#title The Philosophy of Social Ecology #subtitle Essays on Dialectical Naturalism #author Murray Bookchin #source <[[https://archive.org/details/isbn_9210921689630][www.archive.org/details/isbn_9210921689630]]> & <[[https://www.akpress.org/philosophyofsocialecology.html][www.akpress.org/philosophyofsocialecology.html]]> #lang en #pubdate 2026-01-26T15:34:45.869Z #topics social philosophy, social ecology, dialectics, green anarchism, nature, AK Press, #date 1996 #publisher AK Press #isbn 1849354405, 9781849354400 #cover m-b-murray-bookchin-the-philosophy-of-social-ecolo-1.jpg #notes Third Edition #rights 2022 The Bookchin Trust. Afterword © 2022 Todd McGowan. First Edition, 1990. Second Edition, 1996. Cover design by John Yates, www.stealworks.com. *** Dedication | ~~
*Nature* properly encompasses everything around us, from the organic beings that we normally designate as “natural” to the lifeless moon that appears on relatively cloudless nights—that is, the totality of Being. However, if we are to use the word *Nature* in any more specific sense, we should use an adjective before it to describe what *aspect* of “nature” we are talking about—something that I often did not do in these essays, owing to the time period in which they were written. The reader who encounters the word *nature* herein, unmodified by any adjective, should now take it to refer to my notion of “first nature,” or the cumulative evolution of the natural world, especially the organic world. This first nature exists in both continuity *and* discontinuity with “second nature,” or the evolution of society. As I discuss in some detail in “Thinking Ecologically,” second nature develops both in continuity with first nature and as its antithesis, until the two are subsumed into “free nature” or “Nature” rendered self-conscious in a rational and ecological society.
*Society*, in turn, is more than mere consociation or community. It is *institutionalized* community, structured around mutable organizational forms that may range from totalitarian despotism to libertarian municipalism. As such, society is specific to human beings; indeed, an expression like ‘social insects’ is, from my standpoint, nonsensical and oxymoronic, conflating a fixed, genetically programmed aggregation of animals with the developmentally structured consociation of humans. As for *reason* and *rationality*, when I use these terms without any qualifying adjective, I mean *dialectical reason*, a secular dialectical *logos*, as contrasted with *instrumental* or *conventional reason*, an ordinary mental skill. *History*, as I argue in the final essay, is the cultural and social unfolding of reason, not simply a succession of events over time, for which I reserve the word *Chronicles*. *Civilization* is the actualization in varying degrees of historical unfolding, while *Progress* is, more loosely, the self-directive activity of History and Civilization toward increasing rationality, freedom, and self-consciousness in relationships between human and human, and in the relationship of humanity to the natural world.In its influence upon, and reflection within, contemporary revolutionary movements around the world, Bookchin’s *Philosophy of Social Ecology* has proven to be not merely a scholarly work but the foundation of a living, breathing, and continuously evolving praxis. Dialectal naturalism forms the basis of a core tenet of the Kurdish freedom movement, which gained prominence after the Arab Spring in 2011, and has been deeply informed by Bookchin’s work in its configuration of a new ecological politics, empowered, in particular, by the prominent role played by women in every aspect of society and by a directly democratic confederation of cities, towns, and villages. The Kurdish movement has shown us promising glimpses of what a rational, ecological political system might look like, advanced along the lines of an objective ethics rooted in radically democratic notions of community. The *Philosophy of Social Ecology* makes a groundbreaking contribution to dialectical philosophy applied to the study and practice of ecological ethics. I hope readers will find it a compelling work of speculative reason that seeks to uncover the kind of philosophical framework necessary to help us build a more rational society. Debbie Bookchin September 16, 2021 ** Introduction: A Philosophical Naturalism What is nature? What is humanity’s place in nature? And what is the relationship of society to the natural world? In an era of ecological breakdown, these have become searing questions of momentous importance for our everyday lives and for the future that we and other life-forms face. They are not abstract philosophical questions that should be relegated to a remote, airy world of metaphysical speculation. Nor can we answer them in an offhand way, with poetic metaphors or visceral, unthinking reactions. The definitions and ethical standards with which we respond to them may ultimately decide whether human society will creatively foster natural evolution, or whether we will render the planet uninhabitable for all complex life-forms, including our own. At first glance, everybody presumably “knows” what nature is. It is that which is “all around us”—in the form of trees, animals, rocks, and the like. It is that which “humanity” is destroying and coating with oil. But such offhand definitions of nature fall apart when we examine them with some care. If nature is indeed what is all around us, may we reasonably ask, if a carefully manicured suburban lawn is not nature? Or if the split-level house it surrounds is not nature? Or if the people who occupy the house, not to speak of its furnishings are not natural? These sorts of questions are likely to elicit strident polemical answers that reflect highly conflicting outlooks. Some thoughtful people will respond that only “wild,” “primordial,” or even nonhuman nature is authentically natural. Others, no less thoughtful, will reply that nature is basically the “matter,” or the materialized stuff of the universe in any form—what philosophers sweepingly call *Being*. Indeed, wide philosophical differences have existed for centuries in the West over the very definition of the word *nature*. These differences remain unresolved to this day, even when nature makes headlines in environmental issues that are of enormous importance for the future of nearly all life-forms. I need hardly add that the definition of “nature” becomes even more complex when we ask if the human species is part of nature—and if so, in what way; or if human society with its ensemble of technologies and artifacts—not to speak of such ineffable features as its conflicting social interests and institutions—is any less a part of nature than nonhuman animals? And if human beings are part of nature, are we merely one life-form among many, or are we unique in ways that place major responsibilities on us with respect to the world of life that no other species shares or is even capable of sharing? We must determine in what way humanity “fits” into nature, whatever the word “nature” means to us. And we must confront the complex and challenging question of society’s relationship to nature, or more specifically, the different social forms that appeared in the past, that exist today, and that may appear in the future. If these questions are not answered with reasonable clarity—or at least fully discussed—we will lack any ethical direction in dealing with our environmental problems and nonhuman life-forms. Unless we know what nature is and humanity’s and society’s place in it, we will be left with vague intuitions and visceral sentiments that do not cohere into clear views or provide a guide for effective action.
distinctions between two grades of being—divine and mortal, lordly and subservient, noble and mean, of higher and lower honor. It was the ending of these distinctions that made nature autonomous and therefore completely and unexceptionally ‘just.’ Given a society of equals, it was assumed, justice was sure to follow, for none would have the power to dominate the rest. This assumption ... had a strictly physical sense. It was accepted not as a political dogma but as a theorem in physical inquiry. It is, none the less, remarkable evidence of the confidence which the great age of Greek democracy possessed in the validity of the democratic idea—a confidence so robust that it survived translation into the first principles of cosmology and medical theory.[15]
within the system of police and law enforcement, and indeed in all hierarchies, it is most undesirable to have direct contact between levels that are non-consecutive. It is not good for the total organization to have a pipeline of communication between the driver of the automobile [who is ticketed for violating a speed limit] and the state police chief. Such communication is bad for the morale of the police force. Nor is it desirable for the policeman to have direct access to the legislature, which would undermine the authority of the police chief.... In legal and administrative systems, such jumping of logical levels is called *ex post facto* legislation. In families, the analogous errors are called *double binds*. In genetics, the Weissmannian barrier which prevents the inheritance of acquired characteristics seems to prevent disasters of this nature. To permit direct influence from somatic state to genetic structure might destroy the hierarchy of organization within the creature.[25]This is sociobiology with a vengeance. Nor was one of the outstanding founders of systems theory, Ludwig von Bertalanffy, immune to this tendency when he observed that “the behavior of animals such as rats, cats, and monkeys provides the necessary bases for interpretation and control of human behavior; what appears to be special in man is secondary and ultimately to be reduced to biological drives and primary needs.”[26] Bertalanffy’s “general system theory”—with which he seeks to replace Cartesian mechanism, “one-way causality,” and “unorganized complexity”—hardly solves the problems that cybernetic mechanism raises. Ultimately, the thinking in both cases is similar: a general system theory based on a worldview of “organized complexity” is essentially a cybernetic system that is “open” rather than “closed.” Bertalanffy admits that general system theory is still mechanistic in the sense that it presupposes a “mechanism,” that is, structural arrangements. Although it is quite true that “in behavioral parlance, the cybernetic model is the familiar S-R [stimulus-response] ... scheme” and simply replaces “*linear causality*” with “*circular causality* by way of the feedback loop,” the claims advanced by a general system theory to encompass “multivariable interaction maintenance of wholes in the counteraction of component parts, multilevel organization into systems of ever-higher order, differentiation, centralization, progressive mechanization, steering and trigger causality, regulation, evolution toward higher organization, teleology and goal-directedness in various forms and ways, etc.,” are generally more programmatic than real and incorporate some of the most authoritarian and mechanistic attributes of cybernetics. That the “elaboration of this program has only just begun... and is beset with difficulties” is an understatement.[27] The issue of development—specifically evolution—is crucial to nature philosophy, but a solution to the problem of why development occurs, why order and complexity emerge from lesser degrees of order and simplicity, remains markedly absent from systems theory. None of the systems theories come close to an explanation of development and it is not at all clear that the explanatory powers of cybernetics and systems theory can encompass it. To my knowledge, the only “breakthrough” in this regard that lends credibility to Bertalanffy’s sweeping claims for the explanatory potential of general system theory has been Ilya Prigogine’s mathematical elaboration of the organizing role of positive feedback.[28] Prigogines work essentially utilizes the symmetry-breaking effects of positive feedback (or more bluntly, disorder) as a means for creating “order” at various levels of organization. As valuable as this approach may be within the realm of systems theory itself, particularly in its applications to chemistry, the spontaneous structuration that it describes does so as the result of causes no less mechanistic than Bateson’s ladder of “Minds” and Koestler’s hierarchy of “holons.” Certainly, no systems theory I have cited explains *why* one “level of organization” supersedes or incorporates another; at best, they describe only *how*, and even these descriptions are woefully incomplete. Bateson’s stochastic strategy for “explaining” sequence, for example, merely correlates random genetic mutations (or worse, point mutations, which are piecemeal as well as random) with a “selective process” that is remarkably passive. Natural selection merely tells us that the “fittest” survive environmental changes. If all we know about evolutionary development is that, amidst a flurry of utterly random mutations, the organisms that are capable of surviving are those that are the “fittest” to survive—a circular thesis—then we know very little about evolution indeed. It is not clear whether cybernetics and systems theory can extend beyond mere *interaction*, as distinguished from authentic *development*. We certainly have no “system” or “Mind” other than mere interaction that explains it in these theories. An “interaction” cannot be construed as a relationship unless it is meaningful. To call the mere physical fact that one human being stumbles over another “intersubjectivity,” for example, degrades the very meaning of the word *subjective*. The encounter of one body with another merely produces a form of physical contact. The “interaction” becomes “intersubjective” only when the two persons address each other—possibly with friendly recognition, possibly with expletives, possibly even with blows. Moreover, in view of recent “formalizations” of even radical social theories, I cannot emphasize too strongly that attempting to understand this “interaction” in all its possible forms and meanings requires knowing the social and psychological context in which it occurred—that is to say, the history or dialectic, however trivial, that lies buried within the “intersubjectivity” that results from the “interaction.”
has only phenomenal knowledge for its object, this exposition seems not to be Science, free and self-moving in its own peculiar shape; yet from this standpoint it can be regarded as the path of the natural consciousness which presses forward to true knowledge; or as the way of the Soul which journeys through the series of its own configurations as though they were the stations appointed for it by its own nature, so that it may purify itself for the life of the Spirit, and achieve finally, through a completed experience of itself, the awareness of what it really is in itself.” This “pressing forward” is immanent to true knowledge, for short of finding its goal, “no satisfaction is to be found at any of the stations along the way.”[30]Like Lukács, and unlike the academics who have vitiated Hegel’s strong reality principle, I share Engels’s view that the *Phenomenology* may be regarded as “a parallel of the embryology and the paleontology of the mind, a development of individual consciousness through its different stages, set in the form of an abbreviated reproduction of the stages through which the consciousness of man has passed in the course of history.”[31] To a remarkable extent, although by no means consistently, the self-movement of consciousness in the *Phenomenology* parallels the self-movement of consciousness in historical reality, although the strategy is captive to rational reality and the ethical universe it opens for ecology. Taking as our presuppositions Diderot’s concept of *sensibilité* in “matter” and Hegel’s phenomenological strategy, we emerge with a fascinating possibility. Speaking metaphorically, it is nature itself that seems to “write” natural philosophy and ethics, not logicians, positivists, neo-Kantians, and heirs of Galilean scientism. According to a fairly recent revolution in astrophysics (possibly comparable to the achievements of Copernicus and Kepler), the cosmos is opening itself up to us in new ways that demand an exhilaratingly speculative turn of mind and a more qualitative approach to natural phenomena than in the past. It is becoming increasingly tenable to hold that the entire universe is the cradle of life—not merely our own planet or possibly planets like it. The formation of all the elements from hydrogen and helium, their combination into small molecules and later into self-forming macromolecules, and finally the organization of these macromolecules into the constituents of life and possibly mind follow a sequence that challenges Bertrand Russell’s image of humanity as an accidental spark in a meaningless void. The presence of complex organic molecules in the vast reaches of the universe is replacing the classical image of space as a void with an understanding of space as a restlessly active chemogenic ground for an astonishing sequence of increasingly complex chemical compounds. Recent theories about the formation of DNA that are modeled on the activity of crystalline replication (a notion advanced as early as 1944 by Erwin Schrodinger) suggest how genetic guidance and evolution itself might have emerged to form an interface between the inorganic and organic.[32] The point is that we can no longer be satisfied with the theory of an inert “matter” that fortuitously aggregates into life. The universe bears witness to a *developing*—not merely moving—substance, whose most dynamic and creative attribute is its unceasing capacity for self-organization into increasingly complex forms. Form plays a central role in this developmental and growth process, while function is an indispensable correlate. The orderly universe that makes science possible and its highly concise logic—mathematics—meaningful presupposes the correlation of form with function. In life—a *graded* development beyond the chemogenic crucible that we call the universe—metabolism and development establish another elaboration of *sensibilité*: symbiosis. Recent data support the applicability of Peter Kropotkin’s mutualistic naturalism not only to relationships between species but among complex cellular forms. As biologist William Trager astutely observed about the “struggle for existence” and the “survival of the fittest”: “few people realize that mutual cooperation between different kinds of organisms—symbiosis—is just as important, and that the ‘fittest may be the one that most helps another to survive.”[33] Indeed, the cellular structure of all multicellular organisms is itself testimony to a symbiotic arrangement that renders complex life-forms possible. The eukaryotic cell—a cell that makes up an organism—is a highly functional symbiotic arrangement of the less complex and more primal prokaryotes, or single-celled organisms, and evolved in an anaerobic world long before our highly oxygenated atmosphere was formed. The work of Lynn Margulis gives us reason to believe that eukaryotic flagella derived from anaerobic spirochetes; that mitochondria derived from prokaryotic bacteria that were capable of respiration as well as fermentation; and that plant chloroplasts derived from blue-green algae (cyanobacteria).[34] If Manfred Eigen is correct that evolution “appears to be an inevitable event, given the presence of certain matter with specified autocatalytic properties and under the maintenance of the finite (free) energy flow [solar energy] necessary to compensate for the steady production of energy,” then our very concept of matter has to be radically revised.[35] The prospect that life and all its attributes are latent in matter as such, that biological evolution is deeply rooted in symbiosis or mutualism, suggests that what we call matter is actually active substance. The traditional dualism between the living and nonliving worlds, between organisms and their abiotic ecosystems, is being replaced with the more challenging notion that life “makes much of its own environment,” to use Margulis’s words. From an ecological viewpoint, in which life is in its environment and not isolated from it, the Weissmannian barrier that conveniently separates genetic from somatic changes ceases to be meaningful. “Certain properties of the atmosphere, sediments, and hydrosphere are controlled by and for the biosphere”; by comparing lifeless planets such as Mars and Venus with the Earth, Margulis notes that the high concentration of oxygen in our atmosphere is anomalous in contrast with the carbon dioxide atmospheres of other planets. Moreover, “the concentration of oxygen in the Earth’s atmosphere remains constant in the presence of nitrogen, methane, hydrogen, and other potential reactants.” Life-forms, in effect, play an active role in maintaining a relatively constant supply of free oxygen molecules in the Earth’s atmosphere. If the anomalies of the Earth’s atmosphere “are far from random,” much the same can be said for the temperature of the Earth’s surface and the salinity of its oceans, whose stability seems to be a function of life on the planet. The “natural selection” of Darwinian evolution may itself be the product of life-forms, which presumably filter out some genetic changes.[36] Even the Modern Synthesis, the neo-Darwinian model of organic evolution that has been in force since the early 1940s, has been challenged as too narrow and perhaps too mechanistic in its outlook. Its thesis of slow-paced evolutionary change emerging from the interplay of small variations, which are “selected” for their adaptability to the environment, is no longer as tenable as it once seemed based on the fossil record. Evolution seems instead to have been rather more sporadic, marked by occasional changes of considerable rapidity, then long periods of stasis. The “Effect Hypothesis,” advanced by Elizabeth Vrba, suggests that evolution includes an immanent striving, not merely random mutational changes filtered by external selective factors. As one observer notes, “Whereas species selection puts the forces of change on environmental conditions, the Effect Hypothesis looks to internal parameters that affect the rates of speciation and extinction.”[37] Indeed, the theory of small, gradual point mutations (a theory that accords with the Victorian notion of strictly fortuitous evolutionary change, much like the Victorian image of the economic marketplace) can be challenged on genetic grounds alone. Not only genes but chromosomes, too, may be altered chemically and mechanically. Genetic changes may range from “simple” point mutations, through jumping genes and transposable elements, to major chromosomal rearrangements. Major morphological changes may thus result from mosaics of genetic change. This dynamic raises the intriguing possibility of a directiveness to genetic change itself, not simply a promiscuous and purely fortuitous randomness, and an environment largely created by life itself, not by forces exclusively external to it. Neither mysticism nor anthropocentrism is involved in an ecological view that ontologically grades natural history into social history without sacrificing the unity of either. Nor is it a supernatural fallacy to ultimately derive the human brain from an actively chemogenic universe that is self-forming and immanently entelechial. Although Hans Driesch gave entelechy a bad name, the concept derives from Aristotle, not from Driesch’s confused neovitalism. The fallacies of classical Greek cosmology generally lie less in its ethical orientation than in its dualistic view of nature. For all its emphasis on speculation at the expense of experimentation, ancient cosmology erred most when it tried to join the self-organizing, fecund nature it had inherited from the Ionians with a vitalizing force alien to the natural world itself. The self-organizing properties of nature were replaced with Parmenides’ Dike—like Bergson’s *elan vital*, a latently dualistic cosmology that could not trust nature to develop on its own spontaneous grounds, any more than ruling social and political strata trust the body politic to manage its own affairs. These archaisms, with their theological nuances and their tightly formulated teleologies, have been justly viewed as socially reactionary traps. They tainted the works of Aristotle and Hegel as surely as they mesmerized the medieval Schoolmen. Classical nature philosophy erred not in its project of trying to elicit an ethics from nature, but in the spirit of domination that poisoned it from the start with an often authoritarian, supernatural arbiter who weighed and corrected the imbalances or “injustices” that erupted in nature. The ancient gods were still worshiped in the classical era, even after Heraclitus; they had to be exorcised by the Enlightenment before an ethical continuum between nature and humanity could be rendered more meaningful and “democratic.” Late Renaissance thought initiated a new, more rational connection between nature and humanity. Beginning with Galileo and the new scientific societies that were emerging, the way was opened to the increasingly democratic participation of everyone in the discovery of truth. All men—and later women—could now participate in unearthing knowledge, and the veracity of the facts they discovered could be judged freely by the merits of their work, not by their social status. Today, we may well be able to permit nature—not Dike, God, Spirit, or an *elan vital*—to open itself up to us as the ground for an ethics on its own terms. Contemporary science’s greatest achievement is the growing evidence it provides that randomness is subject to a directive ordering principle. Mutualism is a good by virtue of its function in fostering the evolution of natural variety and complexity. We require no Dike to affirm community as a desideratum in nature and society. Similarly, the claims of freedom are validated by what Hans Jonas so perceptively called the “inwardness” of life-forms, their “organic identity” and “adventure of form.” The effort, venture, indeed self-recognition that every living being exercises in the course of “its precarious metabolic continuity” to preserve itself reveals—even in the most rudimentary of organisms—a sense of identity and selective activity that Jonas appropriately called evidence of “germinal freedom.”[38] “Open systems,” “minds,” and “holons” may explain the disequilibria that *change* cybernetic and general systems, but we must invariably fall back on inherent attributes of substance—notably, the motion, form, and *sensibilité* of “matter”—to account for the *development of nature toward complexity, specialization, and consciousness*. This necessity runs counter to every bias in current philosophy, which would ignore the fact of directiveness or endow it with human traits like *purposiveness* when it is simply a tendency that inheres in the organization of substance as potentiality.
