Nestor Makhno in the Culture of Remembrance of Modern Ukraine

Translator’s Foreword

The following interviews were originally conducted in Ukrainian and Russian and published in Polish in the anarchist magazine Inny Świat [A Different World], no. 55 (2024). The following English translation was completed by myself and Malcolm Archibald. We used the Library of Congress system to transliterate Ukrainian and Russian. The footnotes include extensive descriptions of terms and figures that may be unfamiliar to an English audience.

This project was born of a true internationalist character, involving Aleksander Łaniewski, a Belarusian-Polish academic, Ukrainian scholars and activists from across the country, and two Canadian translators. We are thankful to AnarchistStudies.blog for publishing the following interviews, allowing us to bring English readers a unique and timely insight into the contemporary Ukrainian perspective on Nestor Makhno.

I was immediately struck by Łaniewski’s thorough approach to his topic and its contemporary relevance in light of Russia’s war on Ukraine. The historical figure of Makhno—for all his controversy and multiplicity of interpretations over the decades—has taken on renewed significance in the war as a symbol of Ukrainian resistance to Russian imperialism. Across the frontline, Ukrainian soldiers display Makhnovist-themed flags and patches evoking the memory of the peasant anarchist and his anti-authoritarian revolution.

One such soldier, Yurii Kravets, was an interviewee for this project. His, unfortunately, brief answers are indicative of how his circumstances did not allow for the normal thoroughness with which he approached the topic so dear to him. Tragically, during the translation process, we were informed that Yurii’s unit, stationed along the frontline in the Kursk region, was hit by a Russian strike, leaving only two survivors who were taken captive. As of writing this foreword, only one of the survivors has been identified, and it is not known if Yurii survived the attack. He is officially designated as missing in action. I extend a spirit of solidarity and heartfelt concern to Yurii’s family and friends in this time of painful uncertainty.

Introduction

July 2024 marked the 90^th anniversary of the death of Nestor Ivanovych Makhno (1888–1934). Born a peasant in the southeastern Ukrainian city of Huliaipole, Makhno headed the Revolutionary Insurgent Army of Ukraine during the tumultuous period of the Ukrainian Revolution. As a result, he became not only one of the best-known anarchists in the world but also one of the most recognizable figures in Ukrainian history.[1] The anarchist himself and the insurgent movement named after him (known as the Makhnovshchyna) not only evoke many conflicting emotions and controversy but have also inspired successive generations of anarchists (and others) to take up the fight for the ideals of freedom, equality, and social justice.

Regardless of Makhno’s self-identification and the ideals he fought for, in today’s environment, it is not so evident that the Makhnovist movement is associated exclusively with anarchism, self-governance, and social justice. There is an infatuation with Makhno not only as a defender of the common folk symbolizing the Ukrainian rebel spirit but sometimes also as an “ally” of the Bolsheviks. For others, he is a patriot and national hero and almost always a military genius.[2] He is even seen as the architect of a kind of Ukrainian statehood.[3] Today, in the face of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Makhno is seen as a symbol of resistance against Russian imperialism (White, Red, and now Putinist).

The memory of this tragic, misunderstood and underestimated figure does not fit into any of the official models of memory—neither into an exclusive type of Soviet-nostalgic narrative nor into a nationalist narrative. The memory of Makhno is more reflective of inclusive and mixed identities. In the multicultural and multidirectional memory of contemporary Ukraine—for which public space is fundamental—the place of Makhno is unmistakable and most strongly represented in the country’s southeastern regions.

Songs and plays[4] have been written about Nestor Ivanovych, and he appears in contemporary Ukrainian paintings,[5] comics and calendars, as well as in statements by celebrities and politicians. Sometimes, his memory takes unexpected forms, such as in the branding of independent grinding and sharpening machines.[6] It would take many pages of text to list all the songs, poems and novels dedicated to Makhno.[7] The famous but controversial Independence Day with Makhno festival, the so-called Makhnofest, itself deserves a separate study. On the other hand, the term “Makhnovshchyna” is sometimes employed as a pejorative, especially by politicians, denoting disorder and disrepute.[8] Few people are aware of this, but even in Russian prison slang, the term “Makhnovshchyna” is used. In the Gulag system, there was a caste of so-called “Makhnovists” who did not follow any rules, including the codes of the criminal underworld.[9]

Interestingly, in the contemporary Russian narrative, Makhno is portrayed not as a famous representative of Ukraine but of so-called “Novorossiia” [“New Russia”] or southern Russia.[10] It seems that by imposing a generic “anti-fascist” label on him, Kremlin propaganda seeks to undermine Makhno’s symbolic significance for Ukraine.

The front line of the current war with Russia runs dangerously close to Huliaipole in the Zaporizhzhia region. The town is under constant fire from Russian troops and has suffered extensive damage.[11] Nonetheless, soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine frequently take selfies in front of the town’s monument dedicated to the famous anarchist.[12] The statue is covered with sandbags to protect it from damage, but despite such efforts, a Russian strike destroyed the monument’s head this year. Local authorities quickly mobilized and commissioned a sculptor to repair the statue.[13]

This raises the question of whether Ukrainian society’s perception of Makhno has changed during the war despite his anti-government views. A study published by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in January 2023 attempted to answer this question partially, but more thorough research is needed to answer it fully.

In my professional work, which includes “memory studies,” I have been researching historical politics in the BUR (Belarus-Ukraine-Russia) for some time. I am interested in the tendencies and mechanisms that accompany history in the political realm, as well as the dynamics of change in East Slavic cultures and their perception of themselves through historical events and figures. The culture of remembrance is a part of our broader understanding of culture in general, and it is through collective remembering that the symbolic processing of the past takes place. This process provides a backdrop for contemporary popular and political culture, harnessing such cultural tools as artworks, social organizations, and commemorative practices.

In connection with the anniversary of Makhno’s death, I decided to talk to researchers and anarchists from Ukraine who have a solid knowledge of the Makhnovist movement. I asked them questions about Makhno’s place in contemporary Ukrainian society’s culture of remembrance. My aim was to examine the phenomenon of this historical figure and its contemporary repercussions and highlight the dynamics of change (or lack thereof) in the perception of Makhno and his army over the last thirty years. In an attempt to understand, in a way, contemporary Ukrainian society, I tried to find answers to three basic questions: who, how, and for what purpose is the memory of Makhno and the Makhnovshchyna kept alive in Ukraine today?

I sent a questionnaire to seven people. Unfortunately, two people were unable to participate for various reasons, and one sent rather laconic answers. The survey, of course, is not exhaustive, but it does touch on important issues and, at times, shows divergent perspectives on the perception of Makhno in Ukraine. Therefore, the following interviews should be treated as a contribution to the ongoing study of Nestor Makhno and the Makhnovist movement’s place in Ukrainian culture or, more precisely, cultures of remembrance.

 

Let’s begin with historiography. In Soviet historiography and popular culture, a rather colourful yet one-dimensional image of Makhno and the Makhnovists formed in which they were depicted as counter-revolutionaries, alcoholics, bandits, and, broadly speaking, anti-heroes. In your opinion, have there been qualitative changes in the perception of Makhno within Ukrainian society over the past thirty-five years? If so, can this be attributed, among other factors, to the influence of historiography, which, although still incomplete, has made significant strides in studying the Makhnovist movement in post-Soviet Ukraine?

Vladyslav Verstiuk

It’s difficult for me to be objective—I must warn you about this right away because I have devoted many years to the topic of the Makhnovist movement and have delved into its smallest details. It’s as if I see a problem that I’m intimately familiar with and not at all like the average Ukrainian sees and perceives it. Please take this into account.

Now, to the essence of the question. Even in Soviet times, there was a noticeable difference in the depiction of Makhno between official historiography, which was entirely negative, and society’s memory of him. The latter was not negative but mythologized, devoid of reality. People interpreted him as a kind of Ustym Karmaliuk or Robin Hood of the twentieth century.[14] I believe that today, in comparison with Soviet times, the attitude towards the Makhnovist movement has changed significantly because knowledge around it is more substantive, and I think that historiography played a significant role here. It was the insurrectionary movement in the broad sense of the term and its Makhnovist component that became the distinctive feature of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1921.

The Italian historian Andrea Graziosi believes that it was thanks to the peasant insurgent movement that the Ukrainian Revolution achieved a certain primacy in the public realm, which was later repeated in other revolutions and revolutionary movements.[15] This idea is widely used in Ukrainian historiography. Today, dozens of large and small scholarly studies, popular works, and fiction have been written about the Makhnovshchyna, including several films. The topic is freely discussed in the media and has no negative connotations. This fact cannot but influence the formation of public opinion. Books on the issue do not stay on store shelves for long!

