony of the communal hierarchies. In particular, the uprisings of 1833 are typical of an intensity and quality of these rebellions.

In contrast to the Halil rebellion of the 18^th century, in which the insurgents looked for leadership among the ruling class, 1833 had a strongly popular character with implications of social upheaval. The uprisings erupted after massive inter-communal mobilizations over the economic situation and even its leaders[18] emerged from the best clergy of the two communities (Imam, monk Ioannikios) and declared opponents of the elite. But while the spontaneous class rebellion[19] is an extension and a moulding of the class inter-communal rebellions, the new leaders that emerge (especially the Christian Theseus — and to a lesser extent Ioannikios, who also collaborated with the Imam in Paphos) collaborated to an extent with the consulates of the great powers and it is in this context that the possibility of Enosis as “liberation”[20] appears (the neo-hellenic state had already been formed). This projection of annexation to other states as a prospect of liberation is a case which, although not decisive in 1833, nevertheless gradually rises in the 17^th century and especially in the 20^th, as the population itself is “taught” that this is the only solution of liberation, through the spread of nationalism.

The historical silencing and the current distortion of events (by neo-Cypriot and Greek-Christian historians) is to some extent indicative of the history of lies that tries to justify the current structure of power through a mythology of the past.

In this context, at that time, there was a need to split the unity at the grassroots and reconstruct imaginary divisions and unities in order to exorcise the growing social conflict. The Muslim administration tried to revive communal antagonism and conflict in times of crises (1341, 1853, 1862, 1871, etc.), however the success of this method was minimal and common local uprisings were still observed.

The Orthodox hierarchy follows a different path. An attempt to reconstruct the ideology of hegemony in order to shift the contradictions to the religious-communal level. In this it has two allies. The newly established Greek state with its expansionist tendencies and the bourgeoisie, formed in the cities, is experiencing a gradual rise in the 19^th century. Of course, the bourgeoisie and the church (together with the ciflik owners) have to some extent competing economic and political interests. However, the desire of the bourgeoisie to get rid of rotten Ottoman feudalism (and later colonialism) and their fear of popular uprisings push them into a not-so-comfortable alliance with the church and the clerics against the Muslim elite and the danger of growing social conflict. The main contribution of the Greek state and the bourgeoisie lies in the gradual construction of the new ideology of nationalism. Particularly, after the arrival of the English and the certain removal of the administration from the religious hierarchy and the development of the schools, the bourgeois began to play an increasingly central role in the Greek Cypriot community. Competition with other elites of course continues until 1930 when the development of the bureaucracy by the English creates the basis for a new relationship.

School education (strongly promoted by the bourgeoisie and, to a certain extent, by the church) played a decisive role in the constitution of the imaginary unity of the Greek nation and the repulsion of the prospect of social conflict. Communal schools (which experienced a tremendous rise in the English administration), taking their curriculum and teachers from the metropolis of Greek-centric intellectualism and chauvinism, encouraged intercommunal antagonism and the creation of national stereotypes (see Geest and Murvin’s studies)[21]. Education was perhaps the key element in the creation of ethnic division. In essence, the Cypriot population had to be taught new identities as Greeks and Turks, new forms of language and changed customs[22]. Apart from splitting the class unity in the two communities, school education institutionalized on a new level both class and ideological contradictions. The teacher and the priest, the bourgeoisie and the ciflik owners got a new level of hierarchical justification. To the extent that the Greek Cypriot community set Enosis and nationalism as the ideological background, the ruling classes immediately joined the imaginatively structured community that excluded the Turkish Cypriot neighbour and saw a “national” relationship with every orthodox Greek-speaking moneylender. This in the context of a new separation: those who had the power now also possessed the “knowledge”. The Cypriot language was banished as “barbaric” in the face of the culture of the constructions of the metropolis (Athens), demotic and katharevousa.

The separated spectacle is structured hierarchically. The alienation of the commoner in the face of this hierarchical separation (which was justified in the liberatory perspective of Enosis) had already begun the process of conformity that characterizes contemporary Cypriot life. The last massive class conflict manifested itself in 1948, as the Stalinist bureaucracy of AKEL was caught between its internal conflicts and the spectacular polarisation caused by the extreme right-wing, the church and the colonialists. The defeat of the class confrontation had similar results to the gradual defeat of the class alliance in the 19^th century.

A new division is permeating Cypriot society, this time between left and right. The acceptance by the Stalinist bureaucracy of AKEL of the ideological hegemony of nationalism validates the division. For twenty years AKEL has been looking for its entry into the state power structure — the issue was that the party lost the certificates of “patriotism” that allow it to enter the social power of the state. Apart from a few sporadic strikes, the class conflict in Cyprus has been and is being suppressed in the name of “national unity” and of nationalism (Greek or neo-Greek-Cypriot). What is most visible in the political arena are the conflicts of different groups of elites and bourgeois tied to different economic interests (European or American capital, Russian state socialism, etc.).

There is, however, another dimension of the class structure of Cypriot society, which is often overlooked, the growing economic dependence of Turkish Cypriots on Greek Cypriot capital. Of course, Greek Christians will complain, saying ‘well, why on earth are we to blame for their incompetence’. Of course, the comic-tragic in the whole affair is to hear Marxists saying the same thing (for capitalism’s apologists it’s a bit obvious since they say the same thing about workers but for Marxists…).

The main aspect of this development is of course the prospect of the rise of a class-national movement of Turkish Cypriots even if the anti-colonial struggle had independent reasons, as the neo-Greek-Cypriots dream of.

ii. nationalism and patriarchy — from communal to social patriarchy

At first sight, the ideological-imaginary framework of nationalism is quite loaded with patriarchal images. Nationalism is the theory of “racial purity” and national dignity, which passes through the possession of the woman-object.

The “motherland” in the hands of the “barbarian conqueror”, her sons who will liberate her and of course will have her as their own. Even the practice of nationalist movements is quite explicit. Apart from the anti-colonial struggle there is usually a parallel attempt to extract and “purify” the race — the usual victims of this story (apart from political opponents) are the lowlifes of the “lumpen” and especially the prostitutes (which of course is not so coincidental)[23].

Furthermore, at the level of the images and models projected by the nationalist imaginary, the determination of the whole edifice by patriarchal values and idealizations is evident. The model of the hero is the disciplined hard man or the leader who seems to refrain from any contact with women beyond giving orders or praising them when hiding, when giving birth and when supporting the men-heroes.

EOKA[24] was of course the culmination of this model. A small elite of men-heroes[25] under the guidance of “strategists” and “ethnarchs” undertook to “liberate” the island.