The basic dynamics of evolution, according to the new systems view, begins with a system of homeostasis—a state of dynamic balance characterized by multiple independent fluctuations. When the system is disturbed it has the tendency to maintain its stability by means of negative feedback mechanisms, which tend to reduce the deviation from the balanced state. However, this is not the only possibility. Deviations may also be reinforced internally through positive feedback, either in response to environmental changes or spontaneously without any external influence. The stability of a living system is continually tested by its fluctuations, and at certain moments one or several of them may become so strong that they drive the system over an instability into an entirely new structure, which will again be fluctuating and relatively stable. The stability of living systems is never absolute. It will persist as long as the fluctuations remain below a critical size, but any system is always ready to transform itself, always ready to evolve. This basic model for evolution, worked out for chemical dissipative structures by Prigogine and his collaborators, has since been applied successfully to describe the evolution of various biological, social, and ecological systems.[50]Almost everything that is troubling about spiritual mechanism, from its terminology to its thought, is contained in this telling passage. Systems theory is certainly useful in explaining the operation of systems, especially ones so structured as to lend themselves to systems theory analysis, just as the equations of physics can explain any phenomenon that can be reduced to the terms of physics. What serious people in ecological philosophy have to ask themselves is whether evolution, let alone self-transcendence, can really be reduced to “dynamics,” “interdependent fluctuations, “feedback mechanisms”—or even “inputs” and “outputs”—that do not differ in principle from the Newtonian orientation toward phenomena or from La Mettrie’s eighteenth-century description of human beings as machines. If there is anything developmental or evolutionary (as distinguished from merely kinetic) about a systems-theory “paradigm,” it is simply that some relatively homeostatic phenomena, conceived precisely as systems, may be replaced with other, hopefully complex systems. In either case, despite the imagery that Capra tries to form in the reader’s mind, we cannot properly speak of one mechanism being qualitatively transformed into another. If the essential problem of organic development is reduced at all its levels to “feedback loops” and “fluctuations,” our thinking has not advanced beyond Cartesian and Hobbesian mechanism, however lavishly we speak of the “coevolution of an organism *plus* its environment,” of “wholeness,” or of Taoist sagacity and Franciscan theology.[51] There is a physical basis to everything that physics—“Taoist,” Newtonian, or Prigoginian—describes with varying degrees of exactness and at various levels of physical development. But this fact is no more a warrant for casting *all* phenomena in terms of these descriptions than reducing the entire world to matter and motion. Indeed, such reductionism is fatal to any form of organismic thinking. Capra’s explication of a systems theory of evolution describes thought as “free.”[52] But to speak of “autonomy and freedom of choice” in nature, pure and simple, is to diminish the ethical meaning of the words. Nature may be an evolving *ground* for autonomy, freedom, and an increasing measure of choice, but a ground *is no more identical with the ethics it sustains* than nutrients in soil are identical with the plants they sustain. Autonomy and freedom presuppose human intellection, the power to conceptualize and generalize. Their domain must be explicated in cultural, logical, and, within very definite limits, biological terms—not in terms of a cosmic “dynamics” that is “basically open and indeterminate.”[53] Indeed, to flippantly confuse indeterminacy with autonomy and openness with freedom is to shift from one level to another as carelessly as one stirs a cup of tea. Capra’s approach to “freedom” renders indeterminacy and statistical probability in physics coequal with human social freedom, without the least regard for the staggering complexity of social institutions, wayward individual proclivities, diverse cultural traditions, and conflicting personal wills. Ilya Prigogine has attempted to explain the organic process of evolution through “chemical dissipative structures,” in which various systems are formed in succession, each hopefully of greater complexity than the ones that preceded it.[54] In a succession of systems, these “dissipative structures,” which can be mathematically formulated, are shown to succeed each other: a system approaches a “far from equilibrium” situation, which marks its transition to a new system. Here, as “dissipative structures” replace the phases of growth, development gives way to thermodynamics. Nor does a system of positive feedback, upon which Prigoginian systems theory depends, *allow for a concept of potentiality: it is rather chance and stochastic phenomena* that act as “mediating” phases between one “dissipative structure” and another. Confronted with “far from equilibrium” disorder and succeeding orderly systems, speculative thought is reduced to mere observation. Indeed, a system approaching transition may not assume an immanently predictable form thereafter—it may simply fall apart into “chaos.” These systems have, in effect, no internal developmental logic. Prigogine’s mathematics can no more explain the biological, social, and personal differentiae that make up reality, even with the aid of winged Taoist metaphors, than a heap of bricks can form itself into a Gothic cathedral through the “fluctuations” involved in positive feedback. One could, with equal aplomb, try to reduce organic metabolism to Einstein’s cosmic formula *
When I tell people how the worst thing we could do in Ethiopia is to give aid—the best thing would be to just let nature seek its own balance, to let the people there just starve ... they think that is monstrous. But the alternative is that you go in and save these half-dead children who never will live a whole life. Their development will be stunted. And what’s going to happen in ten years’ time is that twice as many people will suffer and die.
Likewise, letting the USA be an overflow valve for problems in Latin America is not solving a thing. It’s just putting more pressure on resources we have in the USA. It is just causing more destruction of our wilderness, more poisoning of water and air, and it isn’t helping the problems in Latin America.[61]Regrettably, it is all too easy to interpret such remarks as an apologia for imperialism, racism, and genocide. To consider starvation as merely an “alternative” to the civil war that wracked Ethiopia and the destruction of so much of the cultural integrity of Latin American villages by (largely American) corporate interests reveals a shocking social amnesia. It is breathtaking to contemplate the extent to which this “ecological” ensemble of ideas deflects public attention from the *social origins* of ecological problems. That anything besides “nature” is seeking its “balance” in the Third World seems to elude Foreman, whose obfuscation of social problems expresses the logic of a reductionist “ecology.” Such “reverence for the earth” stifles even the modest decencies of middle-class virtues like empathy and concern for the plight of hungry children. “Earth wisdom” of this kind could well leave us with a “love” of the planet but no care for the underprivileged who make up so much of the human species. Yet Foreman’s remarks are not idiosyncratic. Quite to the contrary: an authoritarian streak is latent in a crude biologism that conceals an ever-diminishing humaneness with “natural law” and papers over the fact that it is *capitalism* that is at work here, not an abstract “Humanity” and “Society.” This authoritarian mentality sometimes coexists with pious appeals to variants of Eastern spirituality, placing a saintly mask on the ruthless egoism that stems from bourgeois greed. “Ecological thinking” of this kind is all the more sinister because it subverts the organic, indeed dialectical thinking that can rescue us from reductionism. An unbridgeable gulf separates social ecology from the neo-Malthusianism that the ensemble of biocentrism, antihumanism, and “natural law” theory have spawned. We are grimly in need of a “reenchantment” of humanity—to use the quasi-mystical jargon of our day—with a fluid, organismic, and dialectical rationality. For it is in this *human* rationality that nature ultimately actualizes its own evolution of subjectivity over long aeons of neural and sensory development. *There is nothing more natural than humanity’s capacity to conceptualize, generalize, relate ideas, engage in symbolic communication, and innovate changes in the world around it, not merely to adapt to the conditions it finds at hand.* For biocentric, antihumanist, and “natural law” advocates to set their faces against the self-realization of nature in an ecologically oriented humanity and dialectical thought is to foster the image of a blighted humanity. No less than Adam and Eve’s acquisition of knowledge, humanity’s power of thought becomes its abiding “original sin.” Yet for all its moral loftiness, this stance turns out to be a regression of speculative thought to a pedestrian form of “common sense”—generously sprinkled, to be sure, with mystical metaphors. Typically, Foreman not only laments the fate of African children and Latin American peasants for whom, to be sure, he seeks rapid oblivion. In the most galling way, he *calculates* their poor chances, given aid or not, even as he invokes “nature [to] seek its own balance.” This begs the question of what “nature” is doing in contrast, say, to agribusiness. Having dropped to all fours, our “Earth First!” acolyte quickly turns into a pedestrian American bourgeois. The USA, we are advised cannot be an “overflow *valve*” for hungry Latin American peasants who would only “put more pressure on the resources *we* have in the USA” and destroy “our” wilderness! (my emphasis). The language, here, is delicious: Foreman has a strong sense of possession and a cybernetic mind whose imagery, drawn from plumbing, would cause any struggling corporate board member to salivate with envy. A self-balancing notion of “natural law” for the hungry “them” betrays a noxious respect for the border guards who will protect a privileged “we” from losing our “resources” and “wilderness,” a crude way of thinking that should earn Foreman a citizenship award from the Chamber of Commerce. The numbed dying of Africa and the hungry poor of Latin America who are luckless enough to be people of color in their plundered lands have no voice in this “ecologism”—an “ecologism” that is as inhuman in its morality as it is mechanistic in its thinking. *** Ecologizing the Dialectic It is eminently *natural* for humanity to create a “second nature” from its evolution in “first nature.” By *second nature*, I mean the development of a uniquely human culture, with a wide variety of institutionalized human communities, effective human technics, richly symbolic languages, and carefully managed sources of nutriment. Dualism, in all its forms, has opposed these two natures to each other, as antagonists. Monism, in turn, often dissolves one into the other—be it liberalism, fascism, or more recently, the biocentrism that so closely approximates misanthropic antihumanism. These monist ideologies differ primarily in whether they want to dissolve first nature into second or second nature into first. What these dualisms and monisms have in common is an acceptance of domination. Classically, the counterpart of the “domination of nature by man” has been the “domination of man by nature.” Just as Marxism and liberalism see the former as a desideratum that emerges out of the latter, so enthusiasts of “natural law” accept the latter as a fact and condemn efforts to achieve the former. These views are deeply flawed—not only because they are conceptually one-sided or simply wrong, but because of the way they are philosophically structured and worked out. The real question, I submit, is not whether second nature parallels, opposes, or blandly “participates” in an “egalitarian” first nature;[62] rather, it is how second nature is *derived* from first nature. More specifically, in what ways did the highly graded and many-phased evolution from first nature into second give rise to social institutions, forms of interactions between people, and an interaction between first and second nature that, in the best of cases, enriches both and yields a second nature that has an evolutionary development of its own? The ecological crisis we face today is very much a crisis in the emergence of society out of biology, in the problems (the rise of hierarchy, domination, patriarchy, classes, and the state) that unfolded with this development, and in the liberatory pathways that provide an alternative to this warped history. The fact that first and second nature exist and can never be dualized into “parallels” or simplistically reduced to each other, accounts in great part for my phrase *social ecology*. Additionally, social ecology has the special meaning that the ecological crisis that beleaguers us stems from a social crisis, a crisis that the crude biologism of “deep ecology” generally ignores. Still further, that the resolution of this social crisis can only be achieved by reorganizing society along rational lines, imbued with an ecological philosophy and sensibility. Such a philosophy and sensibility cannot be eclectically patched together from bits and pieces of mechanism and mysticism, or of conventional reason and Eastern spirituality. One could respect a consistently Eastern mystical view or a consistently Western mechanistic view, however one-sided or erroneous each may be. But neither view can fruitfully derive second nature from first nature organically. That requires a mode of thought that distinguishes the phases of the evolutionary continuum from which second nature emerges and yet preserves first nature as part of the process. Common sense betrays us with its demand for conceptual fixity; mysticism, in turn, deflects us from rationality that goes substantially beyond poetic metaphors. A good deal of ecological thinking today, as we have seen, partakes of both modes—the mechanistic and the mystical—in an opportunistic, “catch-as-catch-can” manner, rather than restructuring its mode of thought in an authentically organic manner. This much should be clear: the purely deductive logic that we use to build bridges, budget our income and expenses, plan our everyday lives, and calculate our chances of “succeeding” in the world holds no promise of grasping the richly articulated or mediated development that both unites and differentiates first and second nature. Common sense demands only inference, consistency, and the verification that ordinary sensory experience provides. Apart from the inductively apprehended particulars that help us arrive (often quite intuitively) at the concrete premises for our inferences, we normally tend to deduce our ideas schematically, as a series of well-ordered and rigidly fixed concepts. Truth in this everyday logical domain is normally little more than consistency. Thus, we are held to be “logical” when our conclusions can be framed into fixed categories—supported, to be sure, by those atomized isolates known as “brute facts.” This achievement is celebrated as “clarity” and its results as “certainty.” To conceive of any form of reasoning other than a hypothetico-deductive logic is evidence of fuzzy-headedness. Facts, you know, are facts, and truth is truth. Consistency, the formalistic “if-then” propositions that make up conventional logic, together with experience as a sequence of “clear-cut” data and the eminently practical results that conventional logic achieves—all, taken together, are the means to “think clearly” and understand the “real world.” Yet there is a highly personal sphere of life in which we think very differently from conventional reason. We do not deal with children the way we deal with our business affairs and the pragmatics of everyday living. We see children as *developing* beings who pass through necessary phases of growth and increasing capabilities. We try not to impose more demands upon them than they can adequately handle at their age (assuming, to be sure, that we are rational and humane people). Nor do we try to afflict them with problems they cannot yet resolve. We sense a flow in their lives that involves the actualization of their potentialities at different levels of their development. It requires no unusual perception to recognize the infant that lingers on in the child, the child that lingers on in the youth, the youth that lingers on in the adult—in short, the *cumulative* nature of human development, in contrast to mere substitution and succession. Only a fool believes that the man or woman could—or should—completely replace the boy or girl. Properly understood, a mature person is not an inventory of test results and measurements. He or she is an individual *biography*, the developmental embodiment of partially or wholly realized qualities that an environment surely conditions but whose inherent makeup would ultimately determine his or her development *if* society acquired a highly rational form. However intuitive it may be, this kind of thinking is structured around not deduction but *eduction*. If deduction consists of the inferential “if-then” steps we take, with due reverence for consistency, to arrive at unshakable and clearly defined judgments about “brute facts,” eduction fully manifests and articulates the latent possibilities of phenomena. Eduction is a phased process in which “if” is not a fixed hypothetical premise but rather a *potentiality*. “Steps” in eduction are not mere inferences but stages of *development*. “Consistency,” far from being an imposed canon of logic based on principles of identity, contradiction, and the excluded middle, is the immanent process we properly call *self-development*. Finally, “then” is the full *actualization* of potentiality in its rich, self-incorporative “stages” of growth, differentiation, maturation, and wholeness. That the “mature” and “whole” are never so complete that they cease to be the potentiality for a still further development represents an ecological change I am advancing here. Which brings us to the problem of what we are obliged to modify in the dialectical philosophy of its two most outstanding voices, Aristotle and Hegel, in order to render it an *ecological* mode of thought.[63] To do this, we must briefly summarize what an ecological dialectic shares with the Aristotelian and Hegelian. Dialectical philosophy moves from the undifferentiated abstract to the highly differentiated concrete (while most commonsensical forms of thought move in the opposite direction). In this respect, dialectic picks up the thread of classical eduction and goes beyond it, moving from that which is implicit in bare potentiality to its realization in a fully articulated actuality. Much of Greek philosophy expressed this problematic as that of the emergence of the Many from the One: in Aristotle’s work, the apogee of classical thought, “a conception of substance, or the real, as the goal toward which develops a potential being that, save as ultimately realized, is neither real nor intelligible, dominates the whole course of Aristotle’s speculation,” observes G. R. G. Mure in a very pithy formulation. “Follow him as he applies it in every sphere which he investigates; watch it grow from this initial abstract formula into a concrete universe of thought; and you may hope to grasp the essential meaning of his philosophy.”[64] The same could be said of Hegel, whose elaboration of this Aristotelian motif is more subjectivized and informed, although at times it is cluttered by the mountain of problematics that had been added to Western philosophy since Aristotle’s time. An ecological dialectic would have to address the fact that Aristotle and Hegel did not work with an evolutionary theory of nature but rather saw the natural world more as a *scala naturae*, a ladder of “Being,” than as a flowing continuum. An ecological dialectic introduces evolution into this tradition and replaces the notion of a *scala naturae* with a richly mediated continuum. Both thinkers were more profoundly influenced by Plato than their writings would seem to indicate, with the result that in the case of Hegel, we move within a realm of concept more than history (however historical Hegel’s dialectic invariably was). Hegel was strongly preoccupied with the “idea” of nature rather than with its existential details, although he honored this preoccupation in the breach. Finally, the overarching teleology of the two philosophers tends to subordinate the contingency, spontaneity, and creativity that mark natural phenomena.[65] Hegel, with his strong theological bent, terminated the unfolding of the world in an “Absolute” that encompasses it in an identity of subject and object. In an ecological dialectic, by contrast there would be no terminality that could culminate in a God or an Absolute. “Actuality,” to use Hegel’s special term, is the almost momentary culmination of maturity, so that the objectivity of the potential, which is crucial for an objective ethics, is subordinated to its actualization. English translations of Hegel often erroneously render *real* and *actual* as synonyms in certain passages, allowing the Hegelian “real” to be conceived as the actualization of the potential—a failing that I believe should be corrected. What is less “real” than Hegel’s “reality”—notably the “brute facts” or the given “is” of common sense—would more closely correspond to what Hegel considers “the apparent” (*das Erscheinende*). From an ecological viewpoint, this mistranslation could lead to much confusion. Hence, I have used the word *real* to mean simply “what-is,” not “what is necessarily latent in the potential.” The *actual* remains very much what Hegel meant it to mean: the rational realization of the potential, as distinguished from the “real” as the existential.[66] Finally, an ecological dialectic greatly modifies the creative role that Hegel imparted to strife, often interpreted as mere “antithesis” (which is roughly as far as Theodor Adorno takes the dialectic in his *Negative Dialectics*), but not without ignoring the presence of strife in human history. It emphasizes that the dialectic, no less in Hegel’s than in my own thinking, undergoes differentiation through a transcendence beyond mere antithesis, notably what Hegel called an *Aufhebung* or negation of the negation. Dialectic is thus a philosophy of progress in which there is a growing elaboration and self-consciousness, insofar as the world is rational. Dialectic, let me emphasize, is not merely “change,” “motion,” or even process, all banal imputations to the contrary notwithstanding. Nor can it be subsumed under “process philosophy.” Dialectic is *development*, not only change; it is *derivation*, not only motion; it is *mediation*, not only process; and it is *cumulative*, not only continuous. That it is also change, motion, process, and a continuum tells us only part of its true content. But denied its immanent self-directiveness and its entelechial eduction of the potential into the actual, this “process philosophy,” indeed this remarkable notion of *causality*, ceases to be dialectic. Instead, it becomes a mere husk that “eco”-faddists can reduce to “kinetics,” “dynamics, “fluctuations,” and “feedback loops”—the same mechanistic verbiage with which systems theory dresses itself up as a developmental philosophy. As Hegel warned in the course of educing the complexity of the dialectical process: knowledge has “no other object than to draw out what is inward or implicit and thus to become objective.” But if