Viktor Savchenko

Actually, starting in 1988, the perception of Nestor Makhno’s personality in Ukrainian society changed. In the first stage, this perception was influenced by society’s general negative rejection of Bolshevism-communism. From 1988 to 1998, “anti-communism” was a significant factor for an appreciable section of Ukrainian society. During these years, Nestor Makhno ceased to be viewed by society as a “bandit,” “kulak leader,” and “bloodsucker.” Makhno was perceived as an active fighter against the “Reds” and an extraordinary personality. Under the influence of the new historiography, journalism, and documentaries, the personality of Makhno from 1999 to 2021 began to be perceived as the personality of a people’s hero who fought for the interests of the “common people.” After February 2022, he was perceived as a “national hero” who fought against Russian “whites” and “reds,” who brought various forms of imperial colonization to Ukraine. Now, he has become part of the triad of fighters for Ukraine in the 20^th century: Petliura[16]—Makhno—Bandera.[17]

Vyacheslav Azarov

In the USSR, all historical science was filtered through the dominant ideology. Therefore, the Makhnovist movement, which promoted a different type of social organization, could not be perceived positively. Moreover, during the Revolution and in its subsequent development, due to anarchism’s more leftist positions in relation to Bolshevism, it acted as a serious ideological competitor in the pursuit of a similar social ideal. Therefore, it required maximum discrediting from the incumbent government, as it lacked any potential to socially organize.

Post-Soviet historical research, and subsequently the views of Ukrainian society regarding Makhno and his movement, also underwent a definite evolution from a fascination with the external military side of the Makhnovshchyna with dashing cavalry fighting and formidable machine-gun regiments to studying the ideology and social project of the Makhnovist “Free Soviet System.” However, in the last decade, in connection with the growth of Ukrainian nationalist and unitary tendencies, a new, Soviet-style trend critical of the Makhnovist movement has been observed since the Makhnovshchyna’s ideas of universal self-government run counter to the growing policy of state centralization and linguistic and cultural monopoly. This evolution of views is primarily formed by historical science, which is closely connected with the state and which, as in the USSR, sensitively responds to its political demands.

Anatolii Dubovik

From the start, it’s important to say that attitudes toward Makhno and the Makhnovshchyna in the USSR varied somewhat. They differed between Russia (meaning the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) and Ukraine. In Russia, Makhno was seen as a criminal bandit, while in Ukraine, he was more often regarded as a kind of “social bandit” or “dashing rogue”[18]—equivalent to an early twentieth-century Robin Hood. The reasons for this are clear: the Makhnovshchyna operated mainly in Ukraine, where the descendants of the insurgents remained, as did the memory of them. Even those without relatives among the Makhnovists felt a certain pride that their ancestors had some link to the movement. “Makhno once stayed in our home!” they say—or at the very least, “in a house on our street.”

At the same time, no one in the Soviet Union really understood the insurgency’s goals; people only had a vague idea about them. In the most positive (and very widely held) version, “Makhno was for the common people.” Concurrently, official propaganda and the Soviet educational system worked to construct an image of Makhno as an anti-hero, pogromist, counterrevolutionary, sadist, and so on. However, as we can see, the Soviets ultimately failed in this effort. The changes in the perception of Makhno over the past 35 years are enormous. Today, it’s hard to find anyone in Ukraine who still believes these stories about Makhno, the bandit-pogromist.

In my opinion, the main credit for this change belongs not so much to historical scholarship as to its inevitable counterpart—popular literature. The changes occurred thanks to publications in mass literature, newspapers, and magazines. Of course, without serious historical research, popular literature would have had no ground to build on, so historians also deserve some credit. It’s just that we shouldn’t exaggerate their impact on popular memory.

However, the most significant influence on post-Soviet popular perceptions of Makhno was the dramatic TV series The Nine Lives of Nestor Makhno [2006].[19] The imagery and the character created by the film turned out to matter much more than academic works. By the way, the film presented—albeit in a very simplified form—what the Makhnovists were fighting for and what they wanted. That is its main merit. At the same time, those well-versed in the topic (myself included) received the film poorly because of its systematic distortion of historical facts.

Yurii Kravets

Undoubtedly, such changes have occurred. Modern historiography has had a significant influence here, especially thanks to the research and publications of Valerii Volkovinskii[20], Vladyslav Verstiuk, and Volodymyr Chop.[21]

In recent years, discussions have emerged in Ukraine within both the academic and socio-political spheres regarding the Ukrainian Revolution and a rethinking of the events between 1917 and 1921. How has the Makhnovshchyna been written into these discussions? For instance, I found no detailed commentary about the Makhnovist movement in the methodological recommendations of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory.[22] How widespread is interest in the Makhnovist movement among contemporary Ukrainian historians? Are there new approaches and interpretations of this phenomenon?

Verstiuk

I’ve already partially answered the second part of this question. Interest in the topic does not subside, but there are nuances. First of all, the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1921 is considered the historical foundation of modern Ukrainian statehood. This is how the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance interprets it, and this is the side of the revolution that appears to the contemporary Ukrainian authorities because it legitimizes the state. Everything unrelated to statehood fades into the background, including the Makhnovshchyna, which is often viewed as a manifestation of anarchism.

Anarchism as an ideology is an extremely broad concept, yet it’s often mistakenly interpreted as anarchy in the sense of chaos. In reality, it is an attempt to build a social organization from below through self-government. Such was the project of the free soviet system proposed by anarchists to the Makhnovshchyna, above all by Volin.[23] The movement’s alliances with the Bolsheviks cast a shadow on the image of the Makhnovshchyna. Modern historians debate whether the insurgent movement was a struggle for or against the state. There is no definitive answer. But there is another side of the coin—the Makhnovshchyna as an effective partisan movement, which introduced many innovations in the art of war to those times: the tachanka (a horse-drawn cart equipped with a machine gun), thousand-kilometre raids, quickness of maneuver, perfect knowledge of the terrain, and close contact with the local population.

Savchenko

The Makhnovshchyna became an element of not so much scientific as popular memory. In the recommendations of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, without going into detail, the Makhnovshchyna is included in the insurgent struggle against the communist dictatorship, considering Nestor Makhno as one in a series of various Ukrainian otamans active betwen 1918 and 1921 (although the “Bat’ko” never called himself an “otaman”).[24] Modern Ukrainian professionals, for the most part, accord contradictory characteristics to the Makhnovshchyna. Historians such as Verstiuk, Savchenko, Chop, and Arkhireis’kyi[25] see Makhno as a national hero. However, historians of the Lviv and Kyiv “schools,” especially those extolling Hetman Skoropads’kyi,[26] consider him an “inconvenient episode” in Ukrainian history, which harmed the construction of the Skoropads’kyi’s Ukrainian State or the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UPR) during the time of the Directory.[27]

Azarov

I do not participate in the discussions of the nationalist-conservative segment of Ukrainian society and cannot judge their qualitative content. As an active anarchist and researcher of the movement, the Makhnovshchyna is important to me as a large-scale experiment of stateless self-government, development of the masses’ independence, and grassroots initiative in society. At the same time, in some historical works of the last decade, I have observed Makhno’s transformation into some kind of hero of the national liberation struggle. His movement is portrayed as a one-sided confrontation with the White and Red threat from Russia, without a clear explanation of what ideals the Makhnovists fought for and what kind of society they built. On the one hand, there is a denial of Makhnovist ideas, and on the other, attempts to fit this historical phenomenon to the needs of modern state policy.

Dubovik

There is interest, and it is more significant than it was thirty years ago—not to mention during Soviet times. However, overall, the Makhnovshchyna is not at the center of attention in the current sociopolitical or even academic environment. For understandable reasons, the focus is more on state-building figures and movements (such as the UPR, Symon Petliura, Pavlo Skoropads’kyi, and so on).

Nonetheless, in 2017, when Hennadii Efimenko,[28] a senior researcher at the Institute of History of Ukraine, conceived the project “Our Revolution” (a series of popular publications marking the centennial anniversaries of the Ukrainian Revolution (1917–1922), created by various specialists for the well-known online Ukrainian publication Delovaia stolitsa), he felt it necessary to find someone to write on the Makhnovist movement despite the project’s primary focus on the activities of state-centered Ukrainian political forces. Efimenko himself said, “How could it be done without Makhno?” I ended up contributing a few well-received pieces about the Makhnovshchyna and the urban anarchists of the Nabat Confederation.[29]

In this regard, professional historians—such as Volodymyr Chop and especially Viktor Savchenko—continue to work on the topic, publishing books and articles in both specialized journals and book series aimed at a popular audience. As for new approaches, it is worth noting that historians are now increasingly interested in the relationship between the Makhnovshchyna and the Ukrainian national movement: to what extent was the former part of the latter, how did it interact with Ukrainian political forces, and so on. This development is understandable since the movement’s interactions with the Reds and Whites and its chronological narrative are already reasonably well known.