Patriarchy of course pre-exists nationalism. But at least as we know it in the European region, patriarchy has changed significantly in recent centuries. Whereas before it was founded on the personal power of the man-patriarch-father in the family context (we will call this relationship communal patriarchy), it has now spread and diffused, in ‘modern society’ with the infusion of modern, mass institutions and power ties (e.g. state-patriarchy, pornography) with its own characteristics (social patriarchy)[26].

This differentiation, between communal and social patriarchy, is not something static or divisive like capitalism-feudalism[27]. Although it has some things in common with the above distinction (based on class relations), it is nevertheless much more complex. Patriarchy in any society (whether modern or older) is the main lever of social consensus and perhaps the archetypal power relationship. And the family is one of the key institutions of this power structure (a structure that extends from culture to economics and politics). In this sense both the family and the social diffusion of patriarchy are historical phenomena. However, in modern society, with urbanization, the gathering of thousands of people in cities, the spread of mass media, the breaking of blood ties, the ‘extended family’, etc., are leading to a crisis of traditional patriarchy, the family, traditional morality, etc.[28].

Nationalism appears in Europe (and later on globally) at about the same time that communal patriarchy seems to be disintegrating under multiple pressures (patriarchy itself seems to be in crisis in some cases).[29] In this crisis of patriarchy, which is also a crisis of the ideological imaginaries of society, nationalism does not appear as an irrelevant parallel phenomenon. It is essentially the ideology that helps to reconstruct and consolidate patriarchy at new levels. In any of its forms, whether as warlike masculinism or as a cultural turn to the roots of patriarchal culture, nationalism reestablishes social consensus on imaginaries directly identified with patriarchal configuration.

The relationship between nationalism and patriarchal structures became quite clear when nationalism reached its peak with fascism and Nazism. But analyses on these phenomena have, to some extent, dwelled on the extremes of nationalism and the relationship of these extremes to totalitarianism. Particularly after the emergence of the anti-colonial movements in the 1950s and 1960s, the analysis of the relationship between nationalism and patriarchy was overtaken and Lenin’s thesis of good and bad nationalisms (the nationalism of the oppressed is “good” and the nationalism of the oppressors is “bad”) came to the fore again.

However, in the late 1960s and during the 1970s the idyllic images began to fade as the supposed “good nationalisms” continued to produce abominations with astonishing similarity. A more critical reflection of these movements and of the new ‘national-liberation’ nationalism thus began (particularly with the intervention of the feminist movement). Before we begin a more detailed analysis of Greek Cypriot nationalism, we must also mention a contradiction in the so-called “national-liberation movements”.

The ideological differences-imaginaries of nationalism as an extension of patriarchal values and images were mentioned at the beginning of this section. This tendency of nationalism encounters a direct problem in the needs created by the anti-colonial “liberationist” edge of national liberation movements. Ultimately, nationalism as a ‘national’ (in the sense that it is at least theoretically addressed to the whole population) movement must offer something to women, in order to gain not only their tolerance, but in necessity their participation (as helpers of men, of course). The tension between these two tendencies is expressed on another level as a contradiction between modernising-modernist tendencies (promoting a reconstruction of power in new domains) and more conservative-traditional ones. This contradiction is a variable that changes from movement to movement and although modernist tendencies prevail in most cases, there are nevertheless different phases and stages of development.

The interesting element in the Cypriot case is that this contradiction still survives and creates various comic tragedies (e.g. the ‘medieval’ moralism and the position of women as second-class citizens in a seemingly reconstructed social patriarchy). It is in these contexts that the influence of more traditional patriarchal concepts is characteristic.

The tension between these two trends, however, has not yet become particularly intense, and this is because the relatively limited scope for women’s pressure within Greek-Christian nationalism and the peculiar historical circumstances (which have so far led to an alliance between “modernists-traditionalists”) have led to a rapid assimilation of women’s efforts and to the formation of a social patriarchy with a traditional ideological background (a certain tendency and pressure for liberalization lately on a personal level is not unrelated to the crisis of nationalist imaginaries after the defeat of ’74), we will try below to analyse the reconstruction of patriarchy promoted by nationalism on the basis of 3 characteristics of this power relation:

1. The need for the existence of a patriarch.

2. The need for “racial purity” based on sexual repression and the objectification of an Other of the woman in the archetypal relationship.

3. The establishment of immortality as a core value of patriarchal culture.

a) The need for a patriarch -someone with authority to decide, command, punish, submit, etc.- is self-evident in the power structure we call patriarchy. In communal patriarchy the role is played by the male father and his authority, passing from the interpersonal level, is established at the communal level on the basis of his authority in the family. With the crisis of communal patriarchy, the individual man-father is no longer enough. In modern society, the state slowly takes over many of the functions of the old individual-man (this of course does not mean that men cease to be the dominant sex, but the state takes away many of their traditional powers).

Nationalism promotes this process in two ways. On the one hand, it tries to re-establish the family as a stable molecule of power reproduction and ‘racial community’ and on the other hand, it promotes a supra-individual institution, which undertakes to re-establish social consensus.

In this context, the rise of nationalism (in the 19^th and 20^th centuries) intensified the “pseudomoral” sermons [30] of the church, the bourgeois intellectuals and the poets, who wanted to pose as moral cops. In the middle of the 19^th century the first reform school was built for the ‘little tramps’ who were on the streets, while at the beginning of the 20^th century the ‘charitable activity’ of the bourgeoisie for the ‘moral education’ of the poor began. (It is ironic that this “philanthropy”, which appears at the European level and is a key lever for the manipulation and reconsolidation of the family, is carried out through bourgeois women, perhaps looking for a way out of their own misery, see “POLICING OF THE FAMILIES”.) Thus, at the same time as the need to exorcise social conflict, the need to strengthen the family, to reassert the authority of the church, and to build social institutions that limit deviation from morality, enter the picture.

Nationalism appears in this context not just as a reinforcement, but as an ideological direction, and the arguments are formulated: ‘We must create Greek Orthodox Christians — a racially pure race — and get rid of ignorance, corruption, alienation from the church, from those who live with or marry Turks or Turkish women, from street tramps, etc.’. The nationalists put a lot of emphasis on education and schools. The modern state is beginning to be embryonically built. The church and the English are slowly building the institutions of a structure that re-educates Cypriots. A state on which they will learn to depend upon, to expect orders from, to love. (The modern statism of the Cypriots has deep roots.) The results of this process began to be clearly visible from the 1950s onwards.

In ’55 the preparations for the beginning of the “dynamic struggle” culminated, a struggle that aspired to liberate Cyprus (and there is no doubt that many Cypriot people believed seriously in the issue of liberation and gave their lives for it).