that which is implicit comes into existence, it certainly passes into change, yet it *remains one and the same*.... The plant, for example, does not lose itself in mere indefinite change. From the germ much is produced when at first nothing was to be seen; but the whole of what is brought forth, if not developed, is yet hidden and ideally contained within itself. The principle of this *projection into existence* is that the germ cannot remain merely implicit, but is impelled toward development, since it presents the contradiction of being only implicitly and yet not desiring to be so.[67]Thus dialectic is not *wayward* motion, the mere kinetics of change. There is a rational “end in view”—not one that is preordained, to state this point from an ecological viewpoint rather than a theological one, but that actualizes what is implicit in the potential. Every “if-then” proposition is premised not on any “if” that springs into one’s head like a gambler’s hunch; it posits a potentiality that has its ancestry in the dialectical processes that preceded it. Reductionism breaks this process down to the most undifferentiated interactions it can formulate. But it does so at the cost of demolishing the various phases or “moments” (to use Hegelian terminology) from which the process is literally constituted. A human being is clearly an ensemble of chemicals. While reductionism can explain its existence as a physicochemical phenomenon, it cannot comprehend it as a remarkably complex form of life. Chemical analysis provides us with no substitute for the multitude of forms, relationships, processes, and environments that the organic creates for itself as it metabolically sustains its own “selfhood” in distinction from other “selves.” Indeed, carried too far into a lower level of phenomena, reduction leads to dissolution, so that the very integrity of a given level of phenomena—be it social, biological, chemical, or physical—simply disappears into mere “matter” and “motion.” In a kind of ideological entropy, thought no longer has the differentiae with which to define its subject matter, let alone explore it. As the complex is trimmed down to its “irreducible” components, the whole that forms the very premises of thought disappears into a meaningless, indeed formless heap of “matter,” thereby erasing the very boundaries that give *definition* to a phenomenon as a component of a more complex “whole.” In the organic world, the metabolic activity of the simplest life-forms constitutes the sense of self-identity, however germinal, from which nature acquires a rudimentary subjectivity. Not only does this rudimentary subjectivity (which reductionism necessarily cannot encompass) derive from the metabolic process of self-maintenance, a process that defines any life-form as a unique whole; it extends itself beyond self-maintenance to become a striving activity, not unlike the development from the vegetative to the animative, that ultimately yields mind, will, and the potentiality for freedom. Conceived dialectically, organic evolution is, in a broad sense, subjective insofar as life-forms begin to exercise choices in adapting to new environments—a conception that stands much at odds with that clearly definable fixity we blissfully call “clear thinking.” Systems theory enters into the reductionist tableau in a sinister way: by dissolving the subjective element in biological phenomena so that they can be treated as mathematical symbols, systems theory permits evolutionary interaction, subjective development, and even process itself, to be taken over by “the system,” just as the individual, the family, and the community are destructured into “the System” embodied by the economic corporation and the state. Life ceases to have subjectivity and becomes a mechanism in which the tendency of lifeforms toward ever-greater elaboration is replaced with “feedback loops,” and their evolutionary antecedents with programmed “information.” A “systems view of life” literally conceives of life as a system, not only as “fluctuations” and “cycles”—mechanistic as these concepts are in themselves. Despite the external selective factors with which Darwinians describe evolution, the tendency of life toward a greater complexity of selfhood—a tendency that yields increasing degrees of subjectivity—constitutes the internal or immanent impulse of evolution toward growing self-awareness. This evolutionary dialectic constitutes the essence of life as a self-maintaining organism that bears the *potential* for the development of self-conscious organisms. Dialectic, in effect, is not merely a “logic” or a “method” that can be bounced around and “applied” promiscuously to a content. It has no “handbook” other than *reason itself* to guide those who seek to develop a dialectical sensibility. Dialectic can no more be applied to problems in engineering than Einstein’s general theory of relativity can be applied to plumbing; these problems can best be resolved by conventional forms of logic, common sense, and the pragmatic knowledge acquired through experience. Dialectic can only explicate a rationally developmental phenomenon, just as systems theory can only explicate the workings of a fluctuating and cyclical system. The kind of verification that validates or invalidates the soundness of dialectical reasoning, in turn, must be *developmental*, not relatively static or for that matter “fluctuating” kinds of phenomena. Hence, it distorts the very meaning of dialectic to speak of it as a “method.” Indeed, dialectical philosophy, properly conceived and freed of mechanistic presumptions, is an ongoing protest against the myth of methodology: notably, that the “techniques” for thinking out a process can be separated from the process itself. Its sensitivity for concrete phenomena, even when they are distilled into “concepts,” as Hegel did, is what renders dialectic such an existentially vital and palpably organismic philosophy. It was Hegel’s genius to reintroduce Plato’s supramundane world of forms—an *exemplary* and hence a *moral* world, not merely a metaphysical one—into reality and to develop Aristotle’s notion of entelechy into a concept of “transcendence” (*Aufhebung*) that nuances processes as mediated “moments in the self-fulfillment of their potentialities.” Freed of its theological trappings, dialectic *explains*, with a power beyond that of any conventional logic, how the organic flow of first into second nature is a reworking of biological into social reality. Each phase or “moment” pressed by its own internal logic into an antithetical and ultimately a more transcendent form, emerges as a more complex unity-in-diversity that encompasses its earlier moments even as it goes beyond them. Despite the imagery of strife that permeates the Hegelian version of this process, the ultimate point of the Hegelian *Aufhebung* is reconciliation, not the nihilism of pure negation. Moreover, norms—the actualization of the potential “is” into the ethical “ought”—are anchored in the objective reality of potentiality itself, not as it always “is,” to be sure, but as “should be,” such that speculation becomes a valid account of reality in its truth. Hegel, I would argue, *radically expanded the very concept of Being in philosophy and in the real world to encompass the potential and its actualization into the rational “what-should-be”* not only as an existential “what-is.”[68] Dialectical speculation, despite Hegel’s own view of the retrospective function of philosophy, thus is *projective* in a sharply critical sense (quite unlike “futurology,” which dissolves the future by making it a mere extrapolation of the present). In its restless critique of reality we can call dialectic a “negative philosophy”—in contrast, I should add, to Adorno’s nihilism or “negative dialectics.” By the same token, speculation is creative in that it ceaselessly contrasts the free, rational, and moral actuality of “what-could-be, which inheres in nature’s thrust toward self-reflexivity, with the existential reality of “what-is.”[69] Speculation can ask “why” (not only “how”) the real has become the irrational—indeed, the inhuman and anti-ecological—precisely because dialectic alone is capable of grounding an ecological ethics in the actualization of potential, that is, in its objective possibilities for the realization of reason and truth. This objectivization of possibilities—of potentiality continuous with its yet unrealized actualization—is the ground for a genuinely objective ethics, as distinguished from an ethical relativism subject to the waywardness of the opinion poll. An ecological dialectic, in effect, opens the way to an ethics that is rooted in the objectivity of the potential, not in the commandments of a deity or in the eternality of a supramundane and transcendental “reality.” Hence, the “what-should-be” is not only objective, it forms the objective critique of the given reality. Human intervention into nature is inherent and inevitable. To argue that this intervention should not occur is utterly obfuscatory, since humanity’s second nature is not simply an external imposition on biology’s first nature but is the result of first nature’s inherent evolutionary process. What is at issue in humanity’s transformation of nature is whether its practice is consistent with an objective ecological ethics that is rationally developed, not haphazardly divined, felt, or intuited. Minimally, such an ecological ethics would involve human stewardship of the planet. A humanity that failed to see that it is potentially nature rendered self-conscious and self-reflexive would separate itself from nature morally as well as intellectually. Second nature in such a situation would literally be divested of its last ties to first nature; worse, the vacuum left by the departure of consciousness would be filled by blind market-oriented interests and an egoistic marketplace mentality. In any case, there is no road back from second to first nature, any more than second nature as it is now constituted can rescue the biosphere from destruction with “technological fixes” and political reforms. Given the massive ecological crisis that confronts us, intellectual confusion in the ecology movement may yield harmful results of immeasurable proportions. In the present period of history, to carelessly heap fragments of ideas upon each other and call this ecophilosophy is no longer an affordable luxury. Stewardship of the earth does not consist of such accommodating measures as the establishment of ecological wilderness zones or half measures to patch up environmental dislocations. What it can and should mean is a radical integration of second nature with first nature along far-reaching ecological lines, an integration that would yield new ecocommunities, ecotechnologies, and an abiding ecological sensibility that embodies nature’s thrust toward self-reflexivity. For biocentrists and antihumanists to throw the word *arrogance* around whenever anyone cites human beings as ethical and mental referents for nature and natural evolution is manipulative. Nature without an active human presence would be as unnatural as a tropical rainforest that lacked monkeys and ants. Dialectic, it should be noted, is no less a critique of one-sidedness and simplicity than of existing reality and an adaptive mentality to the status quo. Cast in radical ecological terms, it calls for a denial of *centricity* as such, be it “anthropocentricity,” “biocentricity,” or so-called “ecocentricity,” which is meant to include rocks and rivers as well as life-forms. A philosophy of organic development is above all a philosophy of *wholeness* in which evolution reaches a degree of unity-in-diversity such that nature can *act* upon itself rationally through rational human agency, with its derivation in nature’s potential for freedom and conceptual thought. In the intermediate zone between first and second nature that saw the graded passage of biological evolution into social, social evolution began to assume increasingly hierarchical form. Whether this could have been avoided is impossible to say—and meaningless to divine. In any case, social evolution unfolded in the direction of hierarchical, class-oriented, and statist institutions giving rise to the nation-state and ultimately, albeit not inevitably, to a capitalist economy. In our own time, the massive penetration of this economy into society as a whole has produced an even more serious distortion of second nature. The market *economy*, which all cultures from antiquity to recent times have resisted to one degree or another, has essentially become a market *society*. This society is historically unique. It identifies progress with competition rather than cooperation. It views society as a realm for possessing things rather than for elaborating human relationships. It creates a morality based on growth rather than limit and balance. For the first time in human history, society and community have been reduced to little more than a huge shopping mall. Unless ecology explores this warped development systematically—that is, unless it unearths its internal logic in a reasoned and organismic way—its critical thrust will be entirely lost and its integrity hopelessly impugned. Today, eclecticism and reductionism—a hodgepodge of disconnected, even contradictory ideas degraded to their lowest common denominator—are the most serious obstacles to the realization of this critical project. Eclecticism may appeal to lazy minds that prefer slogans to reasoned studies of society and its impact on the natural world. But with lazy minds come lazy thoughts and a passive-receptive mentality that increasingly renders the mind vulnerable to authoritarian control. *** Beyond First and Second Nature We must bring the threads of our discussion together and examine the important implications dialectic has for ecological thinking. A “dialectical view of life” is a special form of process philosophy. Its emphasis is not on change alone but on development. It is eductive rather than merely deductive, mediated rather than merely processual, and cumulative rather than merely continuous. Its objectivity begins with the existence of the potential, not with the mere facticity of the real; hence its ethics seeks the “what-should-be” as a realm of *objective* possibilities. That “possibilities” are objective, albeit not in the sense of a simplistic materialism, is dialectically justified by the perception that potentiality and its latent possibilities form an existential continuum that constitutes the authentic world of truth—the world of the “what-should-be,” not simply the world of the “what-is,” with all its incompleteness and falsehood. From a dialectical viewpoint, a change in a given level of biotic, communal, or for that matter, social organization consists not simply of the appearance of a new, possibly more complex ensemble of “feedback loops.” Rather, it consists of qualitatively new attributes, interrelationships, and degrees of subjectivity that express and radically condition the emergence of a new potentiality, opening up a new realm of possibility with its own unique tendency—not a greater or lesser number of “fluctuations” and “rhythms.” Moreover, this new potentiality is itself the result of other actualizations of potentialities that, taken together historically and cumulatively, constitute a developmental continuum—not a bullet “shot from a pistol” that explodes into Being without a history of its own or a continuum of which it is part.[70] Dialectical logic is an immanent logic of process—an *ontological* logic, not only a logic of concepts, categories, and symbols. This logic is emergent, in the sense that one speaks of the “logic of events.” Considered in terms of its emphasis on differentiation, this logic is provocatively concrete in its relationship to abstract generalizations—hence Hegel’s seemingly paradoxical expression “concrete universal.” Dialectic thereby overcomes Plato’s dualistic separation of exemplary ideas from the phenomenal world of imperfect “copies”—hence its ethical thrust is literally structured, cumulatively as well as sequentially, in the concrete. Emerging from this superb ensemble is a world that is always ethically problematical but also an ethics that is always objective, a recognition of selfhood and subjectivity that embodies nonhuman and human nature, and a development from metabolic self-maintenance to rational self-direction and innovation that locates the origins of reason *within* nature, not in a supramundane domain *apart* from nature. The social is thus wedded to the natural, and human reason is wedded to nonhuman subjectivity through processes that are richly mediated and graded in a shared continuum of development. This ecological interpretation of dialectic not only overcomes dualism but moves through differentiation away from reductionism. Ecology cleanses the remarkable heritage of European organismic thought of the hard teleological predeterminations it acquired from Greek theology, the Platonistic denigration of physicality, and the Christian preoccupation with human inwardness as “soul” and a reverence for God. Only ecology can ventilate the dialectic as an orientation toward the objective world by rendering it coextensive with natural evolution, a possibility that arose in the last century with the appearance of evolutionary theory. As such, an ecological dialectic is not solely a way of thinking organically; it can be a source of *meaning* to natural evolution—of ethical meaning, not only rational meaning. To state this idea more provocatively: we cannot hope to find humanity’s “place in nature” without knowing how it *emerged* from nature, with all its problems and possibilities. An ecological dialectic produces a creative paradox: second nature in an ecological society would be the actualization of first nature’s potentiality to achieve mind and truth. Human intellection in an ecological society would thus “fold back” upon the evolutionary continuum that exists in first nature. In this sense—and in this sense alone—second nature would thus become first nature rendered self-reflexive, a thinking nature that would know itself and could guide its own evolution, not an unthinking nature that “sought its own balance” through the “dynamics” of “fluctuations” and “feedback” that cause needless pain, suffering, and death. Although thought, society, and culture would retain their integrity, they would consciously express the abiding tendency within first nature to press itself toward the level of conscious self-directiveness. In a very real sense, an ecological society would be *a transcendence of both first nature and second nature* into a new domain of a “free nature,” a nature that in a truly rational humanity reached the level of conceptual thought—in short, a nature that would willfully and thinkingly cope with conflict, contingency, waste, and compulsion. In this new synthesis, where first and second nature are melded into a free, rational, and ethical nature, neither first nor second would lose its specificity and integrity. Humanity, far from diminishing the integrity of nature, would add the dimension of freedom, reason, and ethics to it and raise evolution to a level of self-reflexivity that has always been latent in the emergence of the natural world. To deny the potentiality for this transcendence and synthesis of first and second nature into a free nature is to leave ecological thinking open to all the wayward “if-then” propositions that threaten to overrun and brutalize it. Commonsense “brainstorms,” throwing ideas into the air with a prayer that mere probability will provide us with a meaningful pattern, would replace reflection and intellectual exploration. Today, the results of this de-systematized thinking are often ludicrous when they are not simply cruel or even vicious. If all organisms in the biosphere are “intrinsically” equally “worthy” of a “right” to “self-realization,” as many biocentrists believe, then human beings have no right, *given the full logic of this proposition*, to try to stamp out mosquitoes that carry malaria and yellow fever. Nor does the logic of this proposition give humanity the right to eliminate the AIDS virus or other organic sources of deadly illness.[71] It hardly helps that Bill Devall and George Sessions, the coauthors of *Deep Ecology*, hedged “biocentric equality” with the qualifier that “we have no right to destroy other living beings without sufficient reason.”[72] A loophole like “sufficient reason” is ambiguous enough to divest the entire phrase of its logical integrity. Logic, in fact, gives way to a purely relativistic ethics. What Devall and Sessions consider “insufficient reason” to take a life may be very sufficient to many other people whose well-being, indeed, whose very survival under the present “system” depends on it. In this kind of argumentation, which divests ethics of its social basis and second nature of its derivation from first nature, “centricity” bifurcates into two opposing bodies of values: a biocentrism that makes humans and viruses equal “citizens” in a “biospheric democracy,” and an anthropocentrism that makes humans into self-centered sovereigns in what is presumably a biospheric tyranny. That both views are in error is a central point in this work. In any case, “deep ecology” taken at its word, leads us into a foggy and dangerous logical realm from which there is usually no recourse but Eastern mysticism.