Kravets

The Makhnovshchyna does not fit into these discussions in any way, as it is not recognized by official historical scholarship as a part of the Ukrainian national liberation struggle. Only a handful of people study the history of the Makhnovist movement in contemporary Ukraine, and almost all do so at the regional level.

According to the Polish historian of collective memory, Robert Traba, the past in the present always responds to today’s ideological demands rather than to the intellectual challenges of reconstructing historical events and processes.[30] Even in democratic societies, prevailing political demands impose limitations on the inclusion of certain “uncomfortable” events into the main trajectory of state historical policy. Traba contrasts the central authorities’ “politics of memory” with the “democratization of memory”—that is, the right of citizens to independently interpret history, allowing civil society to participate in the construction of historical and collective memory.[31]

In post-communist Poland, a process of the “privatization of memory” occurred simultaneously, influencing both the growth in popularity of local figures and communities participating in national events alongside a demand for greater respect from the state authorities.[32] As a result, “historical sensitivity” intensified in tandem with citizens’ interest and attachment to local heritage as opposed to a unified history of the state. Do these same processes apply to post-Soviet Ukraine? After all, it was the residents of Huliaipole and Zaporizhzhia who actively began to “resurrect” and popularize the memory of Makhno, such as Makhno’s great-nephew Viktor Ialans’kyi,[33] the local historian Volodymyr Zhylins’kyi,[34] the former director of the Huliaipole Local History Museum Liubov Hen’ba, and the musician Anatolii Serdiuk,[35] amongst others.

Verstiuk

This is a difficult question. I don’t see a contradiction between national and regional memories—they correlate with each other in one way or another. National memory absorbs certain parts of regional memory. I remember how, in 1999, the 110^th anniversary of the birth of Nestor Makhno was commemorated in Huliaipole. A relatively large crowd gathered in front of the state administration building. The rally began, and it turned out that it was divided into three factions, each claiming primacy in using Makhno’s name and appropriating it for their own use. The first of these was the head of the local administration as a representative of the state. The second was composed of local Cossacks, who emphasized their kinship with the “Bat’ko,” and the third was the anarchists, who came from Kharkiv specifically and also had their own vision. By the way, at that time there was no consensus among the locals in their assessment of the Makhnovshchyna.

Speaking of appropriation, I would like to note the fierce struggle between Russian and Ukrainian historians over this historical phenomenon. The Russians go out of their way to make the Makhnovshchyna part of their historical myth. Ukrainian historians defend the movement as a Ukrainian phenomenon. Mind you, I disagree that it was the Zaporizhzhian and Huliaipole activists who were the first to resurrect the memory of the Makhnovshchyna. It started with Kyiv, with the works of V. Volkovyns’kyi and my own in the early 90s, and only then did Zaporizhzhia and Huliaipole join in.

Has Nestor Makhno grown in national memory to the level of Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi,[36] Volodymyr Vynnychenko,[37] Symon Petliura, and Pavlo Skoropads’kyi? Obviously not. How did this affect his memory? Today, I found out that only one street bears Makhno’s name, located in Dnipro. A petition was registered on the website of the President of Ukraine to rename a street in the capital after Makhno. In four years, it collected 44 signatures out of the required 25,000. But I’m sure this story is not finished yet because not only does the past affect the present, but the present also flexibly changes its ideas about the past. Let us recall, for example, the Holodomor of 1932–1933,[38] which has shifted from decades of silence and denial to being recognized as one of the most defining events of twentieth-century Ukrainian history.

Savchenko

The process of the “privatization of memory” and the popularity of regional figures increased after 2000. It can be said that Makhno’s sympathizers are especially residents of the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine, and inhabitants of Huliaipole. At the same time, residents of Right Bank Ukraine are often prejudiced against the Makhno movement, considering it as destructive to national liberation from 1917 to 1921. Kyiv is divided approximately in half. The “old” historical school and people of the older generation have some prejudices, while young people often perceive Makhno as a figure of protest discourse (“punk and goth”).

Azarov

I have not studied the processes of historical politics in Poland, but the modern state view of history described in your question is definitely not congenial to me. From my point of view, history should be as truthful and detailed as possible and not distorted to suit the needs of this or that government and its views on the development of the state. The dispute can only be about the lessons and useful skills that modern society can learn from the events and political movements of the past.

I personally acquainted myself with the history of the Makhnovist movement not from books by local historians but from the personal recollections of its participants and the early memoirs of representatives of the political forces that competed with it, then compared these accounts against the works of Soviet historians, document collections, and studies of the post-Soviet period. The works of local historians are undoubtedly important, but, in my opinion, they are more focused on the grassroots level of family histories and rarely reflect the full scale and depth of socio-economic processes in the expansive territories covered by the Makhnovshchyna, and for me, this is the basis for understanding the movement and its goals and slogans that inspired a large layer of the population to fight.

Dubovik

No, I wouldn’t say I’ve observed anything like that. Makhno was and remains the central figure in local history in the Zaporizhzhia region. There likely haven’t been any fundamentally new developments in that sense. By the way, people from other regions did much more to bring the topic of Makhno and the Makhnovshchyna to the national level back in the late 1980s. In 1988 and 1990, Savchenko from Odesa and Verstiuk from Kyiv published the first scholarly works on the subject since the 1920s.

Kravets

The processes you mention can be applied quite well to post-Soviet Ukraine.

Over time, such well-known cultural figures as Andrii Ermolenko,[39] Serhii Zhadan,[40] Antin Mukhars’kyi,[41] and Les Poderv’ians’kyi[42] have drawn attention to Makhno by creating an image of him as a fighter for social justice with a national component. Artistic works, songs, and comics started to appear. I am aware of several theatrical productions. Today, even in entertainment programs, such an image is present.[43] In Zaporizhzhia, the regional folk art festival “Volnytsia” was dedicated to the Makhnovist legacy,[44] and in 2021, in Starobil’s’k, the “Wind of Anarchy” music festival was dedicated to the Makhnovshchyna. Of course, the most prominent and controversial example is the so-called Makhnofest[45]—organized by the creative association “Last Barricade” together with Oles Donii[46] (who wanted to “Ukrainianize Makhno after his death so that he could become the foundation for a new southeastern Ukrainian identity”).

The Polish cultural scholar Andrzej Szpociński believes that “today we are dealing with a phenomenon of the theatricalization of language, culture, and messaging. And the issue of historical truth takes a back seat.”[47] In turn, according to the leading researcher of memory, Aleida Assmann, contemporary art aims not at commemoration but at a critical analysis of memory.[48] This is connected to the widespread interest in identity and traumatic experiences of the past. Where does “Independence Day with Makhno” and other manifestations of memory culture related to the Bat’ko fit into all of this? Is Nestor Ivanovych at risk of “Che Guevara-ization”?

Verstiuk

In my opinion, a lot of different and not always compatible things are involved in this issue. Do I need to explain that academic science and historical memory are different things that develop according to their own laws and often do not intersect but exist as parallel worlds? I might agree with the notion of historical truth if someone could explain to me what it is. As for Aleida Assman’s view, in my opinion, art does not deny remembrance, no matter how critical it is. Perhaps it changes its forms, makes it more modern, and adapts it to the optics of the public. It is possible that something is distorted or mythologized in the process. I’m convinced that one way or another, Makhno’s image will find its place in modern Ukrainian identity.

Savchenko

Makhno is included in the image of the Ukrainian “Robin Hood”—the image of a fighter for social justice with an element of national significance. This was facilitated not only by historians, journalists, singers, and writers but also by some political figures (Yurii Lutsenko[49] and Oles Donii, who were the initiators of the “Independence Day with Makhno” festivals, which took place in Huliaipole during the term of President Iushchenko). It’s also necessary to note the creative association “The Last Barricade” (where Donii and Serhii Zhadan were the leaders). Indeed, Makhno was a national hero who sought to build and protect an alternative model of an independent Ukraine—a “labour federation.” Makhno has already taken a worthy place in the pantheon of great Ukrainian historical figures. He has already partially become an element of collective identification for Ukrainians. The Maidan revolutions of 2004 and 2013—2014, the movement of volunteers, the self-organization of society, the value of personal freedom in modern Ukrainian discourse… in many ways, these are Makhnovist “themes.”