I quote below some extracts, which speak for themselves, from a now historical document of e EMAK (the name of the “revolutionary organisation” before it was renamed EOKA).

“What attitude should the people take? The people should not be carried away by their patriotism and enthusiasm aroused by the struggle and successes of EMAK and rise up in open revolutionary struggle against the conqueror… Only the organized fighters of EMAK will act and always at the command of EMAK. The people should only observe the struggles of EMAK with lively interest and help in every way if necessary, have full confidence, have full faith in the liberation that is soon to come…”

So much for the roots of modern statism and conformity. But there are other interesting things in the document, beyond the generalities about the people, it specifically calls on “Turks and communists” not to take part in the struggle. And for those who wonder what role the people will play anyway, apart from “observing”, “not taking part” and having “full faith” it has something for them:

“Those who are not organised and want to cooperate in the struggle, let them write the word EMAK on the streets and walls. This is also a serious contribution”.

In this context EOKA constitues a point of reference. It is the ideological apogee of the nationalist imaginary based on the roots of the patriarchal culture and at the same time the prelude to a state that you have to “love”, “obey” and “have absolute trust in”, like in EOKA (and it is no coincidence, from another point of view, that the Cypriot state that was created in the 1960s was a pawn of EOKA and right-wing militants). The collective father was created and the Cypriots were ready to accept it. The replacement of Grivas by Makarios in the patriarchal stratum was quite natural. The former probably never understood the modernizing potential of nationalism. Makarios understood it and played on the contradiction between modernization and the traditional ideological charge to create the patriarchal state and at the same time represent it personally.

He managed to a certain extent to offer Cypriots both: a personal father and an organised bureaucratic complex — the state.

The fact is that Cyprus was orphaned by the death of Makarios, it lost its personal patriarch. But there remained his state, which, despite the efforts of Kyprianos, no longer seems to need its personal patriarch so much. Perhaps, finally, the death of Makarios will unleash the dynamics of the contradiction.

b) The ideology of racial purity, the perception that there is a pure race-nation (the Greek one in this case) that is in danger of degeneration, corruption, pollution, is a basic characteristic of nationalism, not only of the far right but also of leftist nationalism (the latter of course being more sophisticated). As various scholars of the Nazi phenomenon have observed, this tendency to “purity” has deep roots, reaching back to repressed sexuality in the context of the patriarchal family. At the same time, the ideology of racial purity is based on an archetypal relationship within the patriarchy.

On the tendency to objectify an Other as something hostile and subversive that must be subjugated. The woman, as Simone de Beauvoir observes, is the typical case of the Other in patriarchal culture. John Chrysostom, from our own Greek-Christian culture, says it quite clearly: “Woman is a necessary evil, a natural temptation, the danger of the home, a deadly charm.”

This objectification of woman as Other at the interpersonal level acquires with the socialization-reconstruction of patriarchy, corresponding macrosocial foundations founded on the internalized archetypal relationship with woman. While in communal patriarchy the “purity” of the village family etc. is guarded, in social patriarchy “racial purity” appears as a collective concept in the context of the nation. The race-nation somehow becomes a closed circuit, an imaginary extended family. Its chastity, its purity, must be guarded against contamination.

This theory of racial purity promoted by nationalism in the context of the reconstruction of patriarchy not only promotes a new conservatism but also has direct political implications based on psychological submission.

The pressure on the Linobambaki to conform to the Greek-Christian nation (discussed below) is a typical case in point. With the emergence of the communists the infection is threatened from elsewhere:

“Communists, artisans and workers should not be employed by individuals and associations. Parents should denounce communist teachers… …young people from the villages who come to the cities to learn their art should be prevented from coming into contact with people infected with the communist germ.” Announcement of a meeting in the archbishopric in 1930.

This need to invent threatening “Others” continues and intensifies as the nationalist fever rises. In 1958 the “fighters” of EOKA started killing poor workers, because they were leftists.The first victim, Menikos from Lefkoniko, was tied to a tree and after the nationalists came by and spat on him, he was subsequently stoned to death. And the hatred for the “objectified Other” is slowly turning towards the Other community as well. This projection of threatening “others” has favoured nationalism, decisively breaking the coexistence of the two communities. The Turkish Cypriot may have been the friend, neighbour or co-villager of the Greek Cypriot, for example, but the fact that he was a Turk created the conditions of tolerating that his fate was in the hands of the nationalists (the same logic worked in reverse for Turkish Cypriots vis-à-vis Greek Cypriots, of course).

It is in the context of the extension of patriarchal objectification to macrosocial levels that it can be inferred that while even at the beginning of the 1960s the fanatical nationalists were a very small minority, they nevertheless managed to create a reality of intercommunal conflict.

Even today, many people wonder how things got this far. The average Cypriot’s tolerance of things he disagreed with was instrumental in getting to ’74. Many Cypriots (Greeks and Turks, left and right), though they disagreed with the chauvinist extremities, tolerated them, because disagreement would have cost them the stigma of anti-Greekness or anti-Turkishness (depending on the community).

Entering the imaginary unity of the nation, they tolerated hatred towards the “objectified Other”, the “barbarians” of the Other community.

Alongside tolerance, the need for “objectified other” enemies, ready to tear Cypriot society apart, took on new dimensions after ’74 with the blossoming of the neo-Cypriot consciousness. For a time it turned against the former EOKA B members and discovered conspiracies every now and then. Slowly, however, it got over that and new targets began to be found: ‘corruption’ and drugs have been a hit lately and from time to time, the ‘anarchists’. (The label fits anything that doesn’t fit in the mind of the Cypriot normie). We have here an extension of the archetypal relationship. The woman-object is the foundation of man’s power and the collectivity of the nation. She is an Other, who, if given or taken (willingly or unwillingly) by others, undermines patriarchal authority.

And in order to “defend” itself the patriarchal imaginary creates a series of objectified Others who “may” undermine it by taking the woman-object.