[73] There is no “biospheric democracy”—or “tyranny,” for that matter—in nature other than what human second nature imputes to nonhuman first nature, just as there is no hierarchy, domination, class structure, or state in the natural world—only what the socially conditioned human mind projects onto nonhuman biological relationships. “Rights,” in any meaningful sense of the word, are the product of custom, tradition, institutional development, and social relationships, of an increasingly self-conscious historical experience, and of *mind*—that is, conceptual thought that painstakingly formulates a constellation of rights and duties that makes for an empathetic respect for individuals and collectivities. They emerge from the human *social* sphere and from ways in which human communities *institutionalize* themselves. Leopards claim no “rights” for themselves and certainly recognize no “right” to life, much less to “self-realization,” in the animals on which they prey. As mammals, these predators may be more self-aware than, say, frogs, because of their more complex neurological and sensory apparatus. Hence, they may be more subjective, even more rational in a dim way. But their range of conceptualization, from everything we know, is so limited, often so immediately focused on their own survival needs, that to impute ethical judgments involving “rights” to them is to be truly anthropomorphic, often without even knowing so. When biocentrists, antihumanists, and “deep ecologists” flagellate us with claims that life-forms have “rights” to life and “self-realization” that we, as humans, fail to recognize, they unknowingly participate in a hidden anthropomorphism that we bring to many forms of life. They work from within human ideas and feelings—indeed, the best that constitutes humanism—to incarnate “rights” and the notion of a “biospheric democracy” in first nature. A human empathy and sense of identification that yield a profound respect and sensitivity for the nonhuman world should not be confused with sophisticated ethical “rights” and a “democracy” that have moral and political meaning—that is, unless we are prepared to undermine the authentic social content of “rights” and “democracy” for human society and intellection. Ironically, if there is to be anything that approximates a “biospheric democracy” in the nonhuman world, it will be shaped by human empathy, which *presupposes* the rational and ecological intervention of human beings into the natural world. This would entail the infusion of human values into nature, and human mind into nonhuman subjectivity.[74] Biocentrists and antihumanists can hardly have their cake and eat it too. Either humanity is a distinctive moral agent in the biosphere, that can practice an ecological stewardship of nature—or else it is “one” with the whole world of life and simply dissolves into it. If the latter is true, then human beings have a “biospheric right” to use the biosphere exclusively to suit their own ends, a “right” that cannot be denied any more than the leopard’s “right” to kill and feast on its prey, albeit less “efficiently” than human beings. At this point, antihumanists may change the whole level of the argument by replying that the despoliation of the earth by plundering “humans” (whoever they may be) will ultimately boomerang on the human species. But this turns their argument into a pragmatic problem of a purely instrumental character, reduces a problem in morality to a problem in engineering new technological fixes and the deployment of mere human cunning. Nature thus reverts to a Darwinian jungle that is morally neutral at best or engaged in a duel between human cunning and animal mindlessness at worst. On the other hand, if we understand that human beings are indeed moral agents because natural evolution confers upon them a clear responsibility toward the natural world, we cannot emphasize their unique attributes too strongly. For it is this unique ability to think conceptually and feel a deep empathy for the world of life that makes it possible for humanity to reverse the devastation it has inflicted on the biosphere and create a rational society. This implies not only that humanity, once it came into its own humanity as the actualization of its potentialities, *could* be a rational expression of nature’s creativity and fecundity, but that human intervention into natural processes *could* be as creative as natural evolution itself. This evolutionary and dialectical viewpoint, which derive the human species from nature as the embodiment of nature’s own thrust toward self-reflexivity, changes the entire argument around competing “rights” between human and nonhuman life forms into an exploration of the *ways* in which human beings intervene into the biosphere. Whether humanity recognizes that an ecological society would be the fulfillment of a major tendency in natural evolution, or remains blind to its own humanity as a moral and ecological agent in nature, becomes a *social* problem that requires a social ecology. It is a grotesque distortion of “spirituality” for people to claim to be consumed by a “love” of “nature” and “life,” while ignoring the needless but very real suffering and pain that exist in nature and society alike. [48] This essay was originally published in *Our Generation*, vol. 18, no. 2 (Spring–Summer 1987). It has been revised for publication here. [49] This basically Marxian thesis, which all members of the Frankfurt School took for granted, is repeatedly misinterpreted, particularly in the ecology movement, when it is discussed at all. However much they opposed domination, neither Adorno nor Horkheimer singled out hierarchy as an underlying problematic in their writings. Indeed, their residual Marxian premises led to a historical fatalism that saw any liberatory enterprise (beyond art, perhaps) as hopelessly tainted by the need to dominate nature and *consequently* “man.” This position stands completely at odds with my own view that the notion—and no more than an *unrealizable* notion—of dominating nature stems from the domination of human by human. This is not a semantic difference in accounting for the origins of domination. Like Marx, the Frankfurt School saw nature as a “domineering” force over humanity that human guile—and class rule—had to exorcise before a classless society was possible. The Frankfurt School, no less than Marxism, placed the onus for domination primarily on the demanding forces of nature. My own writings radically reverse this very traditional view of the relationship between society and nature. I argue that the idea of dominating nature first arose within *society* as part of its institutionalization into gerontocracies that placed the young in varying degrees of servitude to the old and in patriarchies that placed women in varying degrees of servitude to men—not in any endeavor to “control” nature or natural forces. Various modes of social institutionalization, not modes of organizing human labor (so crucial to Marx), were the first sources of domination, which is not to deny Marx’s thesis that class society was economically exploitative. Hence, domination can be definitively removed only by resolving problematics that have their origins in hierarchy and status, not in class and the technological control of nature alone. [50] Fritjof Capra, *The Turning Point* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), 286–87. [51] Ibid., 287, 412. [52] Ibid., 288. [53] Ibid. [54] See Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, *Order Out of Chaos* (New York: Bantam Books, 1984), 291–310. The notion of the irreversibility of time, appropriate as it may be for Prigogine to emphasize it in order to exorcise a mechanistic dynamics based on time’s reversibility, is not congruent with process and evolution; it is merely one presupposition of these phenomena. [55] That such cosmic formulas cannot explain the foundations of either organic or social development is not an argument against “foundationalism”—that is, the view that there are explanations that can account for differentiae in the biological and social as well as the inorganic physical world. Our world has more coherence than many relativists today are willing to admit, with its different levels of unfolding and, in their scope, different foundations, degrees of possibility, subjectivity and, with humanity, reason. [56] Capra, *Turning Point*, 288. [57] Ibid., 300, 393. [58] Gregory Bateson, *Mind and Nature* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1979), 31. [59] For a more complete discussion of nature’s fecundity and its source in species variety, see my “Freedom and Necessity in Nature,” elsewhere in this book. [60] Human self-hatred, I may add, is not a psychological phenomenon alone; it has ugly social roots. The privileged hate not other privileged but the underprivileged, generally accusing them of “anthropocentric” vices and subjecting them to the constraints of “natural law.” [61] David Foreman, interviewed by Bill Devall, “A Spanner in the Woods,” *Simply Living*, vol. 12 (c. 1986). [62] Let me make it clear that I believe that nature is neither hierarchical nor egalitarian—concepts that are meaningless unless they are institutionalized socially, which presupposes a human presence in the biosphere, or second nature. What we encounter in first nature is complementarity, the mutualistic interaction of life-forms in maintaining a nonhuman ecological community. At this biological level, complementarity is not an ethics—which is associated with reasoned behavior—but a descriptive datum related to mutualism. I used the word complementarity to denote an ethics in *The Ecology of Freedom*. Since that book was published, “natural law” devotees have picked up on it with minimal acknowledgment and turned it into a “law of complementarity”—a regressive use of the concept if there ever was one. [63] I am not speaking about “dialectical materialism,” which, whatever the intentions of Marx and Engels, used Hegelian terms and concepts to formulate what was little more than a scientistic “dialectical” mechanism. My purpose is not to flesh out the skeleton of dialectical philosophy with “materialism” or a latter-day nominalist physicality, but to bring nature into the foreground of dialectical thought in an evolutionary and organismic way. [64] G. R. G. Mure, *Aristotle* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 7. [65] It is arguable whether Hegel saw teleology as an inflexible predetermination of the development of the “real” in its beginnings. Hegel’s *Logic* exists on a different level from the existential reality we experience in history and everyday life. Its “purified” categories are developed from each other with a “logical necessity” and, in a metaphoric sense, could be seen as a rational level parallel to the existential level from which they are abstracted. This logos, as it were, could be taken as an exemplary and thus inherently critical vision of the world in a highly subjectivized form whose “logic” yields a distinct rational conclusion, just as Plato’s domain of forms has been regarded by many Platonists as exemplary in a *normative* sense, as distinguished from the flawed world that we experience around us. [66] Responsibility for the confusion about the meaning of the words real and actual is by no means Hegel’s but rather that of some of his translators The German word *wirklich* has a family of English meanings that include “real” as well as “actual.” Hegel was quite scrupulous in distinguishing the “real” from the “actual” in his *Science of Logic*, where “reality,” as he put it in his discussion of “Determinate Being,” seems “to be an ambiguous word,” while “Actuality is the unity of Essence and Existence.” See the Johnston and Struthers translation, *Science of Logic* (New York: Macmillan, 1929), vol. 1, 124, and vol. 2, 160. The problem arose when Hegel’s famous maxim, *Was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich; und was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig*, was mistranslated as “What is rational is real, and what is real is rational.” The correct and philosophically meaningful translation is “What is rational is actual, and what is actual is rational.” The mistranslation, which rendered *real* and *actual* synonyms, conceived the Hegelian real as the actualization of the potential. The mischief this mistranslation produced in the interpretation of Hegel’s ideas is matched only by the confusion it produced in the interpretation of the maxim itself. Engels, ironically, clarified Hegel’s meaning wonderfully—albeit using *real* rather than *actual*. See his *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of German Philosophy*, in Marx and Engels, *Selected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), vol. 3, 337–38. I am not nitpicking here: the odium that Hegelian philosophy acquired as an apologia for the Prussian state rests in no small part on the failure to properly interpret—and translate—this famous maxim in Hegel’s *Encyclopedia Logic* and *Philosophy of Right*. [67] G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy (New York: Humanities Press, 1955), vol. 1, p. 22 (my emphasis). Here Hegel is describing the dialectic in unknowing nature. “In Mind it is otherwise,” he is quick to add; “it is consciousness and therefore it is free, uniting in itself the beginning and the end—that is to say, intention, striving, and predetermination” (p. 22). In fact, from my viewpoint the conclusion that “Mind” is “free” could also mean that knowing beings can be wayward, idiosyncratic and one-sided, and—unlike nonhuman beings—cruel and, put bluntly, evil. [68] Unfortunately, this has not been noticed in most commentaries on Hegel’s oeuvre, much less in philosophy generally, which seems more occupied with establishing what Heidegger means by “Being” than with other concepts of Being in Western thought. [69] “What-*could*-be,” insofar as it involves organic subjectivity and flexibility, derives from the natural realm of potentiality. “What-*should*-be,” the unfolding of the rational, is an ethical extrapolation of individual and social potentialities, of attributes of the truly self-determining person and society. [70] Viewed from this standpoint, there is a sense in which Hegel’s “objective idealism” was more objective than his materialist critics realized. Possibilities—that is, the actualizations of existential potentialities—are as objective as the inherence of an oak tree in an acorn. Ethically, this highly illuminating approach establishes a standard of fulfillment—an objective good, as it were—that literally informs the existential with a goal of objective fulfillment, just as we say in everyday life that an individual who does not “live up” to his or her capabilities is an “unfulfilled” person and, in a sense, a less than “real” person. [71] Antihumanist “ethicists” actually take this argument seriously, I have been startled to learn. In biocentric ethics, reports Bernard Dixon, no “logical line can be drawn” between the conservation of whales, gentians, and flamingoes on the one hand and the conservation of pathogenic microbes like the smallpox virus on the other, which, according to one antihumanist wag (David Ehrenfeld), is “an endangered species.” Logical consistency requires that we try to rescue the smallpox virus with the same ethical dedication that we bring to the survival of whales. See Bernard Dixon, “Smallpox—Imminent Extinction, and an Unresolved Problem,” *New Scientist*, vol. 69 (1976). For an antihumanist position that verges on sheer misanthropy, see David Ehrenfeld, *The Arrogance of Humanism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978). [72] Bill Devall and George Sessions, *Deep Ecology* (Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith Books, 1985), 67. [73] Or else by regarding the human condition with ugly indifference. Misanthropy, indeed an *inhumanity*, labeled biocentrism, “deep ecology,” or population control, could provide a brutal mandate for human suffering and authoritarian state control. Ecology, on these terms, threatens to become an ideology that is cruel, not sharing or cooperative. [74] The more one examines the literature of biocentrists, antihumanists, and “deep ecologists,” the more one senses manipulation. Their appeals to human feelings like empathy and identification are translated into “rights” that rest heavily on the historical development of humanism. Humanism involves not simply a claim to humanity’s “superiority” over the nonhuman world but, significantly, an appeal to human reason and a social ethics of cooperation. Great social movements, uprisings, and ideologies, not to speak of self-sacrificing individuals, were committed to the achievement of these monumental goals—a history that is simply effaced from much of the biocentrist, antihumanist, and “deep ecology” literature. Often, their place is taken by a nagging denigration of the human spirit, decorated with metaphors lifted from Eastern philosophy. Social analysis tends to be minimized and even deflected by a privileged and inward concern with abstractions like “interconnectedness” and “oneness”—in a society riven by genuine conflicts between rich and poor, privileged and denied, and man and woman, not to speak of “deep,” “deeper,” and the “deepest” ecologists. ** History, Civilization, and Progress: Outline for a Criticism of Modern Relativism *** I Rarely have the concepts that literally define the best of Western culture—its notions of a meaningful History, a universal Civilization, and the possibility of Progress—been called so radically into question as they are today. In recent decades, both in the United States and abroad, the academy and a subculture of self-styled postmodernist intellectuals have nourished an entirely new ensemble of cultural conventions that stem from a corrosive social, political, and moral relativism. This ensemble encompasses a crude nominalism, pluralism, and skepticism, an extreme subjectivism, and even outright nihilism and antihumanism in various combinations and permutations, sometimes of a thoroughly misanthropic nature. This relativistic ensemble is pitted against coherent thought as such and against the “principle of hope” (to use Ernst Bloch’s expression) that marked radical theory of the recent past. Such notions percolate from so-called radical academics into the general public, where they take the form of personalism, amoralism, and “neoprimitivism.” Too often in this prevailing “paradigm,” as it is frequently called, eclecticism replaces the search for historical meaning; a self-indulgent despair replaces hope; dystopia replaces the promise of a rational society; and in the more sophisticated forms of this ensemble a vaguely defined “intersubjectivity”—or in its cruder forms, a primitivistic mythopoesis—replaces all forms of reason, particularly dialectical reason. In fact, the very concept of reason itself has been challenged by a willful antirationalism. By stripping the great traditions of Western thought of their contours, nuances, and gradations, these relativistic “posthistoricists,” “postmodernists,” and (to coin a new word) “posthumanists” of our day are, at best, condemning contemporary thought to a dark pessimism or, at worst, subverting it of all its meaning. So grossly have the current critics of History, Civilization, and Progress, with their proclivities for fragmentation and reductionism, subverted the coherence of these basic Western concepts that they will literally have to be defined again if they are to be made intelligible to present and future generations. Even more disturbingly, such critics have all but abandoned attempts to define the very concepts they excoriate. What, after all, is *History*? Its relativistic critics tend to dissolve the concept into eclectically assembled “histories” made up of a multiplicity of disjointed episodes—or even worse, into myths that belong to “different” gender, ethnic, and national groups and that they consider to be ideologically equatable. Its nominalistic critics see the past largely as a series of “accidents,” while its subjectivistic critics overemphasize ideas in determining historical realities, consisting of “imaginaries” that are essentially discontinuous from one another. And what, after all, is *Civilization*? “Neo-primitivists” and other cultural reductionists have so blackened the word that its rational components are now in need of a scrupulous sorting out from the irrationalities of the past and present. And what, finally, is *Progress*? Relativists have rejected its aspirations to freedom in all its complexity, in favor of a fashionable assertion of “autonomy,” often reducible to personal proclivities. Meanwhile, antihumanists have divested the very concept of Progress of all relevance and meaning in the farrago of human self-denigration that marks the mood of the present time. A skepticism that denies any meaning, rationality, coherence, and continuity in History, that corrodes the very existence of premises, let alone the necessity of exploring them, renders discourse itself virtually impossible. Indeed, premises as such have become so suspect that the new relativists regard any attempts to establish them as evidence of a cultural pathology, much as Freudian analysts might view a patient’s resistance to treatment as symptomatic of a psychological pathology. Such a psychologization of discussion closes off all further dispute. No longer are serious challenges taken on their own terms and given a serious response; rather, they are dismissed as symptoms of a personal and social malaise. So far have these tendencies been permitted to proceed that one cannot now mount a critique of incoherence, for example, without exposing oneself to the charge of a having a “predisposition” to “coherence”—or a “Eurocentric” bias. A defense of clarity, equally unacceptable, invites the accusation of reinforcing the “tyranny of reason,” while an attempt to uphold the validity of reason is dismissed as an “oppressive” presupposition of reason’s existence. The very attempt at definition is rejected as intellectually “coercive.” Rational discussion is impugned as a repression of intuitions, presciences, psychological motivations, of “positional” insights that are dependent on one’s gender or ethnicity, or of revelations of one kind or another that often feed into outright mysticism. This constellation of relativistic views, which range from the crude to the intellectually exotic, cannot be criticized rationally because they deny the validity of rationally independent conceptual formulations as such, presumably “constricted” by the claims of reason. For the new relativists, “freedom” ends where claims to rationality begin—in marked contrast to the ancient Athenians, for whom violence began where rational discussion ended. Pluralism, the decentering of meanings, the denial of foundations, and the hypostasization of the idiosyncratic, of the ethically and socially contingent, and of the psychological—all seem like part of the massive cultural decay that corresponds to the objective decay of our era. In American universities today, relativists in all their mutations too often retreat into the leprous “limit experiences” of Foucault; into a view of History as fragmentary “collective representations” (Durkheim), “culture-patterns” (Benedict), or “imaginaries” (Castoriadis); or into the nihilistic asociality of postmodernism. When today’s relativists do offer definitions of the concepts they oppose, they typically overstate and exaggerate them. They decry the pursuit of foundations—an endeavor that they have characteristically turned into an “ism,” “foundationalism”—as “totalistic,” without any regard for the patent need for basic principles. That foundations exist that are confined to *areas of reality* *where their existence is valid and knowable* seems to elude these antifoundationalists, for whom foundations must either encompass the entire cosmos or else not exist at all. Reality would indeed be a mystery if a few principles or foundations could encompass all that exists, indeed, all its innovations unfolding from the subatomic realm to inorganic matter, from the simplest to the most complex life-forms, and ultimately to the realm of astrophysics. Some historical relativists overemphasize the subjective in history at the expense of the material. Subjective factors certainly do affect obviously objective developments. In the Hellenistic Age, for example, Heron reputedly designed steam engines, yet so far as we know they were never used to replace human labor, as they were two thousand years later. Subjective historians, to be sure, would emphasize the subjective factors in this fact. But what interaction between ideological and material factors explains why one society—capitalism—used the steam engine on a vast scale for the manufacture of commodities, while another—Hellenistic society—used it merely to open temple doors for the purposes of mass mystification? Overly subjectivistic historians would do well to explore not only how different traditions and sensibilities yielded these disparate uses of machines but what material as well as broadly social factors either fostered or produced them.