Azarov

From your questions, I get the impression that you look at Makhno and his movement from the perspective of representatives from the national-conservative camp, its historians, cultural figures, and politicians. Yes, in today’s Ukraine, with the targeted support of the state, this ideology has occupied a monopoly position, having displaced or suppressed the entire rest of the political spectrum, including anarchists—the guardians of the Makhnovist legacy. In fact, nationalism today has a monopoly here, comparable to the past dominant role of Soviet ideology. But, as in the USSR, this does not mean that its view of the Makhnovshchyna is objective. I have been working in Ukrainian politics for thirty years and remember all the diversity of the discourse of the previous period about the history of Ukraine and the role of its historical figures, including Makhno.

Here, it is extremely important to take into account that the Makhnovshchyna was fundamentally an international movement, as its direct participants, including the Bat’ko himself, have repeatedly written about. Therefore, the nationalists’ view of the Makhnovist movement and their propaganda of the Makhnovshchyna through cultural events suffers from fragmentation and bias. They try to single out some moments in the movement that are congenial to them and promote them as the basic meaning of this mass phenomenon of the multinational population of south-eastern Ukraine from that historical period. In essence, this is the process of Makhno’s “posthumous Ukrainization.” And the real Makhnovshchyna is a social, not a national identity. It is a model of society, and for the sake of achieving this, the region’s inhabitants joined the movement. Therefore, people of different nationalities—Ukrainians, Russians, Jews, Greeks, Bulgarians, Crimean Tatars, and even Chinese—fought and worked in its ranks.

Dubovik

I’m deeply distrustful of the work done by such cultural workers and all these festivals and artistic projects. Here, I’m speaking as an (anti-)political activist, not as a historian (and certainly not as a cultural theorist). For these people, the main goal has always been to draw attention to their own creative work by instrumentalizing a topic that appeals to a mass audience—the entertaining story of a “social bandit” from the relatively recent past (a hundred years ago).

For me, the goal is to communicate what all of it was for—what these people wanted, what remains of their dreams and goals today, and what might still be relevant for the future. Simply put, people from the cultural sector approach the topic like sales managers looking for customers. In contrast, my comrades and I approach it as anarchists, aiming to spread our views and attract new supporters under the same black flag the Makhnovists once fought under.

It is telling that we—actual, present-day anarchists and the successors of Makhno’s vision—have not once been invited to any of these cultural events. We have always had to organize our own.

Is Makhno threatened with “Che Guevera-ization”—that is, as I understand it, the creation of a rather artificial, distorted image, a photogenic “icon” almost entirely stripped of ideological and political content? Unfortunately, yes, that seems like the most likely scenario for the near future. Thankfully, at the very least, Makhno’s popular appeal hasn’t taken on the traditional Soviet form of memory like so many others. He hasn’t become the central character in a whole series of jokes, as has happened with Lenin, Vasilii Chapaev, or even Maksim Gorky.

Kravets

I can’t comment on “Independence Day with Makhno” right now. The war needs to end before we can discuss this topic concretely. As for the so-called “Che Guevarization” of Makhno, it clearly does not pose a threat. It is neither on the same level nor in the same historical period.

Since we touched on the question of identity, the question arises: how does Makhno fit into contemporary Ukraine? In the West, he is undoubtedly one of the most famous Ukrainians in history.[50] Does he have a chance to take his rightful place in the pantheon of great Ukrainian historical figures? Or is he already considered as such?[51] For example, according to the political scientist Ihor Losev, the “against all” phenomenon [protivsikhstvo] is nothing other than “a serious national illness of the Ukrainian mentality.”[52] Others, especially the aforementioned cultural figures, defend the “anarchistic” nature of the Ukrainian people.

What if, for Ukrainians, Makhno becomes what the French historian Pierre Nora calls a “site of memory” (a symbol of collective identification, which acts as a type of landmark for important values operating in the public consciousness at a particular moment in history)? Does it seem to you that instead of acting as a carrier of values that initially emphasized his “importance” (as an anarchist, peasant hero, and military genius), he is now beginning to function in the public consciousness as an example of new (or perhaps re-actualized) values (as a fighter against Russian/Soviet imperialism, a symbol of Ukrainian identity, and an example of a distinct type of statehood)?

Verstiuk

Indeed, the world knows Ukraine more through Makhno than through Hrushevs’kyi or Skoropads’kyi. This is due to the popularity of anarchism in the interwar period. However, the myth of Makhno and the real Makhno are quite different. The myth of Makhno absorbed much of the collective activity that was part of the Makhnovshchyna. Makhno’s word was far from the last and final; many issues in the army were resolved collectively by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Revolutionary Insurgent Army of Ukraine (Makhnovist), even without the participation of the Bat’ko. Over the last hundred years, the world, including Ukraine, has changed significantly. It’s not certain that today’s challenges can turn Makhno into a symbol of identity. His movement contained much that is profoundly peasant and Ukrainian, which is challenging to combine with the modern, urbanized world. Nevertheless, the Makhnovist movement and its leader provide a wealth of lessons that should be learned and assimilated. On the other hand, it’s worth remembering that the Ukrainian Revolution was a time of searching for Ukraine, with fierce competition between various models. Hrushevs’kyi’s Ukraine differed from Skoropads’kyi’s Ukraine, Ievhen Petrushevich’s Ukraine,[53] Makhno’s Ukraine, and the steppe Ukraine of the heirs of the Zaporizhzhian Sich.

Savchenko

Makhno is one of the leaders in popularity among Ukrainian figures of the 20^th century. All Ukrainians know about him, like Taras Shevchenko[54] or Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi[55]… the situation is worse with Skoropads’kyi or Roman Shukhevych.[56] Since 1990, there has been a positive dynamic in the growth of Makhno’s popularity, and this is a fact. He has become a “people’s alternative” to a government of corruption, nepotism, and oligarchy… Ukrainians know very well what has ruined Ukraine for thirty years of independence, and it is not only the Russian Federation. Makhno has become a symbol of the eternal struggle of the new against the old.

Azarov

I believe that the term “against-all” [protyvsikhstvo], as applied to the Makhnovshchyna, is used by people who are illiterate in the history and ideology of the Makhnovist movement and who do not understand its goals and objectives. Anarchism, in general, and the Makhnovshchyna in particular, worked on the development of society, not the state. Therefore, any state regimes that came to the lands controlled by the Makhnovists were considered by them exclusively from the point of view of the possibility of coexistence with local organs of stateless self-government. The Bolsheviks conducted the most cunning and flexible policy in relation to the Makhnovshchyna, trying to use it against common enemies while giving in return the necessary weapons and ammunition, without which the Makhnovists would have lost their region. During the time of such alliances, the Makhnovshchyna could coexist with Soviet power, but only as long as the Bolsheviks did not try to liquidate Makhnovist organs of self-government. Neither the White Guard nor the national-republican bourgeois regimes provided such an opportunity for coexistence. That is the whole secret of the cooperation of the Makhnovists with the Bolsheviks. The Makhnovshchyna was not an appendix to this or that project of statehood on the lands of the former Russian Empire. It was a new independent project of social organization and therefore opposed other projects that interfered with its implementation.

It was in the context of this experience of socio-economic construction that Makhno firmly took his place long ago in the history of not only Ukraine but all humanity. The world’s first large-scale experiment of anti-authoritarian (bezvlastnogo) self-government, the organizational core of which was the Union of Anarchists of the Huliaipole region with Makhno at the helm. It was a completely new political phenomenon, albeit not fully completed. According to the assessment of the chairman of the Makhnovist Military Revolutionary Council, Volin, at the peak of the movement in the autumn of 1919, it covered territories with a population of up to seven million people, almost a third of the population of Ukraine at that time. The development of self-organization and social independence of the broad masses of people and the arrangement of their own lives without the intervention of authorities is the most important set of skills or social technologies. In the modern period of rethinking the role and functions of the state in economically developed countries in the context of globalization, such technologies should be in high demand to retrain post-Soviet society. Unfortunately, Ukraine is now in a catch-up stage of development, trying to go through the stage of nation-building, which was relevant for advanced countries in the 19^th century, which is why these skills remain undeveloped.

Therefore, Makhno is not about modern Ukraine, where there is neither real competition between different ideologies nor public discussion based on a pluralism of opinions. Makhno is about a Ukraine of the future—I hope, the near future. The foundational principles of Makhno’s Anarchist Labour Federation, including grassroots initiative, multiculturalism, and social self-reliance, can become an excellent alternative to the current state of Ukrainian society, with its linguistic, cultural, and social conflicts that undermine solidarity from within.