In this context, rape becomes the symbol of male-national domination, as well as of defeat-disgrace. Although the true extent of the phenomenon of rape during the inter-communal clashes and the invasion has not yet been ascertained (both sides accuse each other of widespread rape), it is nevertheless a theme that constantly hovers (overtly or implicitly) in discussions of the ‘national struggle’. Comments along the lines of “they’ll fuck your mother or sister” as the extreme argument of intimidation if you say you don’t care about the national issue, or the open tantrums of some nationalists who confuse “national military victory” with the rape of Turkish women (and Greek women on the other side of the green line, of course). The sense of defeat of the Greek Cypriots after ’74 is expressed in the context of this wound. If you look at the posters and literature surrounding the “tragedy”, the classic themes are the raped woman, the woman who was left alone (lost her husband), the woman-Cyprus raped by Attila. Taking these phenomena as a whole, we observe a gradual reconstruction of patriarchy. The woman becomes the property of the nation, the woman identical with the body of the homeland — the one that men struggle to keep as their own and “pure”, the foreigner they want to possess and rape.

c) Another basic characteristic of patriarchal culture is the tendency towards immortality.[31] This tendency is expressed in various ways, for the purposes of this text it is useful to mention History, the appropriation of the body of women and (especially) children. Male immortality in communal patriarchy is founded on the appropriation of the body of the woman (as a reproductive machine, while denying sexual pleasure) and children, and the creation of a family history that goes from patriarch to patriarch. The female body in these contexts is the colony where the patriarch builds his immortality and establishes his central authority.

With the gradual “socialisation” of patriarchy through nationalism, a new situation is created. The tendency of men-individuals to immortality is transformed, with the social reconstruction of patriarchy, into a tendency to immortality of the collectivity of the male sex — patriarchs, heroes, etc. — within the framework of the imaginary unity of the nation. History commemorates the “immortal” men-heroes who not only preserved the female body that belonged to them as their own, but who also preserved the body of the homeland as their own. Nationalism dreams of wars of “immortality” in which women are doubly lost. They lose their children for the patriarchal imaginary, while at the same time everyone knows that the female body is the most precious spoil (even if it is repulsive in the modern language of nationalism) of the victor-rapist. With nationalism and social patriarchy, women are transformed, in moments of feverish nationalist imaginary, into the common property of the nation of men, which requires the production and breeding of national heroes, who look to the old patriarchs for inspiration, not to be “sissies”. At the same time, the female body and its imagined extension into the concept of the homeland is the affirmation of power and the mechanism of immortality for the collectivity of the male gender. At the end of the EOKA struggle, for example, a list of the names of the “heroes” was published: there are 66 dead men, 9 hanged (men, of course) and a footnote for 9 accidentally killed by the English and 64 by the Turks. It is not difficult to see where the already few women who were killed for EOKA — “accidentally killed” — fall. The ‘men’ are the ‘heroes’ who write history. The creation of the patriarchal history of the male heroes of EOKA is one phase in a long process of reconstruction that begins in schools.

It is the school that erases the family patriarchal history of the grandfather and great-grandfather (of the “generation”) and educates the “children” of the nation in the collectivities of the fathers of the nation. Children and especially sons become carriers of the transmission of immortality as a core value of patriarchal culture. In social patriarchy, the upbringing of children passes from the family and the community to centralized institutions (schools — state — bureaucracy), which mark the prelude to the rise of the state as the direct agent and arbiter of patriarchal relations.

As Aries (Centuries of Childhood) points out, the recognition of childhood in a first phase has the characteristics of the perception that the child is more or less a pure empty existence, which, if only filled with the right material, will bring forth a law-abiding class of citizens. This tactic, despite its developments, is a direct objectification of the child (the result of both patriarchal tendencies — objectification/externalization and the appropriation of women’s birth). The school will largely make up for the family in ideological formation. New patriarchal relations, new models of mutilation will slowly pass under the pressure of both power and structural changes for modernization. Immortality as a movement of collectivity (the nation) finds in the state the expressor of the new social need. The child-object is the battlefield chosen by nationalism (and those who promote it) to crush social conflict and reconstruct the ideological hegemony of power. The children are the nation’s children — its living expression and future hope of immortality — and they must be educated in the new ideology like empty boxes waiting to be filled. The rise of education in the period of English rule reflects a similar tendency on the part of the colonisers, namely to form a law-abiding population. It is in these contexts that the controversy between the English and the Church over education is expressed. This conflict, expressed around the slogan ‘whoever controls education, controls the minds of the people’, was an ideological conflict in which the English lost the ideological hegemony of Cypriot society (despite their administrative victory in 1930). The school would promote the ideological hegemony of nationalism, promoting new mechanisms of immortality — history, status quo, etc. — and power within the framework of a reconstructed patriarchy.

iii. centralisation and cultural leveling

The rise of nationalism as an ideology is historically accompanied by the parallel rise of the concept and structure of the modern nation-state. This characteristic of nationalism and the movements that adopted it created quite early on a strong mistrust among the libertarian world towards such movements. Bakunin’s embrace of Garibaldi and his support of self-determination for the Slavic peoples had no continuity in libertarian thought.[32] For, to the extent that various nationalist movements had a liberatory edge of self-determination, etc., their support was self-evident. At the same time, however, the ideological function of nationalism, and especially its extension to the nation-state, not only created scepticism, but with the institutionalisation of the new state power, it actually denied its own liberating edge, the demand for self-determination. This course of nationalism is not accidental. As mentioned above, the liberatory edge was undermined in advance, through the power relations that constituted the ideological basis of nationalism. But the parallel course of nationalism and the nation-state deserves to be seen more closely, because it reveals some of the main features of this ideology — and in particular its central role in the process of centralising social power in the state, the bureaucracy and the intellectuals. There is a double aspect to this process: cultural leveling and the centralization of power structures. The leveling that operates at the cultural level tends to deny the specificities of different social groups and communities. There is a process of creating a “national culture” (which usually functions as the new ideological hegemony) that in the process crushes the autonomous regional or local cultures of various communities, presenting them as degenerate or “lacking culture”. In this context, it expresses the rise of metropolitan intellectuals (usually of the capital city or of the big urban centres), who often define, in a piecemeal way, the “national culture”, choosing what suits them from folk culture and rejecting the rest. This rise of intellectuals expresses on another level the principle of modern homogenization of the population and the definition of its culture or subculture through hierarchical channels. Conformity and consumerism have a direct relationship with these developments. In the face of a culture cooked up within corporations and circuits, the position of the passive spectator and consumer is a position reserved for the layperson within the context of this production.

Returning to Greek-Christian nationalism, it is necessary to look at the experience of the Greek state to understand its impact in the Cypriot region. Because ultimately, if there was one dimension where we have had a more or less common experience with people living on the geographical borders of the Greek state over the last 100–150 years, it is the experience of cultural leveling. And this is largely because we have been subjected to it by the same centre of power, Athens and its nationalist intelligentsia. The Greek state and the intelligentsia that formed its ideology always seem to have suffered from a double problem. A passionate need to prove that the modern Greek state was a descendant of ancient ‘Greek’ civilization and at the same time a strong antipathy to the Eastern influence that characterized folk cultures. These two constituted to some extent a problem of identity. On the one hand, the Greek state wanted to “belong” to Europe (and antiquity was the ideological proof of its status). But at the same time, the people who stuck the label ‘Greeks’ on them had very little to do with the ancients. After so many centuries they had created their own autonomous cultures, expressing their own needs and desires — and at the same time were heavily influenced by contact with Eastern civilization. The opposition to the eastern element and the leveling of regional autonomous cultures are the two elements that strongly characterize the process of building and centralizing social power in the Greek region[33].