[75] Other historical relativists are nominalistic, overemphasizing the idiosyncratic in History, often begging basic questions that must be explored. A small group of people in ancient Judea, we may be told, formulated a localized, ethnically based body of monotheistic beliefs that at a chronologically later point became the basis of the Judeo-Christian world religion. Are these two events unrelated? Was their conjunction a mere accident? To conceive this vast development in a nominalistic way, without probing into why the Roman emperors adopted the Judeo-Christian synthesis—in an empire composed of very different cultures and languages that was direly in need of ideological unity to prevent its complete collapse—is to produce confusion rather than clarity. Perhaps the most problematic aspect of relativism is its moral arbitrariness. The moral relativism of the trite maxim “What’s good for me is good for me, and what’s good for you is good for you,” hardly requires elucidation.[76] In this apparently most formless of times, relativism has left us with a solipsistic morality and in certain subcultures a politics literally premised on chaos. The turn of some anarchists toward a highly personalistic, presumably “autonomous” subculture at the expense of responsible social commitment and action reflects, in my view, a tragic abdication of a serious engagement in the political and revolutionary spheres. This is no idle problem today, when increasing numbers of people with no knowledge of History take capitalism to be a natural, eternal social system. A politics rooted in purely relativistic preferences, in assertions of personal “autonomy” that stem largely from an individual’s “desire” can yield a crude and self-serving opportunism. Capitalism itself, in fact, fashioned its primary ideology on an equation of freedom with the personal autonomy of the individual, which Anatole France once impishly described as the “freedom” of everyone to sleep at night under the same bridge over the Seine. Individuality is inseparable from community, and autonomy is hardly meaningful unless it is embedded in a cooperative community.[77] Compared with humanity’s potentialities for freedom, a relativistic and personalistic “autonomy” is little more than psychotherapy writ large and expanded into a social theory. Far too many of the relativistic critics of History, Civilization, and Progress seem less like serious social theorists than like frightened former radical ideologues who have not fully come to terms with the failures of the Left and of “existing socialism” in recent years. The incoherence that is celebrated in present-day theory is due in no small part to the one-sided and exaggerated reaction of French academic “leftists” to the May-June events of 1968, to the behavior of the French Communist Party, and in even greater part to the various mutations of Holy Mother Russia from Tsarism through Stalinism to Yeltsinism. Too often, this disenchantment provides an escape route for erstwhile “revolutionaries” to ensconce themselves in the academy, to embrace social democracy, or simply to turn to a vacuous nihilism that hardly constitutes a threat to the existing society. From relativism, they have constructed a skeptical barrier between themselves and the rest of society. Yet this barrier is as intellectually fragile as the one-sided absolutism that the Old Left tried to derive from Hegel, Marx, and Lenin. Fairness requires me to emphasize that contrary to the conventional wisdom about the Left today, there has never been any “existing socialism,” the erstwhile claims of Eastern European leaders to have achieved it notwithstanding. Nor was Hegel a mere teleologist; nor Marx a mere “productivist;” nor Lenin the ideological “father” of the ruthless opportunist and counterrevolutionary, Stalin.[78] In reaction to the nightmare of the “Soviet” system, today’s relativists have not only overreacted to and exaggerated the shortcomings of Hegel, Marx, and Lenin; they have concocted an ideological prophylaxis to protect themselves from the still-unexorcised demons of a tragically failed past instead of formulating a credible philosophy that can address the problems that now confront us at all levels of society and thought. Current expositions of oxymoronic “market socialisms” and “minimal statisms” by “neo-” and “post-Marxists” suggest where political relativism and assertions of “autonomy” can lead us.[79] Indeed, it is quite fair to ask whether today’s fashionable political relativism itself would provide us with more than a paper-thin obstacle to totalitarianism. The dismissal of attempts to derive continuity in History, coherence in Civilization, and meaning in Progress as evidence of a “totalizing” or “totalitarian” mentality in pursuit of all-encompassing foundations directly or indirectly imbricates reason, particularly that of the Enlightenment era, with totalitarianism, and even significantly trivializes the harsh reality and pedigree of totalitarianism itself. In fact, the actions of the worst totalitarians of our era, Stalin and Hitler, were guided less by the objectively grounded principles or “foundational” ideas they so cynically voiced in public than by a kind of relativistic or situational ethics. For Stalin, who was no more a “socialist” or “communist” than he was an “anarchist” or “liberal,” theory was merely an ideological fig leaf for the concentration of power. To overlook Stalin’s sheer opportunism is myopic at best and cynical at worst. Under his regime, only a hopelessly dogmatic “Communist” who had managed to negotiate and survive Stalin’s various changes in the “party line” could have taken Stalin seriously as a “Marxist-Leninist.” Hitler, in turn, exhibited amazing flexibility in bypassing ideology for strictly pragmatic ends. In his first months in power, he decimated all the “true believers” of National Socialism among his storm troopers at the behest of the Prussian officer caste, which feared and detested the Nazi rabble. In the absence of an objective grounding—notably, the very real human potentialities that have been formed by the natural, social, moral, and intellectual development of our species—notions like freedom, creativity, and rationality are reduced to “intersubjective” relations, underpinned by personal and individualistic preferences (nothing more!) that are “resolved” by another kind of tyranny—notably, the tyranny of consensus. Lacking foundations of any kind, lacking any real form and solidity, notions of “intersubjectivity” can be frighteningly homogenizing because of their seemingly “democratic” logic of consensuality—a logic that precludes the dissensus and ideological dissonance so necessary for stimulating innovation. In the consensual “ideal speech situation” that Jurgen Habermas deployed to befog the socialist vision of the 1970s, this “intersubjectivity,” a transcendental “Subject” or “Ego” like a mutated Rousseauian “General Will,” replaces the rich elaboration of reason. This subjectivism or “intersubjectivity”—be it in the form of Habermas’s neo-Kantianism or Baudrillard’s egoism—lends itself to a notion of “social theory” as a matter of personal taste. Mere constructions of “socially conditioned” human minds, free-floating in a sea of relativism and ahistoricism, reject a potential objective ground for freedom in the interests of avoiding “totalitarian Totalities” and the “tyranny” of an “Absolute.” Indeed, reason itself is essentially reduced to “intersubjectivity.” Juxtaposed with literary celebrations of the “subjective reason” of personalism, and its American sequelae of mysticism, individual redemption, and conformity, and its post-1968 French sequelae of postmodernist, psychoanalytic, relativist, and neo-Situationist vagaries, Marx’s commitment to thorough thinking would be attractive. Ideas that are objectively grounded, unlike those that are relativistically asserted, can provide us with a definable body of principles with which we can seriously grapple. The foundational coherence and, in the best of cases, the rationality of objectively grounded views at least make them explicit and tangible and free them from the vagaries of the labyrinthine personalism so very much in vogue today. Unlike a foundationless subjectivism that is often reducible, under the rubric of “autonomy,” to personal preferences, objective foundations are at least subject to challenges in a free society. Far from precluding rational critique, they invite it. Far from taking refuge in an unchallengeable nominalist elusiveness, they open themselves to the test of coherence. Paul Feyerabend’s corrosive (in my view, cynical) relativism to the contrary notwithstanding, the natural sciences in the past three centuries have been among the most emancipatory human endeavors in the history of ideas—partly because of their pursuit of unifying or foundational explanations of reality.[80] In the end, what should always be of concern to us is the *content* of objective principles, be they in science, social theory, or ethics, not a flippant condemnation of their claims to coherence and objectivity per se. Indeed, despite claims to the contrary, relativism has its own hidden “foundations” and metaphysics. As such, because its premises are masked, it may well produce an ideological tyranny far more paralyzing than the “totalitarianism” that it imputes to objectivism and an expressly reasoned “foundationalism.” Insofar as our concerns should center on the *bases* of freedom and the nature of reason, modern relativism has “decentered” these crucial issues into wispy expressions of personal faith in an atmosphere of general skepticism. We may choose to applaud the relativist who upholds his or her strictly personal faith by reiterating Luther’s defiant words at Worms, *Hier stehe ich, ich kann nicht anders* (“Here I stand, I cannot do otherwise”). But to speak frankly, unless we also hear a rational argument to validate that stand, one based on more than a subjective inclination, who gives a damn about this resolve? *** II Which again raises the problem of what History, Civilization, and Progress actually are. History, I wish to contend, is the rational content and continuity of events (with due regard for qualitative “leaps”) that are grounded in humanity’s potentialities for freedom, self-consciousness, and cooperation, in the self-formative development of increasingly libertarian forms of consociation. It is the rational “infrastructure,” so to speak, that coheres human actions and institutions over the past and the present in the direction of an emancipatory society and emancipated individuals. That is to say, History is precisely what is *rational* in human development. It is what is rational, moreover, in the dialectical sense of the implicit that unfolds, expands, and begins in varying degrees through increasing differentiation to actualize humanity’s very *real* potentialities for freedom, self-consciousness, and cooperation.[81] It will immediately be objected that irrational events, unrelated to this actualization, explode upon us at all times, in all eras and cultures. But insofar as they defy rational interpretation, they remain precisely events, not History, however consequential their effects may be on the course of other events. Their impact may be very powerful, to be sure, but they are not dialectically rooted in humanity’s potentialities for freedom, self-consciousness, and cooperation.[82] They can be assembled into Chronicles, the stuff out of which Froissart constructed his largely anecdotal “histories,” but not History in the sense I am describing. Events may even “overtake History,” so to speak, and ultimately submerge it in the irrational and the evil. But without an increasingly self-reflexive History, which present-day relativism threatens to extinguish, we would not even know that it had happened. If we deny that humanity has these potentialities for freedom, self-consciousness, and cooperation—conceived as one ensemble—then along with many self-styled “socialists” and even former anarchists like Daniel Cohn-Bendit, we may well conclude that “capitalism has won,” as one disillusioned friend put it; that “history” has reached its terminus in “bourgeois democracy” (however tentative this “terminus” may actually be); and that rather than attempt to enlarge the realm of the rational and the free, we would do best to ensconce ourselves in the lap of capitalism and make it as comfortable a resting place as possible for ourselves. As a mere adaptation to what exists, to the “what-is,” such behavior is merely animalistic. Sociobiologists may even regard it as genetically unavoidable. But my critics need not be sociobiologists to observe that the historical record exhibits a great deal of adaptation and worse—of irrationality and violence, of pleasure in the destruction of oneself and others—and to question my assertion that History is the unfolding of human potentialities for freedom, self-consciousness, and cooperation. Indeed, humans have engaged in destruction and luxuriated in real and imaginary cruelties toward one another that have produced hells on earth. They have created the monstrosities of Hitler’s death camps and Stalin’s gulags, not to speak of the mountains of skulls that Mongol and Tartar invaders of Eurasia left behind in distant centuries. But this record hardly supplants a dialectic of unfolding and maturing of potentialities in social development, nor is the *capacity* of humans to inflict cruelties on each other equivalent to their *potentialities* for freedom, self-consciousness, and cooperation. Here, human capacities and human potentialities must be distinguished from each other. The human capacity for inflicting injury belongs to the realm of natural history, to what humans share with animals in the biological world or “first nature.” First nature is the domain of survival, of core feelings of pain and fear, and in that sense our behavior remains animalistic, which is by no means altered with the emergence of social or “second nature.” *Unknowing* animals merely try to survive and adapt to one degree or another to the world in which they exist. By contrast, humans are animals of a very special kind; they are *knowing* animals, they have the intelligence to calculate and to devise, even in the service of needs that they share with nonhuman life-forms. Human reason and knowledge have commonly served aims of self-preservation and self-maximization by the use of a formal logic of expediency, a logic that rulers have deployed for social control and the manipulation of society. These methods have their roots in the animal realm of simple means-ends choices to survive. But humans also have the capacity to *deliberately* inflict pain and fear, to use their reason for perverse passions, in order to coerce others or merely for cruelty for its own sake. Only knowing animals, ironically capable of intelligent innovation, with the *Schadenfreude* to enjoy vicariously the torment of others, can inflict fear and pain in a coldly calculated or even passionate manner. The Foucauldian hypostasization of the body as the “terrain” of sado-masochistic pleasure can be easily elaborated into a metaphysical justification of violence, depending, to be sure, on what “pleases” a particular perpetrating ego.[83] In this sense, human beings are too intelligent not to live in a rational society, not to live within institutions formed by reason and ethics that restrict their capacity for irrationality and violence.[84] Insofar as they do not, humans remain dangerously wayward and unformed creatures with enormous powers of destruction as well as creation. Here, I believe, we are obliged to make a serious decision about how we look at the past. Either we will relativize History by emphasizing the power of the irrational over human behavior and the endless differences that distinguish cultures from one another; or we will emphasize the remarkable coherence of various cultures and generalize from their similarities, even as we appreciate their differences. Choosing the first alternative would ultimately diminish social development to a disconnected archipelago of wholly unique cultures whose only coherence is psychosocial and internal; while the second alternative would allow for a dialectically rational understanding of History and a ground for ethics. If our animalistic capacity for irrational behavior gains priority over our humanistic potentiality to act rationally, and if social development becomes only an ensemble of *Chronicles* (if even that) rather than a *History* of maturation, there is no basis for striving to achieve a rational society. What, then, of those social failures, aberrations, horrors, and breakdowns that belie humanity’s unilinear progress toward Civilization and freedom?