Concerning Makhno as a fighter against Soviet or Russian imperialism, he also fought against the Austro-German invasion, against the troops of Hetman Skoropads’kyi, the Ukrainian Directory, and even against the Entente landings. Therefore, as a symbol of identity, it is more important not against whom but for what he fought so that this tendency will develop in Ukraine, of course, in a manner attuned to the present situation. The current government welcomes the introduction of mutual aid and technologies of self-government, so these “new Makhnovists” have something to defend from both Russians and space aliens. On the contrary, if the government constantly cuts back on the social gains for which the RPAU/m fought and continues to drive ordinary Ukrainians into poverty and lawlessness, the question inevitably arises: how does such a symbol of identity correspond to what is happening in the rear, while the “new Makhnovists” defend the country at the front? Well, and if this new identity is expected to do without the social component of the Makhnovshchyna, the question arises: How is it expressed then? When the social ideal, slogans, and methods of today’s activists, cultural figures and politicians, who declare themselves to be Makhno’s heirs, look, for example, like those of Banderites, without any other Makhnovist features except for the flag and the tachanka, then it becomes clear to an outside observer that these are not Makhnovists, but Banderites in disguise.

Dubovik

Actually, in my estimation, he’s already become a “site of memory.” Streets are being named after Makhno, which, by the way, violates the decommunization law. Makhno, as a “general”—that is, a brigade commander in the Red Army—should not be used for new place names according to the law. Military units are being named after him, and in Huliaipole, there’s long been a monument to him, unveiled with the involvement of both local and central authorities. Once again, I’m not a fan of this kind of “legitimization,” but we’ll see how it turns out.

On the other hand, the inclusion of Makhno in the “pantheon” of great Ukrainians clearly provokes displeasure from the right wing of the Ukrainian national movement (for whom the main heroes of that time are Pavlo Skoropads’kyi and Petro Bolbochan).[57] These people take every opportunity to point out how Makhno fought against Ukrainian statists and claim that Makhno bears responsibility for the defeat of the Ukrainian (statist) revolution in its confrontation with Bolshevik Russia. The most hardline among them even try to dismiss Makhno as nothing more than a “common bandit.” At present, these views remain fairly marginal. What happens next—we’ll see.

Kravets

Makhno will never become a symbol of collective identity for Ukrainians for a wide range of objective reasons.

The question of the relationship between the Makhnovist movement and statehood also sparks heated discussion. If the position of anarchists on this question is clear, the fascination with Makhno by the representatives of other political tendencies is more interesting. For example, far-right figures Dmytro Korchyns’kyi[58] and the late Illia Kyva’s fascination for Nestor Ivanovych is well known,[59] and a frontline unit of the ultranationalist Right Sector was named after Makhno. Even the Kyiv police are now issuing medals named after Makhno,[60] and one of Makhnofest’s organizers was Oleksandr Korniienko (head of President Zelens’kyi’s Servant of the People Party from 2019 to 2021).[61] Of course, there are those who criticize the Makhnovshchyna as practically and ideologically untenable, but there are also those who attempt to synthesize it with various manifestations of nationalism.

Aside from the above-mentioned examples, ten years ago, an attempt was made by the Lviv left-wing nationalist organization, “Autonomous Resistance.”[62] In turn, the director of the Center for Anti-Oligarch Policy, Volodymyr Lartsev,[63] believes that “only the ideology of Ukrainian solidarism formulated on the basis of Makhno and Lypynsky’s ideas of a ‘union of farmsteads [khutora],’ ‘free councils [soviety],’ and ‘an empire of communities [hromady]) supported at the state level, is capable of gluing together the visibly decaying integrity of our country.”[64] The philosopher and political strategist Andrii Okara,[65] among others, positions himself likewise. Not to mention that the Makhno monument in Huliaipole was unveiled by Ihor Lutsenko, the Minister of Internal Affairs at the time and that the Nestor Makhno Society “Huliaipole” was founded in 1998 by Anatolii Ermak, a member of the Ukrainian parliament and a former intelligence officer.[66] In turn, Borys Oliinyk,[67] a member of the Communist Party of Ukraine, helped publish an important book on Makhno,[68] while the future Party of Regions member Ivan Shufrych was involved in attempts to rebury Makhno.[69] Is this a sincere interest in Makhno, a complete misunderstanding of the Makhnovshchyna’s ideas, or a mercantile exploitation of this figure, as Azarov suggested in his article “My Makhnovshchyna”?[70]

Verstiuk

I’m convinced that outside of academic historical science, which is also pluralistic, there is no deep, objective, and adequate understanding of the Makhnovshchyna. There’s the bright, publicly attractive historical figure of Makhno, and there’s a broad and deep popular movement connected with him that attracts society’s different perspectives, which, at the same time, gives politicians the opportunity to use the Makhnovshchyna in their own interests. There’s not much you can do about that. It’s necessary to see who does it sincerely, with a deep understanding, and who is simply exploiting a popular brand.

The same can be said about Azarov’s article. His main task is to deprive the Makhnovist region of its Ukrainian roots. He sees the movement as a purely anarchic phenomenon. But it is not so. Ideological anarchists were present in the movement, but they were a drop in the peasant sea. The insurgent movement was based on the peasantry’s struggle for land and on opposition to the Bolshevik policy of “war communism,” which actually expropriated the peasants. Undoubtedly, the Makhnovshchyna was a specific Ukrainian phenomenon because it arose on Ukrainian soil. Outside its borders in Russia, it lost strength and popular support, was perceived as something foreign, and forced the Makhnovists to return to Ukraine. Note the name of the Makhnovist Army—the Revolutionary Insurgent Army of Ukraine (Makhnovists). Another thing is that the movement was not nationalist. Let’s understand the difference between national and nationalist. In addition to Ukrainians, there were also Greeks, Jews, Russians, and Germans in the army. This is an undeniable fact, but what was the relationship between them? Ukrainians in Katerynoslav province comprised 70% of the population, and the rest belonged to forty other ethnic groups.

Azarov

Your list of representatives of different political camps interested in the Makhnovist legacy is exactly what I wrote above about the diversity of historical discourse in past years. However, after Maidan, serious changes took place in Ukraine, largely confirming the suspicions expressed in my article that you mentioned. That part of the left movement and anarchists who had the courage to defend their ideals were subjected to cruel persecution for criticizing the post-Maidan government and the anti-social reforms it carried out. In order to create for the West an image of democracy and the people’s consent for liberal economic shock therapy, the government did not suppress such protests with the police; they were attacked by ultra-right groups working under the protection of the Special Services.

Our rallies were dispersed in the same way. In 2014, our Makhnovist march, traditionally held on Nestor Ivanovych’s birthday, was banned in Odesa. Personally, in 2016, I spent six months in the hospital and walked on crutches after an attack by nationalists at the event of the Liberation Day of Odesa from the Nazis.[71] In 2018, in Lviv, the ultra-right attacked the anarchists of the “Black Banner,”[72] and there were attacks in Kyiv and other cities as well. The anarchists were persecuted for defending self-government, labour, and the social rights of Ukrainians. In fact, for their Makhnovist ideals, they have been driven underground and have not been allowed to raise their heads for years. Consequently, they find themselves politically and economically crushed, and their cells have fallen apart.

Of course, such methods of “communication” with the modern bearers of Makhnovist ideology cause a maximum of mistrust for any synthesist proposals put forward by the nationalists and raise suspicions of a cynical attempt to absorb the Makhnovist legacy—to bleed and crush a competitor and then appropriate his assets. It is no secret that Ukrainian nationalism’s darker pages of history, such as the Volyn massacre, are very negative for Western neighbours, and especially for Poland. Therefore, the nationalist proposal for synthesis can be considered in the context of searching for a new shell for mass ideology without changing any domestic or foreign nationalist policies. However, the Makhnovist movement is world-famous and well-studied, so its flag cannot be used in service of a diametrically opposed policy. The international historical community and the anarchist movement will quickly expose and condemn such a fake. Therefore, no anarchist or recognized historian-Makhnovist will agree to this forgery, risking disgrace and an indefinite boycott by their social circle.

Nevertheless, I have long and repeatedly proposed that the image of Makhno and his movement is the most promising historical reference point for gluing Ukraine together, which is racked by internal conflicts. However, in order to bring together the different ideological poles of the Ukrainian political class, anarchists must have equal rights and opportunities. Anarchist political organizations (not to be confused with youth subculture) are not only the guardians of the Makhnovist heritage but also try to adapt its developments to modern society, to implement those same technologies of mutual aid and self-reliance which are in great demand today as a result of the dismantling of the state’s social institutions, military devastation, and poverty. This means that practical attempts at such rapprochement should be preceded by anarchists’ return to the country’s political life and their access to the media and resources for restoring their groups and implementing social projects of the adapted Makhnovshchyna.