With the expansion of the Greek state, various communities (Turks, Macedonians, etc.) “disappeared”, while others, under the pressure of the Athenian state, “adapted”. Even the Orthodox Christian communities (which seem to have formed the basis of the new state) were gradually forced to abandon their autonomous regional development and become appendages of the metropolitan centre of Athens.

If there seems to be something positive achieved by greater communication between communities, this is completely lost, as the “new national culture” slowly ceases to be created by the community. The Cypriot experience had several parallels with other regional-autonomous cultures in the Greek region. Not because there was a Cypriot culture in Cyprus — as some Neo-Cypriots say. Rather, the Cypriot population was made up of various communities, as I mentioned above. The main effect of this leveling was to destroy the possibility of autonomous development of each community within a framework of reciprocal interactions. And this perspective seems to have existed in the 19^th century.

This can be seen not only in the common uprisings, but also in the possibility of overcoming religious fanaticism within the framework of popular religion. And this is evident both in inter-communal marriages (which according to some observers were once a common phenomenon) and in the tendency to make joint pilgrimages to mosques and churches.

Of course, the most striking example of these reciprocal interactions is the community of the Linobambaki. And the fate of this community is typical of the crushing of the prospect of autonomous community development in the context of reciprocal interaction. With the rise of Greek-Christian nationalism, the church decided to stop sacraments to the Linobambaki, hoping to force them to choose Orthodoxy. Despite all the pressure, however, eventually the community gradually joined the Muslim community. The segregation worked perfectly (albeit against the church’s hopes), destroying a space of interaction. Polarisation through spectacular segregation was a major element of cultural leveling. (The same polarization reappeared after the civil war in Greece, this time among the Greek Cypriot community). At the same time, leveling, by gradually moving the centre of culture creation to Athens, gradually began to promote the cultural decline of this land — culture was coming from Athens — and to lay the foundations of modern consumerism. The divergence in the period 1878–1930 between intellectual and popular poetry (intellectuals — traditional poets) is an expression of a growing gap, but not by mutual reinforcement. (And of course it is no coincidence that the great majority of nationalist poems come from intellectuals). Traditional poetry will become more and more underground and repressed (now it seems that the experts have decided that it is dead for good so they have started to build “museums” for it).

The strengthening of the intellectual “culture” will seal the death of “folk” culture and will promote the separation of art/layperson. Alongside the process of cultural leveling and ideological centralization, there is a parallel centralization in structures. The rise of nationalist consciousness among the bourgeois, intellectuals and church hierarchs at the beginning takes, alongside everything else, the form of an attempt to rationalise and centralise the church structure. (The church functioned as a political organization for the elite of the Orthodox community during Turkish rule). The conflicts that erupted because of this role, but also the gradual autonomy of the poor strata together with the corruption that had always characterized the Cypriot church had essentially formed various centers of power within the hierarchy and at the same time a tendency of the parishes to more autonomy. The centralisation of both the administrative structure and the ideological influence of the church was necessary to promote both communal divisions and the reconstruction of ideological hegemony. However, the efforts did not seem to have had significant results until the arrival of the English. The British colonial power set out from the beginning to build a more rationalized centralized political structure.[34] Within the framework gradually built by the English, the internal processes in the church intensified. On the one hand, the church seems for a moment to be in danger of losing community leadership as the English build political structures of representation. At the same time, pressures on the church structure to take a leading role in the formation of an ideological hegemony centred on nationalism are intensifying. This naturally sharpens and gives new dimensions to the internal crises between the various centres of power (bishoprics — archbishopric).

These conflicts were expressed at a first open level in the attempt to break down the administrative control of schools by local authorities and the relative autonomy of church parishes (this was of course also a blow to the tendency of various ordinary priests to identify with the community in various disputes with the power of the elite).

The ecclesiastical crisis of 1900–10, apart from its class edge (bourgeois, conservative wing of the church, the church’s chiropolitans), was also at another level a conflict through which the church structure began to rationalise and centralise.

The English are promoting this process, as they are laying the foundations for a centralised society through the gradual building of the infrastructure of a Cypriot state. The conflicts of the elite naturally intensify in this context, because alongside their old antagonisms, a central contradiction is beginning to emerge and take on increasingly explosive dimensions: The English administration, with the ‘modernism’ it promotes — the development of political structures, a centralised school system, the institutionalisation of inter-community divisions through administrative structures, etc. — is the decisive factor in the gradual reconstruction of the ideological hegemony of the elite and at the same time paves the way for the social and economic rise of the bourgeoisie. From this point of view, the English administration not only helps the elites in exorcising social conflict, but also paves the way for a painless reconstruction of power structures (and after all, the colonial army was a surer guarantee of security than that the Ottoman one). On the other hand, however, ideological hegemony, built on the Greek-Christian nonsense and nationalism of Enosis, was inherently opposed to English rule.

Ultimately, ideological hegemony, the reconstruction of power and the exorcism of social conflict were institutionalised and developed intensely within the framework of colonial modernisation, but at the same time the turning of reality into a spectacle within the nationalist imaginary required opposition (however mild) to the English and insistence on Enosis in order to maintain its coherence. The segregated spectacle and its imagined unity in the out-of-life image began to set the stage for the political absurdity that would follow in our modern history (from EOKA to ’74).

The above contradiction had another important effect. It creates the opportunity for the church and the conservative wing of the elite to remain in the limelight and even slowly emerge as a leading mechanism in Cypriot society. Of course, the conflicts between different groups of the elite continue to rage below the surface. The important result of all this, however, is that English modernization is left somewhere in the middle, especially as far as social life is concerned (as we shall see below, the neo-Cypriot consciousness is precisely the attempt to complete this modernization). The history of Cyprus after 1930 is particularly charged by these contradictions, as the spectacle takes on an autonomous dynamic. The Palmerocracy (1930–40) is the decisive step of the English to push the process of modernization to its realization — the birth of the bureaucracy.