[85] Without in any way understating this problematic, we must be wary of overstating it by dissolving social development in psychosocial interpretations, thereby minimizing the very reality of social maturation as such. There has been a historical social development, all its many setbacks notwithstanding, setbacks that can in part be attributed to elites of agonistic men whose power gave them the scope to play out their destructive fantasies, impulses, and designs on a large social stage. In their activities they have “gone too far,” so to speak, demonically pushing cultures beyond the rational framework of their historical time. Such distortions become especially problematical during times of transition, when established social formations are being negated and new ones are emerging with uncertainty and ambiguity. This overextension of the “negative” (to use Hegel’s term) occurred at numerous times and in numerous places, when “antitheses” became ends in themselves and did not develop as a rational or progressive transcendence. Neither tribal, feudal, autocratic, republican, nor even classical democratic political systems have been historically immune to this phenomenon. And yet it would be a gross simplification of social development to ahistorically dichotomize the hierarchical, class, and even state formations of the past, on the one hand, and the torturous efforts of humanity to advance toward freedom, on the other. Paradoxically, in its emergence out of barbarism—indeed, out of simple animality—humanity may have had to depend upon priests, chieftains, and perhaps state-like formations to overcome parochialism, lack of individuality, kinship bonds, gerontocracies, and patriarchies, to cite some key social features of early tribal cultures. “Evils” these are, to be sure, but, if we are to believe Michael Bakunin, “socially necessary evils,” a phrase with which he historically characterized the state and that Peter Kropotkin echoed in his famous *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article, “Anarchism” The groundwork for making a civilizatory process possible—notably the emergence of cities, territorial forms of consociation, writing, an expanding moral sensibility, a rational and incipiently secular outlook on the world, technological advances that led to agriculture, metallurgy, and relatively sophisticated crafts—all may have required what we would regard today as unacceptable institutions of social control but that at an earlier time may have been important in launching a rational social development. In any case, to ahistorically counter pose “virtue” to “evil” without *any* historical qualifications and mediations can be very naive. In much earlier historical eras, “good” and “evil” had not even acquired the definitions they have today, after thousands of years of human social development. The state’s invasion of patriarchal authority; its substitution of a relatively rational system of law for the patriarch’s arbitrary and absolute authority over all other members of a family or clan; and the abrogation of blood vengeance as a way of resolving conflicts—all, to cite some significant advances, played a role that was relatively liberatory in its historical context, given a general framework of domination in early hierarchical societies. Patriarchs, for example, would have seen the state’s function in this respect as “evil.” Like the historical replacement of kinship ties with civic ties, barter with markets, agrarian isolation with cities, particularism with growing universalism, and superstition with secularism, there were certain forms of socially regulative institutions that, while oppressive in modern eyes, opened possibilities for liberatory developments that otherwise might never have emerged. But although the very real barbarism of past and present remains an “evil,” as Bakunin observed, it was not a historical “necessity” in any sense akin to Bakunin’s, for we can never know what rational alternatives may have existed at any time. At no time can we surrender to the “inevitability” of domination in certainty that latent liberatory possibilities do not exist. In no sense, then, should my remarks be seen as an “excuse” for barbaric behavior, past or present. Rather, I intend them in great part to be the premise for trying to understand how it is that the irrational dimensions of the past, with their many barbarities, never completely stifled the rational development of humanity and yet may have even interacted with it at times to yield social advances within a broadly evil framework. It behooves us to study the historical and social interactions between the legacy of freedom and the legacy of domination, in degree as well as in kind, not to simplify them or even brush them aside with psychosocial categories or ahistorically enumerate them on a social ledger of debits and credits. Humanity may have a “potentiality for evil,” but that over the course of social development people have exhibited an explosive capacity to perpetrate the most appallingly evil acts does not mean that human potentiality is constituted to produce evil and a nihilistic destructiveness. The capacity of certain Germans to establish an Auschwitz, indeed the means and the goal to exterminate a whole people in a terrifyingly industrial manner, was inherent neither in Germany’s development nor in the development of industrial rationalization as such. However anti-Semitic many Germans were over the previous two centuries, Eastern Europeans were equally or even more so; ironically, industrial development in Western Europe may have done more to achieve Jewish juridical emancipation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries than all the Christian pieties that marked preindustrial life during the Middle Ages. Indeed, evil may have a “logic”—that is to say, it may be explained. But most general accounts explain the evolution of evil in terms of adventitious evil acts and events, if this can be regarded as explanation at all. Hitler’s takeover of Germany, made possible more by economic and political dislocations than by the racial views he espoused, was precisely a terrible event that cannot be explained in terms of any human potentiality for evil. The horror of Auschwitz lies almost as much in its inexplicability, in its appallingly extraordinary character, as in the monstrosities that the Nazis generally inflicted on European Jews. It is in this sense that Auschwitz remains hauntingly *inhuman* and that it has tragically produced an abiding mistrust by many people of Civilization and Progress. When explanations of evil are not merely narrations of events, they explain evil in terms of instrumental or conventional logic. The knowing animal, the human being, who is viciously harmful, does not use the developmental reason of dialectic, the reason of ethical reflection; nor a coherent, reflective reason, grounded in a knowledge of History and Civilization; nor even the knowing of an ambiguous, arbitrary, self-generated “imaginary,” or a morality of personal taste and pleasure. Rather, the knowing animal uses instrumental calculation to serve evil ends, including the infliction of pain. The very existence of irrationalism and evil in many social phenomena today compels us to uphold a clear standard of the “rational” and the “good” by which to judge the one against the other. A purely personalistic, relativistic, or functional approach will hardly do for establishing ethical standards—as many critiques of subjectivism and subjective reason have shown. The personal tastes from which subjectivism and relativism derive their ethical standards are as transient and fleeting as moods. Nor will a nominalistic approach suffice: to reduce History to an incomprehensible assortment of patterns or to inexplicable products of the imagination is to deny social development all internal ethical coherence.[86] Indeed, an unsorted, ungraded, unmediated approach reduces our understanding of History to a crude eclecticism rather than an insightful coherence, to an overemphasis on differentiae (so easy to do, these mindless days!) and the idiosyncratic rather than the meaningful and the universal, more often attracting the commonsensical individual to the psychoanalytic couch than helping him or her reconstitute a left libertarian social movement. If our views of social development are to be structured around the *differences* that distinguish one culture or period from another, we will ignore underlying tendencies that, with extraordinary universality, have greatly expanded the material and cultural conditions for freedom on various levels of individual and social self-understanding. By grossly emphasizing disjunctions, social isolates, unique configurations, and chance events, we will reduce shared, clearly common social developments to an archipelago of cultures, each essentially unrelated to those that preceded and followed it. Yet many historical forces have emerged, declined, and emerged again, despite the formidable obstacles that often seemed to stand in their way. One does not have to explain “everything” in “foundational” terms to recognize the existence of abiding problems such as scarcity, exploitation, class rule, domination, and hierarchy that have agonized oppressed peoples for thousands of years.[87] If critics were correct in dubbing dialectic a mystery for claiming to encompass *all* phenomena by a few cosmic formulas, then they would be obliged to regard human social development as a mystery if they claimed that it lacks any continuity and unity—that is, the bases for a philosophy of History. Without a notion of continuity in History, how can we explain the extraordinary efflorescence of culture and technique that *Homo sapiens* produced during the Magdelenian period, some twenty or thirty thousand years ago? How can we explain the clearly unrelated evolution of complex agricultural systems in at least three separate parts of the world—the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Mesoamerica—that apparently had no contact with one another and that were based on the cultivation of very different grains, notably wheat, rice, and maize? How can we explain the great gathering of social forces in which, after ten thousand years of arising, stagnating, and disappearing, cities finally gained control over the agrarian world that had impeded their development, yielding the “urban revolution,” as V. Gordon Childe called it, in different areas of the world that could have had no contact with one another? Mesoamerica and Mesopotamia, most clearly, could not have had any contact with each other since Paleolithic times, yet their agriculture, towns and cities, literacy, and mathematics developed in ways that are remarkably similar. Initially Paleolithic foragers, both produced highly urbanized cultures based on grain cultivation, glyphs, accurate calendrics, and very elaborate pottery, to cite only the most striking parallels. The wheel was known to Mesoamericans, although they do not seem to have used it, probably for want of appropriate draft animals, as well as the zero, despite the absence of any communication with Eurasian societies. It requires an astonishing disregard for the unity of Civilization on the part of historical relativists to emphasize often minor differences, such as clothing, some daily customs, and myths, at the expense of a remarkable unity of consciousness and social development that the two cultures exhibited on two separate continents after many millennia of isolation from each other. The unity of social evolution is hardly vitiated by such nominalistic perplexities as “Why didn’t a Lenin appear in Germany rather than Russia in 1917–1918?” In view of the great tidal movements of History, it might be more appropriate to explore—Lenin’s strong will and Kerensky’s psychological flaccidity aside—whether the traditional proletariat was *ever* capable of creating a “workers’ state,” indeed, what that statist concept really meant when working men and women were obliged to devote the greater amount of their lives to arduous labor at the expense of their participation in managing social affairs. Caprice, accident, irrationality, and “imaginaries” certainly enter into social development for better or worse. But they literally have no meaning if there is no ethical standard by which to define the other of what we are presupposing with our standard.[88] Seemingly accidental or eccentric factors must be raised to the level of social theory rather than shriveled to the level of nominalistic minutiae if we are to understand them. Despite the accidents, failures, and other aberrations that can alter the course of rational social and individual development, there is a “*legacy of freedom*,” as I named a key chapter in my book *The Ecology of Freedom*, a tradition of increasing approximation of humanity toward freedom and self-consciousness, in ideas and moral values and the overall terrain of social life. Indeed, the existence of History as a coherent unfolding of real emancipatory potentialities is clearly verified by the existence of Civilization, the potentialities of History embodied and partially actualized. It consists of the concrete advances, material as well as cultural and psychological, that humanity *has* made toward greater degrees of freedom, self-consciousness, and cooperation, as well as rationality itself. Let me state as clearly and firmly as possible that I do not regard History and Progress as unilinear, inevitable, teleological, or in any sense predetermined. The power of speculative reason to logically project beyond the given into what is yet to come *if* humanity acts rationally—a power that is one of our highest human attributes—does not mean that what rationally “should be” will indeed *necessarily* “be.” To constitute the all-important standard by which we may judge the rationality of a society is a firmly held function of dialectical reason. We would lose ourselves in a quagmire of solipsistic relativism if we were to abdicate the power of reason to “judge” History, Civilization, and Progress. Even the most dyed-in-the-wool antirationalists and relativists exercise this power, irrespective of their convictions against doing so. As any thinking person would agree, people do indeed imagine the world as it *might* be, in contrast to what it *is* in reality, even in their daydreams. They do have the wildest fantasies about their culture and its environment. And they do hold the most seemingly unrealistic constellations of images and “patterns of culture” about basic aspects of their experience. None of this do I deny—quite the contrary, humanity’s continual struggle with its imagination lies at the very heart of the tensions within early society, which in turn has historically led to varying degrees of rational self-understanding as well as frightening, often atavistic regressions. Given these observations, it would be simplistic and one-sided to ignore the moral and cultural paradoxes embedded in social development. Humanity did not emerge *ab novo*, without roots in animal evolution. The human being has been and still is an animal with emotional states that are animalistic, like “fight and flight” reactions and tormentingly basic fears. But humans are also animals of a very special kind: we are highly intelligent by comparison with other species—indeed, qualitatively so—and as such, we have the ability not only to adapt to our environments but intentionally to alter them significantly. In short, we can do more than adapt; we can innovate, although we do not always innovate willingly if we can survive in a given environment without doing so. Our intelligence is also highly problematic. It makes not only for innovation but for foresight, fantasy, imagination, creativity—and cruelty. Indeed, much personal and social irrationality *stems* from the intentionally, will, self-assertiveness, and fantasies of our animality informed by our intelligence. As Marx suggested, we still live in prehistory and have yet to find our way toward a self-conscious, humane, cooperative, and empathetic social life. With our animalistic as well as human attributes, we evolve in an ever-changing world and face stark problems of survival and well-being. Apart from those people who inhabit places with benign physiographic conditions, we are subject to material insecurity, contesting wills, challenges to our sense of self and self-regard, fears of disease, diminishing physical powers with age, frightening dreams, and so forth. We address these abiding problems with relatively developed minds that are still encased, as it were, in extremely potent animal attributes. History is the painful movement of human beings in extricating themselves from animal existence, of the emergence of tensions from a combination of nonhuman and human attributes, and of progressively advancing toward a more universally human state of affairs, however irregular or unsteady this advance may be. The problems that humans retain from early society continue to exist in one way or another to this day, and their resolution in part or whole is one of the meaningful goals of History, even as new problems arise over the course of time. Nor is there any certainty that these problems will be resolved. A descent into barbarism—a problematic that Marxists were raising during the grimmest years of World War II—is just as possible as the attainment of a rational society. But to deny, because of such starkly conflicting alternatives in social development, that there are rational criteria by which we may judge that Progress is myopic, or even that Progress has occurred, is self-deceptive. It is all too easy to rebuke History if one minimizes the genuine advances that have been made in culture, social relations, and technics. All doubts about History, Civilization, and Progress aside, it is undeniable that we have divested ourselves of many of the kinship ties that parochialized us into tribal groups, and that we have accepted—albeit with many qualifications—our status as a *human* species rather than as a *folk*. We have created cities that are open to strangers, we have advanced technology to the point that a sufficiency in the means of life could be available to all in a rational society, and we have increased our knowledge of the natural world to almost sublime proportions. Not only do we kill each other with terrifying brutality, given our combination of animality with intelligence, but we help each other on a massive scale with extraordinary sensitivity. To have transcended the limitations of the kinship tie; to have gone beyond mere foraging into agriculture and industry; to have replaced the parochial band or tribe with the increasingly universal city; to have devised writing, produced literature, and developed richer forms of expression than non-literate peoples could have ever imagined—all of these and many more advances have provided the conditions for evolving increasingly sophisticated notions of individuality and expanding notions of reason that remain stunning achievements to this very day. It is dialectical reason rather than conventional reason that apprehends the development of this tradition. Indeed, dialectical logic can hardly be treated coequally with eruptions of brutality, however calculated they may be, since in no sense can *episodic capacities* be equated with an *unfolding potentiality*. A dialectical understanding of History apprehends differentiae in quality, logical continuity, and maturation in historical development, as distinguished from the kinetics of mere change or a simple directivity of “social dynamics.” Rarefying projects for human liberation to the point that they are largely subjective “imaginaries,” without relevance to the realities of the overall human experience and the insights of speculative reason, can cause us to overlook the existential impact of these developments and the promise they hold for ever-greater freedom, self-consciousness, and cooperation. We take these achievements all too easily for granted without asking what kind of human beings we would be if they had not occurred as a result of historical and cultural movements more fundamental than eccentric factors. These achievements, let us acknowledge quite clearly, *are* Civilization, indeed a civilizing continuum that is nonetheless infused by terribly barbaric, indeed animalistic features. The civilizing process has been ambiguous, as I have emphasized in my “Ambiguities of Freedom,”[89] but it has nonetheless historically turned folk into citizens, while the process of environmental adaptation that humans share with animals has been transformed into a wide-ranging, strictly human process of innovation in distinctly alterable environments.[90] Those of us who understandably fear that the barrier between Civilization and chaos is fragile actually *presuppose* the existence of Civilization, not simply of chaos, and the existence of rational coherence, not simply of irrational incoherence. Moreover, the dialectic of freedom has emerged again and again in recurring struggles for freedom, ideological as well as physical, that have abidingly expanded overall goals of freedom, self-consciousness, and cooperation—as much in social evolution as a whole as within specific temporal periods. The past is replete with instances in which masses of people, however disparate their cultures, have tried to resolve the same millennia-old problems in remarkably similar ways and with remarkably similar views. The famous cry for equality that the English peasants raised in their 1381 revolt—“When Adam delved and Eve span, who was then the gentleman?”—is as meaningful for contemporary revolts as it was six hundred years ago, in a world that presumably had a far different “imaginary” from our own. The denial of a rational universal, History, of Civilization, of Progress, and of social continuity renders any historical perspective impossible and hence any revolutionary praxis meaningless except as a matter of personal, indeed often *very* personal, taste. Even as social movements attempt to attain what they might call a rational society, in developing humanity’s potentialities for freedom, self-consciousness, and cooperation. History may constitute itself as an ever-developing “whole.” This whole, I should emphasize, must be distinguished from a terminal Hegelian “Absolute” just as demands for coherence in a body of views must be distinguished from the worship of such an “Absolute” and just as the capacity of speculative reason to educe in a dialectically logical manner the *very real potentialities* of humanity for freedom is neither teleological nor absolutist, much less “totalitarian.”[91] There is nothing teleological, mystical, or absolutist about History. “Wholeness” is no teleological referent, whose evolving components are merely parts of a predetermined “Absolute.” Neither the rational unfolding of human potentialities nor their actualization in an eternally given “Totality” is predestined. Nor is the working out of our potentialities some vague sort of suprahuman activity. Human beings are not the passive tools of a Spirit (*Geist*) that works out its complete and final self-realization and self-consciousness. Rather, they are *active agents*, the authentic “constituents” of History, who may or may not elaborate their potentialities in social evolution. Aborted the revolutionary tradition has been here, and discontinuous it has been there—and for all we know it may ultimately be aborted for humanity as such. Whether an “ultimate” rational society will even exist as a liberatory “end of history” is beyond anyone’s predictive powers. We cannot say what the scope of a rational, free, and cooperative society would be, let alone presume to claim knowledge of its “limits.” Indeed, insofar as the historical process effected by living human agents is likely to expand our notions of the rational, the democratic, the free, and the cooperative, it is undesirable to dogmatically assert that they have any finality. History forms its own ideal of these notions at various times, which in turn have been expanded and enriched. Every society has the possibility of attaining a remarkable degree of rationality, given the material, cultural, and intellectual conditions that allow for it or, at least, are available to it. Within the limits of a slave, patriarchal, warrior, and urban world, for example, the ancient Athenian *polis* functioned more rationally than Sparta or other Greek *poleis*. It is precisely the task of speculative reason to educe *what should exist* at any given period, based on the very real potentialities for the expansion of these notions. To conclude that “the end of history” has been attained in liberal capitalism would be to jettison the historical legacy of these magnificent efforts to create a free society—efforts that claimed countless lives in the great revolutions of the past. For my part, I and probably many revolutionaries today want no place in such an “end of history”; nor do I want to forget the great emancipatory movements for popular freedom in all their many forms that occurred over the ages. History, Civilization, and Progress are the dialectically rational social dispensations that form, even with all the impediments they face, a dialectical legacy of freedom. The existence of this legacy of freedom in no way denies the existence of a “legacy of domination,”[92] which remains within the realm of the irrational. Indeed, these “legacies” intertwine with and condition each other. Human ideals, struggles, and achievements of various approximations to freedom cannot be separated from the cruelties and barbarities that have marked social development over the centuries, often giving rise to new social configurations whose development is highly unpredictable. But a crucial historical problematic remains, to the extent that reason can foresee a given development: will it be freedom or domination that is nourished? I submit that *Progress* is the advance—and as everyone presumably hopes, the ascendancy—of freedom over domination, which clearly cannot be conceptually frozen in an ahistorical eternity, given the growing awareness of both hopes and oppressions that have come to light in only a few recent generations. Progress also appears in the overall improvement, however ambiguous, of humanity’s material conditions of life, the emergence of a rational ethics, with enlightened standards of sensibility and conduct, out of unreflexive custom and theistic morality, and social institutions that foster continual self-development and cooperation. However lacking our ethical claims in relation to social practice may be, given all the barbarities of our time, we now subject brutality to much harsher judgments than was done in earlier times.