If under such conditions, looking into the practical formation of this new Makhnovist identity, we must understand that such a process has its own reasonable boundaries of compatibility. In a totalitarian society, the leader is obliged to look from behind every wall and broadcast from every station. For the Makhnovist theme, for example, the existing police detachment named after Makhno is an obvious oxymoron. Makhnovist policemen! What will happen next, Makhnovist jailers, Makhnovist censors, Makhnovist oligarchs? This is the fastest way to discredit the new identity. We need to leave alignment with the Bat’ko for the development of Ukrainian society, the rise of its initiative and enthusiasm in the post-war restoration of the country, and not mix it with state symbols, law enforcement, and state security structures that come into sharp conflict with Makhnovist ideals. In a developed democracy, officials and police agencies must be equidistant from all ideologies.

As for the aforementioned attempts to synthesize the Makhnovshchyna with “various manifestations of nationalism,” we must understand what exactly is meant by that. Coercion based on the principle of ethnic majority, xenophobia, the hypertrophied glorification of national identity, and the prohibition of other local cultures—all this is incompatible with Makhnovist principles of coexistence. On the contrary, if we combine Makhno’s model with the proposed idea of ​​​​a “union of farmsteads,” from such a synthesis follows the equality of central and local cultural traditions, i.e. cultural self-governance. At the same time, the historical Makhnovshchyna never opposed itself to Ukrainian culture. The Makhnovist Cultural-Education Department held concerts on Taras Shevchenko’s birthday, and one of the most famous Ukrainian songs, “Unharness the horses, lads,” was composed by the Makhnovist artilleryman Ivan Nehrebits’kyi.[73] Anarchist tendencies are also compatible with what is called “civic nationalism” in the West, where citizens actively participate in political decision-making and government through plebiscites, referendums, and polls, thereby expressing the will of the nation. That is, it is possible to discuss the topic of synthesis, but for obvious reasons that have driven Ukrainian anarchists underground, any such dialogue would be of a cautious nature at the moment.

Dubovik

It’s all of these things at once, though for different people, different factors might dominate within the mix of their personal views. For Korchyns’kyi, for example, there was neither “genuine interest” nor “misunderstanding”—he deliberately appropriated Makhno into his ideology (or what passed for an ideology) of “The Brotherhood,” just as he did with Pol Pot and Mussolini. Shufrych was a mercenary exploiter of Makhno’s memory. And so on. Everyone approaches it differently.

Kravets

In my view, in all the mentioned cases, there is a mercantile use of Makhno’s persona, partly based on the personal interests of this or that individual.

The historian Volodymyr Chop considers Makhno the most popular leader among 20^th-century Ukrainian figures, as evidenced by the enormous quantity of folklore associated with the anarchist. Makhno’s name is included in some book series about “great” Ukrainians, while he is absent in others. However, Makhno has consistently ranked high in sociological surveys of the “greatest Ukrainians.” For example, in the highly representative 2023 study, “Historical Memory: Results of a Sociological Survey of Adult Residents of Ukraine,” conducted by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, Makhno was ranked 14^th with 55% of respondents viewing him positively compared to 24% with a negative view.[74] At the same time, he still “lost out” to Symon Petliura, Roman Shukhevych, Stepan Bandera, and Pavlo Skoropads’kyi. It is also interesting to note that Makhno is known across all regions of Ukraine, but according to this survey, he is perceived more negatively in the east of the country than in other regions. Is it possible to speak of a positive trend in the growing popularity of Makhno, and are respondents’ answers influenced by the political situation in the country? How reliable are these types of surveys?

Verstiuk

This is probably a question for a sociologist, not a historian. I can say once again that the name of Nestor Makhno has been purged of previous negative Soviet connotations and that this is evidence of a positive dynamic. Now, everything will depend on the various means of interpretation. I see no reason for Makhno’s growing popularity as a successful partisan. It seemed that war could contribute to this, but the current war has a completely different character: no one fights with a tachanka and a sabre, and partisan tactics are not employed. Accordingly, what is needed is not a hero who is the people’s avenger with a grade school education but a hero armed with a military education and science, a modern general, let’s say, like Zaluzhnyi, who understands and defends the interests of the state.

Azarov

In modern society, the popularity of a historical figure depends on the number of informational products about him. There are incomparably fewer such products about Makhno than about the statists of the nationalist camp. In addition, political opinion polls of recent years often sin by being commissioned in order to shape public opinion. And I cannot rule out that historical polls have the same goals. Of course, the political situation in the country directly affects the pantheon of historical figures promoted by the state; Makhno, with his self-government, is very inappropriate for the current processes of unitary centralization. I have not analyzed the change in the Bat’ko’s popularity, but according to the subjective impression of a historian and anarchist consistently interested in this topic, the peak of publications about the Makhnovshchyna on the internet occurred between 2008 and 2013.

Dubovik

There is a growth in popularity. Of course, it isn’t rapid, but it is quite real. It happens in leaps—like it did after the release of The Nine Lives of Nestor Makhno.

As for how much sociological research can be trusted—I can’t say. I’m not a specialist in sociology and know next to nothing about how these surveys are conducted or how their results are processed.

Kravets

No kind of growth in Makhno’s popularity can be observed. The survey respondents’ answers are in no way connected to the political situation in the country, and such research is not particularly trustworthy anyway.

I know that there are relatively few commemorative symbols of the Makhnovshchyna across the country (correct me if I am wrong—approximately five streets and around ten plaques and signs), but all of them have a pronounced geographical character tied to southeastern Ukraine.[75] In Huliaipole, they even have a tongue-in-cheek saying that as long as their Makhno monument stands, the city will not be occupied. At least two governors of the Zaporizhzhia region (A. Starukh and A. Peklushenko) spoke favourably of Makhno. In 2012, the latter announced a competition for the best play about the life and times of the anarchist. Do you think that streets should be named and monuments erected in the name of Makhno and his movement to give voice through a shared public space to this mythologized history?

Verstiuk

This is also a difficult question because of the alliances between the Makhnovists and the Bolsheviks. However, the movement cannot be reduced to cooperation with the Bolsheviks. From January 1920 to September, and later in 1921, they waged an active struggle against the Soviet authorities, not to mention the struggle against the Whites. Since the Makhnovshchyna is such an extraordinary phenomenon, it should be more closely integrated into the Ukrainian historical context and modern historical memory. Why not create a monument near the village of Perehonivka, where the Makhnovists defeated elite White Guard troops? Or in Dnipro (Katerynoslav), which the Makhnovist army defended for several weeks against attacks by the Whites?

Savchenko

I believe that there should be streets and monuments associated with the Makhnovshchyna in Kyiv, Odesa, and Kharkiv. Makhno’s life deserves a world bestseller and a TV series. One of the first to propose developing “Makhnovist tourism” was the conceptual artist from Odesa, Leonid Voitsekhov,[76] back in 1996 with the “Makhno-Land” program in Huliaipole.

Azarov

Regarding the shortage of memorial symbols of the Makhnovshchyna, I would like to remind you that in the process of thoughtless decommunization, memorials to anarchists were also destroyed. In Mariupol, the only monument to a Makhnovist from the Soviet period was first desecrated by the ultra-right, and, in 2016, it was torn down—the memorial to the battalion commander in the 1^st brigade of the 1^st Insurgent Division of Makhno, Kuzma Apatov.[77] In 2023, a monument to the famous anarchist sailor Anatolii Zhelezniakov,[78] whom Makhno greatly respected, was torn down in Verkhovtsevo. As for new memorials, I believe that in honour of the participants of the Makhnovist movement, they should not be part of a state program from above but an initiative from below, at the level of territorial communities, where, as a result of the truthful popularization of such historical images, there will exist a desire to create memorial sites for the inspiration of contemporaries. Then, it will be a sincere impulse and not the imposition of yet more idols.

Dubovik

There are probably a few more streets named after Makhno now, but I haven’t been keeping track.

As an anarchist, I’m opposed to naming streets and erecting monuments. I’ve said it before, and I still believe it: the best way to honour Makhno’s memory would be to revive a mass movement based on the same ideas that Makhno and his comrades fought for. Everything else is, at best, an empty gesture—and at worst, a distortion.

Kravets

Since I’m generally opposed to naming streets after various figures, accordingly I am against naming anything after Makhno. A commemorative plaque or marker is appropriate enough.

In December 2019, a memorial cross was solemnly unveiled in the village of Osypenko (formerly Novospasivka) in the Berdiansk district to honour the soldiers of Nestor Makhno’s army who died in March 1919 in the struggle against the White Guards.[79] Priests of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine consecrated the monument. This is something of an exceptional case when it comes to commemorating the Makhnovists. Why is it that Nestor Ivanovych himself is presented as either a hero or a villain while many brilliant Makhnovist commanders—and even more so, the thousands of rank-and-file supporters—remain in his shadow?