The bureaucracy appears as a meeting place of the conflicting elites and, at the same time, as the emergence of a new group of elites that sets the basis of the Cypriot state. As this bureaucracy grows stronger and feels its dynamics (whose logical perspective was the Cypriot state), the contradiction between ideology (Enosis) and reality (the bureaucracy as the basis of the future Cypriot state) is only maintained in the self-contained perspective of the spectacle. For some strata of the bureaucracy this will continue until ’74. The rise of AKEL in ’41-’46 is the first (and last so far) popular reaction to the growing power of the bureaucracy. Significantly, in ’43 AKEL ran for the first time in the municipal elections with the main slogan “down with the appointed”, while its later propaganda (e.g. for the Constitutional Assembly in ’47) centred on the hypocrisy of the right wing manning the state apparatus while presenting itself as intransigent towards the British. In its early years, AKEL looks like a continuation of the popular movements of the 19^th century, as it tries to overcome divisions and express an anti-colonial, class and social discourse (its rise at the time was astonishing, 4 years after its creation it won the 4 largest of the 6 municipalities of the island and several Turkish Cypriot municipalities). Degeneration however comes very quickly. The growth of internal bureaucracy (to some extent an inevitable result of the Marxism-Leninism of the leadership group that prevailed), as well as the attempt to woo the parallel bureaucratic apparatus of the church (with the election of Leontios), quickly lead it into the ideological framework of hegemony and spectacle. Nationalism is the rope with which AKEL is slowly tying itself to then crawl at the feet of its opponents, demanding certificates of patriotism. AKEL’s stance from ’47 to ’60 is one of those unique moments of political schizophrenia (at least for the people who follow AKEL) and political hypocrisy (for the leaders) that characterise the Cypriot political scene. While in Greece thousands pass through Makronisos suspected of being leftists, and while thousands are slaughtered, tortured, etc., AKEL crawls through the spectacle and its contradictions. On the one hand, it bashes the government of Athens as monarcho-fascist, sold out and so on and on the other hand it strives to compete with the extreme right in nationalism-fanaticism with the slogan: “Enosis and only Enosis with any Greek government”. (It is worth noting that 5–6 months before the “popular mobilizations” for this line, the party had held similar celebrations with the slogan “Self-Government — Enosis”.) The bureaucracy as a social force (inside and outside AKEL), not only wins the game by integrating its opponents, but also makes its first impressive entry into politics, reproducing imaginary divisions, and effectively abolishing politics. The foundations of the Cypriot state were ready. If there is anything significant in the fifteen years of ’45-’60, it is the gradual rise of the church and the seduction of the state bureaucracy by it. The election and unchallenged authority of Makarios is the linking of the 2 centralizing mechanisms (church-state) and their temporary alliance under the patriarchal gaze of Makarios.

4. the neo-cypriot consciousness and modernism

In recent years there has been an effort, which (at least superficially) seems to come into conflict with Greek Christianity (not just the term but the ideology), what the far right, the church and, among the far left, the pro-Enosis Marxists so passionately call “neo-Cypriot consciousness”. Apart from the fantasies projected by the above, the “neo-Cypriots” (theoretical or not) are essentially pre-oriented to the notion that we must overcome also ideologically the insecurity of hellenism as a dependency on the national centre and begin to identify with the Cypriot state. Thus, a bastardization of history begins (however, for the moment it has not reached the frenzy that Greek Christianity has reached), to prove that we are and are not Greeks, that the struggle for Enosis was good and was not, etc.

Eventually, of course, it is not difficult to see the extension of this reasoning: somewhere, a Cypriot nation will slowly emerge, of which the Cypriot state will be the main axis.[35] However, although the centre of gravity is different (the Cypriot rather than the Greek state), the roots of this phenomenon go back a long way and come directly from the Greek-Christian imaginary and the reconstruction of power that was promoted by the Greek-Enosis nationalism. As we have seen above, the processes and structures of power and ideology promoted by Greek-Christian nationalism essentially built the foundations of the modern Cypriot state. And if the “intra-Cypriot” problematic has something certain where its problematic begins, it is this state. Neo-Cyprianism is a nationalism that takes its ideological hegemony and practices from Greek-Christian nationalism. Leveling through national unity, exorcism of social conflict, need for an Other to project the scarecrow of danger, reproduction of power within the family and institutionalization of the objectification of the Other, rise of the state as the regulator of social patriarchy, etc. The segregated spectacle, the predisposition of people, a fitting modernization. It is for this reason that in the previous pieces and from now on I will use the term neo-(Greek)-Cypriot consciousness — precisely as an opinion that this is a new face of the old fairy tale — of Greek-Christian nationalism and its functioning in this region. In this context, the relevance of what was mentioned in the previous piece is, I think, obvious and needless to repeat. Apart from the ideological continuity, however, the neo-(Greek)-Cypriot consciousness is also a significant development-shift perhaps in the Cypriot history of the last 50 years. In a first phase it comes to seal a period and to say openly what Greek Christianity has been chewing on us for years, that ultimately the extension of nationalism is that state with which the social imaginary must finally be reconciled. On another, not so obvious, level, the neo-Greek Cypriot consciousness is perhaps the portent of 2 important processes, the completion of modernization (and at the same time the settling of old scores between the elites) and the creation of an ideological hegemony (and the reconstruction of the segregated spectacle), so as to put an end to its reactions. Modernism, whose completion was blocked by nationalism (whose development framework it had built), seems to be the central theme again. With the death of Makarios, the antagonisms between the state (with its bureaucracy and its politicians) and the church began to express themselves transiently (for the time being), but quite strongly. The antagonism is, to a certain extent, a settling of scores between two centres of ideological, political and economic power. At the same time, however, it expresses (and will express more strongly in the future) a conflict between modernists and conservatives.

The state, and to a certain extent and the power mechanisms that anchor it, seems determined (as shown by the education reform and labour legislation) to rationalise society completely and to take over the central role of social power. Pressured both by the needs of economic dependency (whether in the form of tourism or as an ‘offshore business station’) for a modern, modernised society, but also by the internal needs of a suffocating society, the promoters of modernism hope for a painless reconstruction of power structures (as their peers succeeded in doing in the days of Greek-Enosis nationalism). The conflict is expressed between 2 trends, the modernists and the conservatives. The terms are to some extent misleading, because apart from the church and a part of DISY, the others are both — their position is determined more by who holds state power than by their “ideology”. To some extent, it can be said that the most consistent moderniser is the very state structure that needs this process and which to some extent imposes it on those who govern it. At another level, the Neo-Cypriot consciousness is an ideological attempt to close the internal reactions of ideological hegemony that led to the absurdities of the last 30 years. We have already mentioned the political masochism of AKEL with the Enosis and only Enosis. A few years later, the EOKA struggle brings out the contradictions in a more explosive way and leads to the Zurich patchwork of a state. However, the decisive time of developments was in ’58, when the segregated spectacle had its first violent contact with reality.