[93] It is difficult to conceive of a rational ethics—as distinguished from unthinking custom and mere commandments of morality, like the Decalogue—without reasoned criteria of good and evil based on real potentialities for freedom that speculative reason can educe beyond a given reality. The “sufficient conditions” for an ethics must be explicated rationally, not simply affirmed in public opinion polls, plebiscites, or an “intersubjective” consensus that fails to clarify what constitutes “subjectivity” and “autonomy.” Admittedly, this is not easy to do in a world that celebrates vaporous words, but it is necessary to discover truth rather than work with notions that stem from the conventional “wisdom” of our times. As Hegel insisted, even commonplace moral maxims like “Love thy neighbor as thyself” raise many problems, such as what we really mean by “love.” *** III I believe that we lack an adequate Left critique of the theoretical problems raised by classical Hegelianism, Marxism, anarchism, social democracy, and liberalism, with the result that there are serious lacunae in the critical exploration of these “isms.” A comprehensive critical exploration would require an analysis not only of the failings of the subject matter under discussion, but of the hidden presuppositions of the critic. The critic would be obliged to clearly define what he or she means by the concepts he or she is using. This self-reflexive obligation cannot be bypassed by substituting undertheorized terms like “creativity,” “freedom,” and “autonomy” for in-depth analysis. The complexity of these ideas, their sweep, the traditions that underpin and divide them against one another, and the ease with which they can be abused and, in the academic milieux in which they are bandied around, detached from the lived material and social conditions of life—all require considerable exploration. Among the important concepts and relationships that require elucidation is the tendency to reduce objectivity to the “natural law” of physical science.[94] In the conventional scientific sense of the term, “natural law” preordains the kinetic future of objects colliding with each other. It may even preordain what an individual plant will become under the normal conditions required for its growth. Objectivity, however, has a multiplicity of meanings and does not necessarily correspond to the “laws” that the natural sciences seek to formulate. It involves not only the materiality of the world in a broad sense but also its potentialities, as very real but as yet unrealized form structured to undergo elaboration. The evolution of key life-forms toward ever-greater subjectivity, choice, and behavioral flexibility—*real* potentialities and their degrees of actualization—and toward human intellectuality, language, and social institutionalization, is transparently clear. An objective potentiality is the implicit that may or may not be actualized, depending upon the conditions in which it emerges. Among humans, the actualization of potentiality is not *necessarily* restricted by anything besides aging and death, although it is not free to unfold unconditionally. Minimally, the actualization of humanity’s potentialities consists in its attainment of a rational society. Such a society, of course, would not appear *ab novo*. By its very nature it would require development, maturation, or, more precisely, a History—a rational development that may be fulfilled by the very fact that the society is potentially constituted to be rational. If the self-realization of life in the nonhuman world is survival or stability, the self-realization of humanity is the degree of freedom, self-consciousness, and cooperation, as well as rationality in society. Reduced merely or primarily to scientific “natural law,” objectivity is highly attenuated. It does not encompass potentiality and the working of the dialectic in existential reality, let alone its presence as a standard for gauging reality against actuality in the unfolding of human phenomena.[95] Marx’s claim to have unearthed “the natural laws of capitalist production” was absurd, but to advance relativism as an alternative to it is equally absurd. A younger, more flexible Marx insightfully claimed, “It is not enough that thought should seek its actualization; actuality itself must strive toward thought.”[96] Thought, *qua* dialectical reason, becomes transformative in shaping the present and the future insofar as human rational praxis objectively actualizes the implicit. Today, when subjectivism reigns supreme and the common response even to significant events is to erase any meaning and coherence from History, Civilization, and Progress, there is a desperate need for an objectivity that is immensely broader than natural science and “natural laws,” on the one hand, and an emphasis on the idiosyncratic, “imaginary,” and adventitious, on the other. If vulgar Marxists used “science” to turn the *ethical* claim that “socialism is necessary” into the *teleological* assertion that “socialism is inevitable,” today’s “post-Marxist” critics repeat a similar vulgarity by mordantly celebrating incoherence in the realm of social theory. The claim of socialism’s inevitability was crudely deterministic; the claim of its necessity was a rational and ethical explication. “Intersubjectivity” and “intersubjective relations,” for their part, cannot explain in any meaningful way *how* humanity is rooted in biological evolution, or what we broadly call “Nature,” least of all by deftly using the phrase “social construction” to bypass the very objective evolutionary reality that “Nature” connotes. Just as a subjectivized nexus of “intersubjective relations” dissolves the objectivity of social phenomena, so a subjectivized nexus of “social construction” dissolves the objectivity of natural evolution, as if neither social phenomena nor natural evolution had any actuality, aside from being a pair of simplistic epistemological categories. Here Kant reappears with a vengeance, with the possible difference that even his noumenal or unknowable external reality has disappeared. Dialectic, it should be emphasized, cannot be reduced merely to a “method” on the grounds that such disparate dialectical thinkers as Aristotle, John Scotus Eriugena, Hegel, and Marx comprehended different realms of knowledge and reality in different ways and periods. Humanity’s knowledge of dialectic *has itself been a process*, and dialectical thinking has itself undergone development—a *cumulative* development, not a so-called “paradigm shift”—just as scientists have been obliged in the give-and-take or sublation of ideas to resolve one-sided insights into the nature of reality and its becoming.[97] Although the broader objectivity that dialectical reasoning educes does not dictate that reason *will* prevail, it implies that it *should* prevail, thereby melding ethics with human activity and creating the basis for a truly objective ethical socialism or anarchism. As such, dialectic is not simply an ontological causality; *it is also an ethics*—an aspect of dialectical philosophy that has not been sufficiently emphasized. Dialectical reason permits an ethics in history by upholding the rational influence of “what-should-be” as against “what-is.” History, qua the dialectically rational, exercises a pressing claim, so to speak, on our canons of behavior and our interpretation of events. Without this liberatory legacy and a human practice that fosters its unfolding, we have absolutely no basis for even *judging* what is creative or stagnant, rational or irrational, or good or evil in any constellation of cultural phenomena other than personal preference. Unlike science’s limited objectivity, dialectical naturalism’s objectivity is ethical *by its very nature*, by virtue of the kind of society it identifies as rational, a society that is the actualization of humanity’s potentialities.[98] It sublates science’s narrow objectivity to advance, by rational inferences drawn from the objective nature of human potentialities, a society that increasingly actualizes those potentialities. And it does so on the basis of what *should be* as the fulfillment of the rational, that is to say, on rational knowledge of the good and a conceptual congruence between the good and the socially rational that can be embodied in free institutions. It is not that social development is dialectical because it is *necessarily* rational, as a traditional Hegelian might suppose, but rather that where social development *is* rational, it is dialectical or historical. We aver, in short, that we can educe from a uniquely human potentiality a rational development that advances human self-realization in a free, self-conscious, and cooperative society. Speculative reason here stakes out a claim to discern the rational development (by no means immune to irrational vicissitudes) of society as it *should be*—given human potentiality, as we know it in real life, to evolve from distinct kinship groups into a democratic citizenry, from mythopoesis to reason, from the submission of personhood in a folklike collectivity to individuality in a rational community—all as rational ends as well as existential realities. Speculative reason should always be called upon to understand and *explain* not only what has happened with respect to these problematics but *why* they recur in varying degrees and how they can be resolved. There cannot be a dialectic, however, that deals “dialectically” with the irrational, with regression into barbarism—that is to say, a strictly negative dialectics. Both Adorno’s book of that name and Horkheimer and Adorno’s *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, which traced the “dialectical” descent of reason (in Hegel’s sense) into instrumentalism, were little more than mixed farragoes of convoluted neo-Nietzschean verbiage, often brilliant, colorful, and excitingly informative, but often confused, rather dehumanizing and, to speak bluntly, irrational.[99] A “dialectic” that lacks *any* spirit of transcendence (*Aufhebung*) and denies the “negation of the negation” is spurious at its very core.[100] One of the earliest attempts to “dialectically” deal with social regression was the little-known “retrogression thesis,” undertaken by Josef Weber, the German Trotskyist theorist who was the exile leader of the Internationale Kommunisten Deutschlands (IKD). Weber authored the IKD’s program, “Capitalist Barbarism or Socialism,” published in November 1944 in Max Schachtman’s *New International* during the bitterest days of the Second World War and posed the question that many thinking revolutionaries of that distant era faced: what forms would capitalism take *if* the proletariat failed to make a socialist revolution after the Second World War?[101] As the title of the IKD document suggests, not all Marxists, perhaps fewer than we may think, regarded socialism as “inevitable” or thought that there would necessarily be a socialist “end to history” after the war. Indeed, many whom I knew as a dissident Trotskyist fifty years ago were convinced that barbarism was as serious a danger for the future as socialism was its greatest hope.[102] The prospect of barbarism that we face today may differ in form from what revolutionary Marxists faced two generations ago, but it does not differ in kind. The future of Civilization is still very much in the balance, and the very memory of alternative emancipatory visions to capitalism are becoming dimmer with each generation. Although the “imaginary” and subjective are certainly elements in social development, contemporary capitalism is steadily dissolving the uniqueness of “imaginaries” of earlier, more diverse cultures. Indeed, capitalism is increasingly leveling and homogenizing society, culturally and economically, to a point that the same commodities, industrial techniques, social institutions, values, even desires, are being “universalized” to an unprecedented degree in humanity’s long career. At a time when the mass-manufactured commodity has become a fetish more potent than any archaic fetish that early cultures “imagined”; when the glossy tie and three-piece suit are replacing traditional sarongs, cloaks, and shoulder capes; when the word *business* requires fewer and fewer translations in the world’s diverse vocabularies; and when English has become the lingua franca not only of so-called “educated classes” but people in ordinary walks of life (need I add more to this immensely long list?), it is odd that the idiosyncratic in various cultural constellations is now acquiring a significance in academic discourse that it rarely attained in the past. This discourse may be a way of side-stepping a much-needed examination of the challenges posed by recent capitalist developments, and instead mystifying them in convoluted discussions that fill dense academic tomes and, particularly in the case of Foucault and postmodernism, satisfy the “imaginaries” of self-centered individuals. Stated bluntly: no *revolutionary* movement can grow if its theorists essentially deny Bloch’s “principle of hope,” which the movement so needs for an inspired belief in the future; if it denies universal History that affirms sweeping common problems that have besieged humanity over the ages; if it denies the shared interests that give a movement the basis for a common struggle in achieving a rational dispensation of social affairs; if it denies a processual rationality and a growing idea of the Good based on more than personalistic (or “intersubjective” and “consensual”) grounds; if it denies the powerful civilizatory dimensions of social development (ironically, dimensions that are in fact so useful to contemporary nihilists in criticizing humanity’s failings); and if it denies historical Progress. Yet in present-day theoretics, a series of events replaces History, cultural relativism replaces Civilization, and a basic pessimism replaces a belief in the possibility of Progress. What is more sinister, mythopoesis replaces reason, and dystopia the prospect of a rational society. What is at stake in all these displacements is an intellectual and practical regression of appalling proportions—an especially alarming development today, when theoretical clarity is of the utmost necessity. What our times require is a *social* analysis that calls for a revolutionary and ultimately popular movement, not a *psycho*-analysis that issues self-righteous disclaimers for “beautiful souls,” ideologically dressed in cloaks of personal virtue. Given the disparity between what rationally *should be* and what currently *exists*, reason may not necessarily become embodied in a free society. If and when the realm of freedom ever does reach its most expansive form, to the extent that we can envision it, and if hierarchy, class, domination, and exploitation were ever abolished, we would be obliged to enter that realm only as *free beings*, as truly rational, ethical, and empathetic “knowing animals,” with the highest intellectual insight and ethical probity, not as brutes coerced into it by grim necessity and fear. The riddle of our times is whether today’s relativists would have equipped us intellectually and ethically to cross into that most expansive realm of freedom. We cannot merely be *driven* into greater freedom by blind forces that we fail to understand, as Marxists implied, still less by mere *preferences* that have no standing in anything more than an “imaginary,” “instincts,” or libidinal “desires.”[103] The relativists of our time could actually play a sinister role if they permitted the “imaginative” to loosen our contact with the objective world. For in the absence of rational objective standards of behavior, imagination may be as demonic as it may be liberatory when such standards exist; hence the need for informed spontaneity—and an *informed* imagination. The exhilarating, events of May–June 1968, with the cry “Imagination to Power!” were followed a few years later by a surge in the popularity of nihilistic postmodernism and poststructuralism in the academy, an unsavory metaphysics of “desire,” and an apolitical call for “imagination” nourished by a yearning for “self-realization.” More than ever, I would insist, we must invert Nietzsche’s dictum, “All facts are interpretations,” and demand that all interpretations be rooted in objectivity. We must seek out broader interpretations of socialism than those that cast socialist ideals as a science and strangled its movements in authoritarian institutions. At a time when we teeter between Civilization and barbarism, the current apostles of irrationality in all their varied forms are the chthonic demons of a dark world who have come to life not to explicate humanity’s problems but to effect a dispiriting denial of the role of rationality in History and human affairs. My disquiet today lies not in the absence of scientific “guarantees” that a libertarian socialist society will appear—one that, at my age, it will never be my privilege to see—but in *whether it will even he fought for* in so decadent and desperate a period. —February 15, 1994 [75] Moreover, despite this tendency to bifurcate objectivity and subjectivity, the two do not exclude each other. There is always a subjective dimension to objectivity, but it is precisely the *relationship* between the two that requires explication. [76] Moral relativism has recently been the breeding ground of a purely functional or instrumental form of rationality, which in my view is one of the greatest impediments to serious social analysis and a meaningful ethics. “Subjective reason,” to use Max Horkheimer’s phrase from *The Eclipse of Reason*, on which a relativistic approach rests, has been one of the major afflictions of Anglo-American thinking, not merely within the academy but within the general public. [77] Predicated as their self-realization is in their own potentialities, human beings *nevertheless cannot do as they please*, despite the assertions of “beautiful souls,” to use Hegel’s phrase, who live in an aerie of personal liberation and self-contained “autonomy.” [78] Nothing is easier, more mystifying, and more smug these days than to advance sweeping, ahistorical generalizations about figures like Hegel, Marx, and Lenin. It is evidence of the ugly intellectual degradation of our time that people who should know better make them so flippantly. One might as well claim that Stalin’s totalitarianism had its roots in Machiavelli’s so-called “Atlantic Republican Tradition” since the latter was the author of *The Prince*; or in Plato, as Karl Popper so notoriously did. Yet Hegel would undoubtedly have resolutely opposed Marx’s view of the dialectic; Marx might very well have disowned Lenin, as the Marxist Rosa Luxemburg and the council communists Gorter and Pannekoek did; and Stalin would certainly have imprisoned Lenin, as Lenin’s widow bitterly reproached Trotsky in 1925, after the former Red Army commander belatedly began to attack Stalin. [79] Many of these former Marxists (particularly “New Left” students and their professors) polluted the sixties with their pet dogmas, only to “grow up” after they had “had their fun” (to rephrase a cynical expression of many Parisian veterans of 1968) and are now polluting the nineties with skepticism, nihilism, and subjectivism. The most serious obstacles to the development of an authentic New Left today are the Alain Touraines, Andre Gorzes, and Michael Walzers who have rallied variously to “market socialism,” “minimal statism,” or pluralized concepts of justice and freedom that are perfectly compatible with modern capitalism. [80] It is easy, when criticizing scientism as an ideology, to forget the role that the natural *sciences* themselves played in subverting beliefs in witchcraft and superstition, and in fostering a secular and naturalistic approach to reality. I would like to think that we no longer believe in Dracula, or in the power of the crucifix to fend off vampires, or in the occult power of women to communicate with demons—or do we? [81] See my “Introduction: A Philosophical Naturalism,” elsewhere in this book. [82] Indeed, there may be a “logic to events,” but it would be the logic of conventional reason, based on mere cause-and-effect and the principle of identity, *A equals A*, not dialectical reason. [83] See James Miller, *The Passion of Michel Foucault* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993). [84] See my book *Re-Enchanting Humanity* (London: Cassell, 1995) for a more detailed discussion of these issues. [85] The notion of a unilinear social development, like the one Friedrich Engels presented in *Anti-Dühring*, had already fallen into considerable disrepute among serious Marxists in the first half of this century, as I myself recall. One of the most troubling problems with this notion, I should note, was the “transition” from feudalism to capitalism. For my own part, I clearly challenged the idea that capitalism was the “inevitable” successor of feudalism in my book *From Urbanization to Cities*. There I argued that capitalism, from the fourteenth century until well into the eighteenth and early nineteenth, was merely part of “a mixed economy which