Verstiuk

The naming of streets and the establishment of monuments are the prerogative of local authorities. As far as I know, the name “Makhno” is on the list of recommended names for renaming objects in public spaces. Why local authorities avoid this name should be asked. Obviously, Soviet inertia is still in effect. Why do Makhnovists such as Bilash, Kurylenko, Vdovychenko, and Havrylenko remain in the shadow of Makhno?[80] This is also an obvious shortcoming of those professional historians who failed to identify the personal participation of these commanders in the history of the struggles of the RPAU(m). We don’t have extensive biographies of these people, often not even birth dates. By the way, the figure of Petliura also quite strongly shadows other active participants in the struggle for independence.

Azarov

I would like to note that the cross is an unusual symbol for the Makhnovists, as they had a complicated relationship with the Church; the clerical theme was not reflected in the Makhnovist movement. It should be remembered that Makhno was an atheist and tolerated religion only so far as not to cause unnecessary conflicts with the traditions of the local population.

As for the new monuments to other participants in the Makhnovshchyna—brilliant military leaders, bright orators of the Cultural-Educational Department, organizers of anti-authoritarian (bezvlastnogo) self-government, and ordinary fighters for the freedom of working people—they fall out of public attention due to the elitist leader-like model of perceiving the past, dominant in Ukrainian historical science, as well as the insufficient popularization of the Makhnovist movement. One can also talk about a deep misunderstanding of this mass phenomenon as its memoirists have repeatedly noted that the main figures of the Makhnovshchyna were not the leaders but the initiative-taking rank and file.

Dubovik

I believe this is both natural and inevitable (although unfortunate). The same thing happens to all movements as they fade into the past. We remember the names of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi, Tadeusz Kościuszko, and Joan of Arc, for example, but the names of their comrades are known only to specialist historians or those who have recently read a book, watched a film, or played a video game on the subject.

New events— that is, history unfolding before us in real-time—gradually displace the “excess” details of older, long-passed history in collective memory. There’s simply no way around it.

There are quite a few documentary films about Makhno, but not so many when it comes to fictional portrayals.[81] Almost half a century ago, Vladimir Vysotsky was supposed to play the role of Makhno, but it never came to pass.[82] In 1993, the playwright and children’s author Yaroslav Stelmakh wrote a now-forgotten book, Bat’ko: A Cinematic Tale. I also came across information that negotiations with Robert DeNiro occurred, who was considered for the role of Nestor Ivanovych in a proposed film entitled Anarchist, based on a screenplay written in 1995 by the director and People’s Artist of Ukraine Volodymyr Savel’iev. However, Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Culture and Arts of Ukraine, Anna Chmil, was “unable” to allocate half a million hryvnias for the film. Today, all we have is the 2007 Russian-produced TV series The Nine Lives of Nestor Makhno, which raises many questions about historical authenticity. In my humble opinion, a quality feature film about the Makhnovist movement has yet to be produced. Do you agree?

Verstiuk

Completely. There is a shortage of films not only about the Makhnovist movement but also on Ukrainian historical themes in general. This is a question for the authorities, who, for thirty years, kept Ukrainian culture and humanitarianism at a residual level, not understanding that this is a powerful tool in the formation of national identity.

Azarov

In the current condition of the Ukrainian state with its ideology of strict unitarism and nationalism, which brands any aspiration for self-government as separatism, I see the creation of a truthful feature film about the Makhnovshchyna as unlikely. State historians, receiving a salary from the state, can, of course, write any script ordered by the authorities. However, to depict the deep essence of the Makhnovist movement and its goals, which inspired the broad masses of different nationalities, it is necessary to change too much in the state’s ideology and the public perception that it fosters. Otherwise, such a film would end up being a shocking informational bomb. Nonetheless, I hope its creation will be a matter of the near future, when at least the first stage of forming a new Makhnovist identity, which we are discussing, will be realized.

Dubovik

I agree with one caveat—there is no quality film or TV series. In this case, “good quality” means that it would necessarily involve a historical consultant.

Kravets

This is a consequence of Makhno having become the symbol of the entire insurgent movement in our region. He led it from the beginning to the end, and the movement itself is named after him—the Makhnovist movement. The others, as they say, don’t count. Of course, such a situation is not right, but one must also take into account that very little information has been preserved about many of the movement’s commanders, let alone rank-and-file insurgents. This makes the popularization of their names and activities significantly more difficult.

In Dnipro, there is the “Underground Makhno Pub,” and I know that in 2020, the local historian Serhii Zvilins’kyi was working on opening a bar, hostel, and museum in Huliaipole.[83] Regional tourist routes were also in development (such as “For the Spirit of Makhnovist Freedom” in the Mezhivska community),[84] and there were discussions about building a memorial complex on the Haichur River.[85] Do you think “Makhnovist tourism” should be developed in Huliaipole and Zaporizhzhia after the war? Will Huliaipole take its symbolic place within the consciousness and memory not only of the southeastern regions but also of Ukrainian society as a whole?

Verstiuk

One can’t be of two minds here. As Lviv’s restaurant experience has shown, historical trends can boost business efficiency. Perhaps not all businessmen understand this or do not know how to organize their business creatively. Like movies, historical tourism is a method of patriotic education, delving into the country’s history. Unfortunately, here, too, the Ukrainian authorities are faltering. The Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance is trying to do something, but it’s too weak to move this case forward fundamentally. Notice how quickly the Poles restored the memory of Józef Piłsudski and his associates after the fall of the communist regime,[86] while Ukraine has been waiting for decommunization for almost thirty years. Maybe the war will change something in this situation.

Azarov

Of course, I welcome the development of tourism, festivals, and theme clubs—places of recreation dedicated to the Makhnovshchyna. However, with the obligatory condition that they contain the spirit of this movement not turn out to be a camouflage for ideas inimical to the Makhnovists or for trivial money-making. I think that with a comprehensive approach to popularizing the Makhnovshchyna, it will be perceived as a historical legacy of Ukrainian society as a whole. After all, many of its ideas were ahead of their time and are more than relevant today. In addition, the movement’s participants were immigrants from different regions of Ukraine and foreign countries, where it is possible to create memorial signs for their popularization. For example, the husband of Makhno’s comrade-in-arms, the famous anarchist Marusia Nikiforova,[87] was the Polish anarchist Witold Brzostek.[88]

Dubovik

Given everything that’s happening, we’ll be lucky if Huliaipole remains an actual city at all and doesn’t turn into a heap of ruins like Bakhmut and Avdiivka.

As for the question itself, “Makhnovist tourism” will develop (regardless of our wishes) if it proves profitable. I believe it will be, primarily thanks to European tourists rather than Ukrainians themselves. If Huliaipole becomes a significant tourist center, especially internationally, its symbolic importance is guaranteed.

Kravets

Yes, “Makhnovist” tourism is worth developing. However, I do not believe Huliaipole will take on a symbolic place in the consciousness and memory of Ukrainian society as a whole.

I actively follow events in Ukraine and, prior to the full-scale war, regularly visited the country. In 2019, I was lucky enough to visit Huliaipole and chat with the local population. Now, the city is on the frontline and has suffered extensive damage. Anarchists, Ukrainian soldiers, and Belarusian volunteers all take photos near the Makhno monument. Military units are even named after him, such as the N.I. Makhno Mobile Group for Small Arms Repair. In the new documentary Huliaipole: The Homeland of Makhno and Anarchy | A Year on the Front Line, one of the town’s elderly residents, when asked what side Makhno would be fighting on, answered that he would be on Ukraine’s side.[89] Do you agree with this statement? Can we say that the war has changed or will change Ukrainian attitudes toward Makhno?

Verstiuk

It’s obvious that the current war will become an extremely important event in the history of Ukraine. Time will be divided into before and after, and the war will nominate new heroes and give birth to new national myths. In fact, it has already given birth to them (the Heavenly Hundred, the Donetsk cyborgs, and the battles for Hostomel’, Bucha, and Moshchun).[90] It’s difficult to predict whether old heroes can withstand the competition of new myths. Recent history is always more interesting and understandable to people, while the distant past becomes a field for academic historical science. I have no doubt that Makhno would have fought on the side of Ukraine because this is his homeland. What connected him to Russia? His years spent in Butyrki prison? The Makhnovists fought against the Empire, for a new free democratic order. What could possibly attract them to contemporary Russia?

Savchenko

Makhno himself would have been in Ukraine’s volunteer battalions since 2014. I do not doubt that he would have defended his “free region” and the whole of “free Ukraine” from the aggression of the Russian Empire. Any attempts to make Makhno a “Novorossiian phenomenon” are ridiculous because from January 1919 to August 1921, he fought against Russian imperialism under the guise of Denikin, Vrangel, and Lenin.