Intercommunal clashes begin with mass massacres, while Grivas and his counterparts in the Turkish Cypriot community push the logic of separation and objectification of the Other to the extreme with a series of murders of leftists. The state of Zurich under the patriarchal rule of Makarios is an attempt to reconstruct the spectacle after its overwhelming contact with reality. And what comes out of Zurich is striking, not only for the funny belief (?) of its makers that it would last, but also because it is perhaps a global phenomenon, where after a “national-liberation” struggle, a people gets a constitution worse than what the colonialists proposed before. It is time this fairy tale of the EOKA struggle was put back where it belongs, in the autonomous dynamic of an ideology that has lost all contact with reality. ’63 is a repetition of ’58, the roots of Greek Cyprianism begin from then, in Makarios’ attempt to disengage from the ideological extension (Enosis) and accept the practical result of the ideology of nationalism (the Cypriot state). Thus, the theory of the possible appears. The intervention of the population (the “people”) in these situations hovered between submitting to and supporting the modernist efforts of Makarios and confronting ghosts of the past. The emergence of EOKA B simply pushed the contradictions to extremes again, but this time among the Greek Cypriot community. The march to the coup and invasion was at one point as predictable as the absurdity of the whole affair. The collision of spectacle with reality and the explosion of contradictions in ideology in ’74 was disastrous. The emergence of the neo-(Greek)-Cypriot consciousness in this context was an extension of the ‘possible’, but an extension determined to reconstruct the ideological hegemony coherently on the basis of a nationalism that sees more clearly where it is, where it is going and what it is building. Now, whether or not it succeeds is their problem. What do we do?

[2] The official line of “Socialist Expression” was the need for a left-wing government (AKEL — EDEK).

[3] There was a perception that this stratum (unionists), which opposed the Cypriot state (on the basis that its existence excluded Enosis), was revolutionary — somewhere some people were calling these strata unconscious anti-statists!!! (see Pentadaktylos No.4 “The State in Cypriot society”).

[4] This is the group that the magazine “Mavres Pinelies” put out and for which this text was originally written and discussed.

[5] For more analysis of this issue and its function within the patriarchal family see the piece on patriarchal reconstruction.

[6] It would be nice if pro-Enosis Marxists would take a look at socialist Zionism. Perhaps they might see some correlations with their own case and the implications of such “marriages” — where socialism is sacrificed to the need for the “national interest”, or how many people with such views were used to make the state of Israel what it is today.

[7] DISY and AKEL got about as much in the ’81 elections.

[8] The last thing I heard in the various tragic-comedic “whining” threads is that the government maintains 1–2 camps with shacks (and pays refugees to stay there) for official visitors.

[9] The Cypriot economy has been “on its feet” since ’74, largely due to foreign aid. In this context, we should also mention the huge financial aid from Greece, which was among the highest. The continuation of this aid is funny and to some extent scandalous. The standard of living in Cyprus is higher than in Greece — the money that people in Greece are deprived of in a time of economic crisis is largely given to sustain nationalist illusions.

[10] Despite Makarios’ maneuvers and theories of feasibility, the ideological charge was so great that no one dared to openly take on the “national centre”. Makarios was a typical case, he tolerated for years conspiracies in the army and propaganda against him in schools, in the hope of avoiding conflict with the “national centre” (even when it was the Junta). When he decided that he was going no further it was already too late.

[11] The pro-Enosis Marxist perspective, which dates back to the 1960s and the first appearance of Greek Maoism, has found its spiritual father in the historian Nikos Psyroukis. The emphasis in the analysis, which follows Psyroukis and RIXI (rather than the Cypriot pro-Enosis Marxists), is because they seem to have largely determined the ideology of the Cypriot comrades. Also, it should be stressed that pro-Enosis Marxists do not necessarily have a single view on all issues or even a single ideology. I use the term pro-Enosis Marxist as a term generally accepted by them (see also RIXI No.14). As for the analysis, I rely on their theoretical and views expressed without encountering a contradiction among them (e.g. dual Enosis).

[12] R. Olympios, Tetradia no.1. “The influence of the Cyprus problem on the thought of the left-wing militants.”

[13] Here, Psyrroukis is taking things too far and completely disregarding historical reality. For the mentioned refusals of Greece were made at times of particular historical circumstances and in no case was Enosis erased. It is simply that the politicians in Athens postponed the issue for a better opportunity. Let us not forget, it was the “communist-eater” Papagos who began to somewhat move the diplomatic nets for Enosis. And in Cyprus, the Enosis struggle in the 1950s was clearly led by the ruling classes. It is a stretch to interpret diplomatic circumstances and political contradictions as social or historical contradictions.

[14] P. Prodromou “Our reaction to Turkey’s expansionist plans”, Apopsi no. 8–9. page 4.

[15] It should be noted in this context, that the theory of “national integration” and ethnogenesis goes out of the window with regard to the Northern Epirus. But this is a matter of “right-wing nationalism”. And then Albania is “socialist” and for years was Maoist.

[16] During this period (as well as others) it is debatable whether the Orthodox (the ancestors of the Greek Cypriots) were the majority. Mr. Graikos notes that in a population of about 180,000, there were 70–80,000 Armenians and Maronites — alongside them must be added the Latins and Syrians. Also in the 17^th century, in an official census, the Mohammedans were the majority. Although this majority included the Linobambaki who were an independent community, it nevertheless highlights the point that the Orthodox, even if they were the largest religious community, were not the majority.

[17] Neo-Cypriots like an idyllic picture of cohabitation until the evil nationalists came along and lured the “uneducated people” etc.

[18] These “leaders” appeared after the popular mobilisations to “lead” the military struggle. And it is no coincidence that the Neo-Cypriot and Greek-Christian historians, each trying to justify their state, argue over the moods of the 3 leaders instead of the popular tendencies that were admittedly common (Christian-Muslim) and with obvious implications of a final conflict (and the elites of course responded in unison. Archbishop Panaretos blessed and justified the massacres of Christians and Muslims in Paphos after the suppression of the movement). Anyway, anyone who wants to justify modern institutions of power will look no further than the embryonic power mechanisms (leaderships) that were created in the movements.

[19] The uprisings, beyond the class edge, also had the prospect of more rapprochement between the two communities after political equality regardless of religion. Hill, for example, observes that Gavür Imam was perhaps named so because he promised Christian-Muslim equality.