was neither feudal, capitalist, nor structured around simple commodity production. Rather, it contained and combined elements of all three forms.” Economically as well as culturally, an open situation, so to speak, existed that could quite conceivably have led to more benign social advances and avoided the horrors that capitalism brought into the world. See *From Urbanization to Cities* (Chico and Edinburgh: AK Press, 2021, originally published as *The Rise of Urbanization and the Decline of Citizenship* by Sierra Club Books in 1987). In this book, I consistently emphasize the significance of libertarian municipalist confederations in opposition to the state—historically as well as contemporaneously. [86] Ironically, it even vitiates the meaning of *social* anarchism as an ethical socialism. [87] I find no solace in the notion that preliterate peoples “enjoyed” an “affluent society,” as Marshall Sahlins would have it. Their lives were all too often short, their cultures burdened by superstition and bereft of a syllabic system of writing, and they normally were at war with each other, to cite only their major afflictions, pastoral New Age images of their lives to the contrary. [88] Indeed, even nominalistic historians who see History as a series of accidents often tacitly presuppose the existence of the “nonaccidental” (perhaps even the *rational*) in a social development. [89] See chapter 11 of my book *The Ecology of Freedom*. [90] I find no view more one-sided and noxious than Theodor Adorno’s dictum, “No universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the slingshot to the megaton bomb.” This inflated, less than thought-out pronouncement, taken together with Adorno’s commitment to a negativity that rejected sublation (*Aufhebung*), or social and ideological advances, was a step toward nihilism, indeed, an ugly demonization of humanity, that belied his affirmations of reason. See *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Seabury Press 1973), 320. [91] I deliberately eschew the words *Totality* and *Spirit* to preclude any such suggestion. [92] The name of another chapter in *The Ecology of Freedom*. [93] G. W. F. Hegel, “Reason as Lawgiver,” in *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 252–56. [94] Hegel for all his entanglements with the notion of *Geist* or “Spirit” and despite his conception of a predetermined “Absolute,” at least had the good sense to distinguish the self-development of nonhuman life-forms, for instance, from the self-development of humanity or, for that matter, society. See G. W. F. Hegel, “Introduction,” *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, vol. 1, trans. E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson (1892; New York: Humanities Press, 1955), 22–23. [95] Present-day cosmology and biophysics, however, are coming up against phenomena whose explanation requires the flexible concepts of development advanced by dialectical naturalism. [96] Karl Marx, “Toward a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law: Introduction,” *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society*, trans. Lloyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1967), 259. [97] W. T. Stace’s *Critical History of Greek Philosophy*, for example, shows how a series of ancient Greek thinkers rounded out increasingly full but still one-sided views to produce the most advanced dialectical philosophy of their time, particularly that of Aristotle. Certainly the development of insight into the dialectical nature of reality did not end with the Greeks. Nor will it end with thinkers in our time, any more than science ended in the nineteenth century, when so many physicists thought little more could be added to complete Newtonian physics. In his history of philosophy, Hegel pointed out not only different *degrees* of dialectical reason, which approximated different degrees of truth (which in no way means that he was a “relativist”), but different kinds of rationality—“Understanding” or *Verstand*, of the commonsensical kind, and “Reason” or *Vernunft*, of the dialectical kind. [98] Dialectical naturalism has been criticized for committing the “epistemological fallacy,” in which a priori concepts become their own conditions of validity, rendering dialectics as such a self-validating system. This, as if dialectic naturalism were not structured around the reality of potentiality and were purely an a priori speculative form of reason. Yet these critics themselves usually use the kind of logic that employs the most a priori, indeed tautological of all concepts, the principle of identity, A equals A, in preference to dialectical reason. [99] This view is not new for me. In *The Ecology of Freedom*, completed in 1980 and published in 1982 [with an AK Press edition in 2005], I was at pains to indicate that “the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* is actually no dialectic at all—at least not in its attempt to explain the negation of reason through its own self-development” (p. 272). My respect for the Frankfurt School rested largely on its insightful critique of positivism, which was the dominant philosophical fad in American universities and social theory (so-called “sociology”) in the 1940s and 1950s, and on its various insights into Hegelian philosophy. Today, these valuable contributions are far outweighed by the ease with which the Frankfurt School’s work has fostered postmodern views in the United States and Germany and by the extent to which its products, especially Adorno’s writings, have become academic commodities. [100] Nor does a verbal paradox that contrasts seemingly related but opposing ideas, or colorful expressions of alterity, constitute a dialectic in the sense in which I have discussed it here, however much it seems to resemble formulations in Hegel and the best of Marx. Adorno’s provocative endeavors of this kind often turn out to be little more than that—provocations. [101] Presented by the IKD’s Auslands Kommitee (Committee Abroad), this huge document long predated *Socialisme ou Barbarie*. The ideas that it advanced, however, are moot today. Extrapolating Hitler’s seeming war aims of the early 1940s—to reduce industrialized Western European countries to mere satellites of German capital and to agrarianize and depopulate the East—to the world at large, this theory of imperialism (and barbarism) argued that deindustrialization would be exported to undeveloped countries, and not, as old Marxist theories of imperialism had assumed in the prewar period, capital. [102] Nor did we, by the late 1940s, regard the workers’ movement—indeed, “workers’ councils” or “workers’ control of industry”—as revolutionary, especially with the sequelae of the great strike movements of the late 1940s, which directly affected my own life as a worker. [103] The notion of an “instinct for freedom,” touted by many radical theorists, is a sheer oxymoron. The compelling, indeed necessitarian character of instinct makes it the very antithesis of freedom, whose liberating dimensions are grounded in choice and self-consciousness. ** Afterword: Todd McGowan I first heard of Murray Bookchin when his former spouse, Bea Bookchin, showed up in my course on Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* at the University of Vermont in 2004. As a nontraditional student, Bea brought an engaged political spirit to the course that prompted me to look into her own theoretical roots, which were, needless to say, intertwined with those of Murray. Murray and Bea came to Vermont from New York City in search of a site where they might implement their communitarian project. Since Murray’s death in 2006, Bea, along with their children Debbie and Joe, has continued this political effort. One element of their work has been seeing to it that Murray’s theoretical contributions remain accessible to the public. This is the genesis of the present volume. It is fitting that my first acquaintance with Bea and Murray came in a course on Hegel. Hegel was an important touchstone for Bookchin’s thinking. Bookchin was one of the first thinkers to see in Hegel a political light as compelling as that of Marx. Bookchin’s Hegel is not the mythological defender of the Prussian regime bent on justifying the world as it is. Instead, his Hegel is a radical political thinker whose singular emphasis on contradiction as the driving force in nature and society provides the basis for theorizing the relationship between the natural world and subjectivity. Bookchin’s major work, *The Philosophy of Social Ecology*, shows more than any of his other books the central place that Hegel has for his theorizing about politics. Hegel provides the basis for a critique of the philosophies of nature that dominated thinking in the 1980s and 1990s. Although the names of the proponents of these theories have changed today, the theories themselves largely have not. From Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory to “deep ecology,” philosophies of nature continue to call for thinking about the human bond with the natural world, for thinking about nature and humanity as part of a whole. These movements, in Bookchin’s idiom, provide an overly sentimental conception of the natural world, a conception not attuned to the role that contradiction plays in nature. As Bookchin sees, Hegel offers an antidote to this type of thinking. While Hegel insists that every philosophy must be a totalizing philosophy that always ends up conceptualizing the whole, his understanding of the role of contradiction within this totality challenges the harmonious vision that other philosophies of nature espouse. For Hegel, nature is the site of contradiction rather than a harmony. To accede to the dialectic of nature is not to discover serenity but to be thrust into violent self-division. This self-division is the source of philosophical insight and political possibility. The subject is the natural being able to recognize its own contradictory structure and thus that of the natural world as well. Contradiction provides Bookchin’s starting point for theorizing a Hegelian dialectics of nature. The natural world develops through its contradictions, but these contradictions also give birth to what Bookchin calls a second nature—the social world. In this sense, we must think of society as part of the natural dialectic, as a moment within the natural world’s contradictory development. This theorization requires Bookchin to update Hegel’s own thinking about nature. Although Hegel devotes the middle third of his *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* to the philosophy of nature, he explicitly rejects thinking about nature in evolutionary terms. Because Hegel writes about nature decades before Charles Darwin publishes *Origin of the Species* in 1859, he has no acquaintance with the modern theory of evolution through natural selection. Hegel knows only of the limited and misguided evolutionary theories current during his lifetime. As a result of his rejection of an evolutionary conception of the natural world, nature, for Hegel, lacks the dynamism that the evolutionary understanding provides. Hegel never has the chance to think about natural evolution as dialectical movement, but this is precisely what the discovery of Darwin demands, even though Darwin himself is not a dialectical thinker. Murray Bookchin is the only Hegelian I know of to take up this challenge, to attempt to outline the contours of a dialectics of nature that takes Darwinian natural selection into account. Armed with a Hegelian understanding of contradiction as ontologically necessary, Bookchin theorizes evolution as a process driven by the contradictory structure of everything. Things evolve because they are never simply identical to themselves. This self-division becomes the Hegelian engine for Darwinian evolution as *The Philosophy of Social Ecology* theorizes it. Once one understands evolution through contradiction, it ceases to be a politically neutral process and takes on a political radicality. Although Social Darwinists have mobilized the theory of Natural Selection for reactionary ends, Bookchin grasps a political radicality inherent in evolution, insofar as we understand it to be driven by contradiction.[104] The linkage between Hegelian dialectics and Darwinian evolution is not self-evident. While Hegel explicitly rejects evolution, Darwin never thinks of natural selection in terms of contradiction. But bringing the two together allows Bookchin to overcome the limitations of each and to sketch a dialectics of nature that would remain viable even as Hegel’s own understanding of nature has become hopelessly out of date. Evolution occurs, according to Bookchin, because every natural entity is at odds with itself. Everything is becoming because nothing is purely identical with itself. This is why evolution occurs in Bookchin’s Hegelian-inspired theory. This theoretical advance becomes possible because Bookchin recognizes the fundamental breakthrough of Hegel’s primary insight. Hegel sees that identity always includes nonidentity within it or that being is always contradictory. Nothing simply is what it is but becomes what it is through its constant transformation into something else. Rather than accept identity as a given of logic, Hegel recognizes that identity depends on and interacts with what it is not. There is no pure identity, not even as a logical idea. Logic relies on understanding identity as necessarily wrapped up in what it is not. Or, as Bookchin puts it in his account of Hegel’s thinking, “Dialectical reason acknowledges the developmental nature of reality by asserting in one fashion or another that *A equals not only A but also not-A*.”[105] One cannot clearly separate what an entity is from what it is not, and it is this contradiction that drives all natural and historical movement. This claim about the reliance of identity on nonidentity is what separates Hegel from Kant and from the analytic thinking that predominates in twentieth and twenty-first century philosophy, an analytic thinking that depends on a clear distinction of identity from the nonidentical.[106] In order to save Hegel as a reputable thinker during this epoch, his interpreters had to attenuate his philosophical claims. They had to perform radical surgery on the Hegelian edifice in order to keep the patient viable. The radicality of a dialectical understanding had to be restricted to a limited field in order to remain convincing in the twentieth century. As a result, thinking about Hegel as a political figure confined itself to his philosophy of spirit or *Geist*. What Hegel had to say about the dialectics of nature was, thanks to the influential lectures of Alexandre Kojève, simply a dead letter. In these lectures on Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Kojève dismissively claims that “the real (metaphysical) and phenomenal dialectic *of Nature* only exists in the (“Schellingian”) imagination of Hegel.”[107] For Kojève, we simply cannot know about whether nature has a dialectical structure or not. Our knowledge is confined to subjectivity, where the dialectic is self-evident. We must leave the natural world to itself and abandon all speculative thinking about it. Despite the vast differences among leftist interpretations of Hegel at play in the twentieth century, Kojève’s claim functions for all sides as common sense. From Jean-Paul Sartre to Herbert Marcuse, what Hegel has to say about the dialectic of nature has no political relevance whatsoever. In 1990, with the publication of *The Philosophy of Social Ecology*, Bookchin helps to revolutionize the evaluation of Hegel’s understanding of nature. In addition to challenging the consensus at the time about Hegel’s philosophy of nature, Bookchin also charts the path to redeeming reason in *The Philosophy of Social Ecology*. This is also evidence of the importance of Hegel for Bookchin’s thinking. Reason (*Vernunft*) is not instrumental calculation, as it primarily is for Theodor Adorno and the Frankfurt School. Against the theoretical attack on reason that dominates twentieth-century leftist thinking, Bookchin stakes a claim for the radicality of reason, once we understand reason as the comprehension of the necessity of contradiction. Reason is our ability to see the coincidence of A and not-A, to see the interdependence of identity and non-identity. Rather than leading to the human domination of the natural world, reason represents the path out of domination and toward the recognition that subjectivity must depend on the natural world. The second nature of spirit emerges out of the self-emancipation of the natural world itself. Subjectivity is a natural being that derives from nature’s self-alienation. It is only reason that enables us to come to this dialectical insight. Bookchin defends even Hegel’s most extreme claims about reason. For Hegel, reason is not an instrument through which we calculate what happens in the world. Reason is actual in the world. This idea leads Hegel to claim famously in the preface to the *Philosophy of Right* that “What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational.”[108] This sentence has caused generations of leftist Hegelians many sleepless nights. It appears here as if Hegel is defending things as they are and opposing himself to political action. But Bookchin understands Hegel’s theory of rationality as necessarily political. Bookchin rightly turns to the distinction that Hegel makes between actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) and reality (*Realität*). When Hegel calls the actual rational, he is not making a claim about the form of our everyday reality. Hegel is not saying that the ruling order is reasonable and therefore worthy of our obedience. The ruling order is just reality or *Realität*. Actuality or *Wirklichkeit* refers to the dialectical structure of nature and society. It is the force of contradiction that generates new political possibilities out of the current reality. Actuality is the imperative to change our reality. It is what our reality must become. The roots of this becoming are not just social but natural. This is why philosophy has to be natural rather than simply social dialectics. This is why philosophy has to be ecological in its orientation. Today, almost everyone is turning to considerations of ecology. As the planet becomes increasingly uninhabitable, ecological thinking seems exigent. But before most experts were sounding the alarm about climate change, Bookchin was calling for an ecological philosophy. What makes this ecological philosophy still pertinent today—and what demands the reissue of this book—is the emphasis on Hegel’s dialectics as a way for theorizing the relationship between subjectivity and the natural world. As Hegel and Bookchin both understand, subjectivity emerges out of the contradictions of the natural world, which means that we cannot think of subjects outside of nature *nor* can we think of nature outside of the subject. The contradictions of nature generate the subject, but the contradictions of subjectivity allow us to access and comprehend nature. The disharmony of the subject and of the natural world within themselves creates the possibility for a political intervention. Rather than lament contradiction and try to eliminate it, Bookchin, with his appeal to Hegel, shows us that contradiction is salutary. *The Philosophy of Social Ecology* is a forgotten gem from the end of the twentieth century. To read this book today is to bear witness to the incredible foresight of Murray Bookchin, not just in his rediscovery of Hegel’s importance as a political thinker (which has today almost become common sense), but in his insistence that ecology must be at the fore of our political thinking. Murray and Bea Bookchin came to Vermont to found a new kind of politics, a communitarian politics rooted in an ecological philosophy. This book is evidence of the success of their efforts. The idea of looking to Hegel as a source for an ecological philosophy remains as novel today as it was when Bookchin wrote this book. Bookchin opens the path for rethinking the philosophy of nature as a dialectical ecology, an ecology that highlights the contradictory relation of the natural world to itself. He provides the starting point here for such a philosophy. It remains for everyone else today to pick up the baton and further the dialectical struggle. [104] Even Darwin himself, in *The Descent of Man and Sexual Selection in Relation to Sex*, argues that imperialist conquest represents natural selection at work. He contends, “At the present day civilized nations are everywhere supplanting barbarous nations, excepting where the climate opposes a deadly barrier; and they succeed mainly, though not exclusively, through their arts, which are the products of the intellect.” Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex*, Part I, Volume 21, eds. Paul H. Barrett and R. B. Freeman (New York: New York University Press, 1989), 133. [105] Page 6 in this edition. [106] Bertrand Russell is the representative figure of this movement of analytic thinking. His vehement opposition to Hegel and Hegelian dialectics follows from his insistence on analyticity. [107] Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel*, ed. Raymond Queneau (Paris: Gallimard, 1947), 490. [108] G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. H. B. Nisbet, ed. Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 20. ** Murray Bookchin One of the most important radical thinkers of the last century, Murray Bookchin (1921–2006) originated a reconstructive social theory called “social ecology,” blending aspects of classical Greek and modern philosophy, anarchism, anthropology, and ecology in an effort to rethink humanity’s relationship with nature. His groundbreaking essay, “Ecology and Revolutionary Thought” (1964), was one of the first to assert that capitalism’s grow-or-die ethos was on a dangerous collision course with the natural world that would include the devastation of the planet by global warming. A long-time activist, and author of two dozen books on ecology, history, philosophy, and urbanization, Bookchin insisted that a complete transformation in social relations, in which all forms of hierarchy and domination were eliminated, was essential if we are to heal our relationship with nature. His work has influenced numerous movements around the world, including the New Left of the 1960s, the alterglobalization movement, the radical municipalism movement, and the Kurdish democratic confederalism project in Turkey and Northeast Syria.