[20] The claims of the Greek-Christians that the movements were of an Enosis nature are far-fetched to say the least. The rebellion of the more “Enosis” leader (Nicholas Theseus) was quickly dispersed and it is unlikely that the insurgents (including many Turks) had any idea of the ideas of the self-proclaimed “military leader”. The same applies to Ioannikios, who even collaborated with Gavür Imam, and whose (Ioannikios’) last comrades were 40 Albanians. As for the other “self-proclaimed” leader, Gavür Imam, his intentions are not yet clear. The Neo-Cypriots want him to be the most genuine popular leader, while L. Piggouras, in a study-distraction for the Neo-Cypriots, suggests that he had links with Egypt and that he was a ‘Cypriot Ali Pasha’. Although from a historical point of view all this is interesting, we hope that in the future our historians will solve the problem of “good” and “bad” leaders (theirs and others) and also deal a little with the class movement (as many of them claim to be Marxists anyway).

[21] Studies by two American psychologists among Cypriot youth in the 1960s. Among other things, they found a more pronounced nationalism among high school youth than among older people or private school students. Also, in a thematic analysis of school textbooks, nationalism and anti-Turkism were among the most projected values.

[22] Cyprus: A case study

[23] Not to imply that this is only the practice of right-wing nationalist movements, anyone who is interested should look at Stina’s book “EAM, ELAS, OPLA” to see the practices of a left-wing nationalist movement against ideological opponents, marginalised people, prostitutes, etc.

[24] The reference to EOKA and the criticism of this organisation is not made at the level of the A or B fighter. It is a criticism of the ideological climate that gave birth to and tolerated EOKA — and on an individual level to its initiators and organizers — Makarios and, more importantly, Grivas. Beyond that, there is no doubt that beyond the interest-seekers who sought a position in the Cypriot state (Giorkatzis) or the ideological fascists (Grivas), there were also people who believed and fought for freedom and the anti-colonial struggle. If more people thought like the quote from Matsis below, things might have been different: “That’s why I don’t care if this land is lived on by Turks or Greeks. What has value is that it is lived by those who water it with their sweat, standing on it free…”

[25] The description of EOKA as an “elite of male heroes” does not mean that EOKA had no female followers or even members. Grivas in ’56 ordered the creation of women’s groups — which, despite their training, of course always remained as reserves. It is also worth reading the book by Eleni Seraphim Loizou (the only woman who was allowed to turn “wanted in case of need” (i.e. a partisan) and one of the few (were there any others?) female section leaders of EOKA. The way she talks about the ” leader”, phrases like “the earth opened up to swallow me” when she was congratulated by the “ leader” in front of the male section commanders, the fact that in order to convince the men to take on a mission, she threatened them that if they didn’t, she would “send girls”, etc. say a lot about the mentality in EOKA, especially when said by a woman who had risen on its ranks somewhat. It is in these contexts that the elite man-hero critique is made. Like the mentality, ideology and power structure of the organization — which were clearly male issues — women, like the people, were at best the reserves.

[26] Both communal and social patriarchy have their own distinctions.

[27] For those who like sociological definitions, the classical distinction between Gemeinschuft and Gessellschaft (for all its drawbacks) is closer to the distinction of patriarchy proposed here.

[28] For a first reflection on the issue of changing morals, crisis of the family, etc. in the period of change, see Edward Shorter’s classic study ‘History of the modern Family’. Shorter observes that the first sexual revolution that took place in this period was made by the lower classes (the proletarians).

[29] It enters a crisis in the sense that the pressure and struggle of women goes beyond the interpersonal level, it is brought into the political problem. It is no coincidence in this context that modern feminism appears from the French Revolution onwards and goes hand in hand with other social movements (e.g. worker’s movement). As pointed out in the study “Fire in the minds of Men”, between the two major revolutionary currents of the 19^th century (socialist — nationalist), women revolutionaries had more fields of expression and a preference for the former.

[30] It is not clear whether the intensification of the “pseudomoral” campaign coincided with an intensification of the crisis of communal patriarchy and the dimensions of this crisis. The lack of a lot of data and of a socio-historical analysis creates problems of identifying the historical phases of the reconstruction. Perhaps the most serious shortcoming is the near absence of studies and analysis of the position of Cypriot women in various historical phases. The little evidence that does exist, such as the large number of dialogues in the archbishopric codes (see Kirris), the existence of “ children of the street”, etc., points to a model with many similarities to the European ones that have been analysed in depth. Certainly, however, much more is needed in this area. — One of the few studies of women in the 18^th and 19^th centuries presented in the “popular university” is a collection of extracts (mostly from foreign observers) without a theoretical-analytical framework.

[31] This trend has been observed by several scholars. Al Habri, for example, attributes it to man’s attempt to make up for the fact that he cannot give life like the woman in childbirth. When this effort is placed in the context of a power relationship (such as patriarchy), it turns into perpetuation and immortality on the basis of domination.

[32] Libertarian anarchist movements developed in the 20^th century in intense competition with nationalist movements. Suffice it to mention two classic anarchist movements, the Makhnovist movement in Ukraine in 1918–21 and the revolution in Catalonia (and other Spanish regions of course) in 1936. In both cases, both the Makhno movement and the CNT had to confront the nationalists, who ultimately played a role in the defeat of the revolution. It is necessary to stress that in both regions there was a “national” problem (of autonomy from the Russian or Spanish state). The anarchists and the nationalists offered completely different solutions to the problem (the former decentralized-separate federation of regions, the latter the creation of a nation-state). Without responding to the national issue, at the level it was presented, the anarchists formed an autonomous ‘discourse and sphere’, insofar as their counter-power could be counterposed against the state and the nationalists, and opened up new solutions.

[33] See the persecution of Rebetiko when it was a live singing practise or the modern persecution of “Turkish gypsy”, “gypsy” etc.

[34] The impression is often cultivated that the English did everything to de-hellenise the Greek Cypriots. This is a far-fetched fairy tale from the nationalist period. Without caring much for the Cypriots, the English nevertheless increased the power of the Greeks and for various reasons encouraged the Greek-Christian movement in its early days (see Churchill’s statements in ’12, Governor Storrs’ writings, etc.). In the first period (up to ’14 when the annexation took place and some up to ’30) several Englishmen through a Eurocentric racism (against the eastern Turks) or for reasons of political expediency (since until ’14 England was just a placeholder in Cyprus belonging to the Ottoman Empire) emphasized quite clearly the Greekness of Cyprus.

[35] Although the Greek Christians live with this nightmare, the Neo-Cypriots have not yet proposed it. Their two demands, which aroused the holy wrath of our Greeks (and the pro-Enosis Marxists, of course), were the proposal to officially establish only the Cypriot flag as the state flag (i.e. to do away with the Greek flag) and to create a Cypriot national anthem. Yearnings that these people have.