Azarov

The question of whose side Makhno would have taken in this war is quite provocative for an inhabitant of the Ukrainian rear during the period of Russian aggression. And today, when there is so much blood and suffering, a negative answer would cause a negative reaction to both the respondent and to the Makhnovist topic in general. But at the same time, I urge you to understand why Makhno did not join the army of the Ukrainian People’s Republic even during the most acute period of the struggle against Denikin’s Armed Forces of South Russia in the fall of 1919[91] and why the temporary agreement with Petliura ended in a break and an accusatory appeal by the Makhnovists against the commander of the Directory’s troops. Makhno was certainly for Ukraine—but for a Ukraine of his own, with socio-economic arrangements aligned with his views. Moreover, the conditions of pre-war life in our country, with an increased oppression of Ukrainian workers, whom he defended, do not correspond to Makhnovist ideals in any way. Therefore, to answer this question with complete confidence, we must put Ukraine on the path of moving toward Makhno’s guiding principles.

Dubovik

Regarding the first question, we have a direct quote from Makhno, who truly loved his homeland and his people. I’ve cited it more than once—but strangely, as far as I know, I’m the only one to do so:

If our Bolshevik comrades come from Great Russia to Ukraine to help us in our difficult struggle against the counterrevolution, we must say to them: ‘Welcome, dear brothers!’ But if they are coming here with the aim of monopolizing Ukraine, we will say to them: ‘Hands off!’ [From Makhno’s report at the Second Regional Congress].[92]

For the second question, I can’t really say. I think there are too many problems in the present moment for people to think deeply about history, let alone radically reassess their attitudes toward historical events. In any case, attitudes toward Makhno are not likely to change for the worse—unless massive state resources and talented propagandists are thrown at it, and that seems unlikely in postwar Ukraine. There will be more pressing concerns. Besides, even the USSR, with its decades-long monopoly on education, culture, and everything else, failed to erase all sympathetic popular memory of the Makhnovshchyna. So, it’s hard to imagine that anyone will succeed now.

Kravets

Such comparisons are generally inappropriate, as Makhno lived in a completely different historical era. However, in my personal view, Makhno would definitely defend Huliaipole and its population from the Russian barbarians. The war has not changed attitudes toward Makhno in any way.

Makhno’s name appears in K.V. Ryzhov’s book One Hundred Great Russians (Moscow, 2000),[93] as well as in the 2008 Rossiya television channel’s project “Name of Russia.”[94] The late war correspondent Vladlen Tatarsky also identified as a Makhnovist.[95] A striking illustration of how contemporary Russia views Makhno is presented in the propagandist Arkady Mamontov’s program featuring professional historians, “Makhno and the ‘Makhnovshchyna’: Traces of the Empire.”[96] Even a historian of anarchism like Dmitrii Rublev[97] sometimes includes Nestor Ivanovych in the canon of “Russian anarchists” (for example, in his book Russian Anarchism in the 20^th Century or in a recent article, where the author delicately avoids calling Makhno a Ukrainian anarchist).[98] Can we say that there are attempts by modern Russian historians and propagandists to “appropriate” Makhno and the Makhnovist movement, i.e., to make them a “Russian,” “Little Russian,” or “Novorossiian” phenomenon?[99]

Verstiuk

I’ve already partially touched on this topic. There is nothing surprising here when Russian propaganda, with one voice behind Putin, tries to deny the existence of Ukraine and Ukrainians, diminishing them in various ways, including by declaring Makhno an outstanding Russian and ignoring actual facts. I will only offer two counterarguments. On August 5, 1919, Makhno issued an order to restore/create the Revolutionary Insurgent Army of Ukraine (Makhnovist). First of all, it stated: “The task of our revolutionary army and every insurgent who joined it is an honest struggle for the complete liberation of the working people of Ukraine from all forms of enslavement.” Russia is not mentioned here. Moreover, the “Draft Declaration of the Revolutionary Insurgent Army of Ukraine” prepared by Volin outlined the anarchist vision of the development of revolutionary events and noted the fundamental difference between Ukraine and Russia. If, in Russia, the authorities managed to create a strong state apparatus that suppressed any manifestations of popular discontent with an iron hand, the situation was developing quite differently in Ukraine. The Draft Declaration reads:

Since the end of the summer, all of Ukraine has been boiling with peasant uprisings and a broad insurgent movement against the Communist Party, which does not deserve the trust of the masses. The Third Revolution is approaching—it has already begun—which Ukraine has already entered… Ukraine is on the threshold of a real peasant and workers’ revolution. This is the main meaning of the events taking place. We, the Makhnovist insurgents, are only the children of this revolution, its servants and defenders.[100]

That’s the whole answer to the question, although it can be expanded into a broader article.

Azarov

Several aspects are combined here, starting with the fact that it is quite difficult for Ukraine and Russia to historically separate the activists of the Ukrainian southeastern regions during the period of the Revolution and Civil War. The main fronts of the struggle between the Red and White armies, which decided the fate of Soviet power not only in Ukraine but also throughout the former Russian Empire, moved across these lands during this period. Denikin marched on Moscow through the Ukrainian Left Bank, and then Vrangel advanced from Crimea and threatened to join forces with the Polish troops. So, the battles here are also part of Russian history, which is closely intertwined with Ukrainian history. The same Revolutionary Insurgent Army of Ukraine (Makhnovists), having captured large territories in the rear of Denikin’s troops advancing on Moscow in the fall of 1919, diverted large forces from the Armed Forces of South Russia and thus played an almost decisive role in saving the power of the Bolsheviks in Russia.

On the other hand, in the ideological confrontation with Ukrainian nationalism in the Russian media sphere, one can see the opposition of the Makhnovist movement, which was internationalist and supported the free development and coexistence of different cultures in Ukraine. Thus, a compromise version of the ideological content of Ukrainian society is being promoted, which, from the Kremlin’s point of view, is more convenient for the coexistence of neighbouring countries that will be forced to live side by side because they cannot change geography. More radical politicians and propagandists of the Russian Federation declare the Makhnovshchyna a Russian phenomenon to justify their claims to the lands of southeastern Ukraine.

In this, they are helped by some Ukrainian politicians and the historical community, who do not welcome the popularization of Makhno and his movement, not considering them part of their historical and political development because otherwise, they will have to recognize the right of Ukrainians to engage in social struggle for Makhnovist ideals. Such bourgeois-nationalist categoricalness creates convenient preconditions for Russians to lay claim to the Bat’ko as part of their history. From this point of view, one can understand that the attitude towards the Makhnovshchyna and the competition for its legacy is not a narrow historical problem but a question of building the Ukraine of the future, what our society should be like with a real consensus of various development projects generated by its history. This issue should have been sorted out much earlier, and we would not have had as many of the current consequences of a one-sided political discourse. However, this was hampered by attempts to manipulate history and repress Makhno’s current followers to achieve immediate political gain. I hope the chance has not been missed.

Dubovik

By denying the independence of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people, Russian imperialists naturally view the Makhnovshchyna as part of Russia and the Russian people and historical figures of Ukraine as their own, as Russian. Nothing is surprising about that. They’re not even consciously “appropriating” anything—they genuinely believe that this Russian belonging is natural and that it simply couldn’t be any other way.

Kravets

Such attempts clearly take place and have been evident for a very long time. It is not just about Makhno. The so-called “Russians” shamelessly claim everything as their own that is in any way connected to the former Russian Empire.

 

Translated and edited by Sean Patterson and Malcolm Archibald

Aleksander Łaniewski (b. 1984) is a Belarusian-Polish historian, publicist, and anarchist. He works at the Tadeusz Manteuffel Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences and has extensively published on the history of anarchism. Łaniewski is the author of the monograph Intelektualne oblicza polskiego anarchizmu przełomu XIX i XX wieku. Augustyn Wróblewski, Józef Zieliński i Jan Wacław Machajski [The intellectual faces of Polish anarchism at the turn of the 20^th century. Augustyn Wróblewski, Józef Zieliński and Jan Wacław Machajski’], (Warszawa: Instytut Historii PAN, 2024).

Vladyslav Verstiuk (b. 1949) is a Ukrainian historian, professor, and the author of over 250 publications dealing with the Ukrainian Revolution, including Kombrig Nestor Makhno [Brigade Commander Nestor Makhno] (1989); Makhnovshchyna: selianskyi povstanskyi rukh na Ukraini (1918—1921) [The Makhnovshchyna: a peasant movement in Ukraine (1918—1921), (1991); and the chief editor of Direktoriia. Rada Narodnikh Ministriv Ukrainskoi Narodnoi Respubliki 1918—1920. Dokumenty i materialy u 2 tomakh [The Directory: Council of People’s Ministers of the Ukrainian People’s Republic 1918—1920. Documents and materials in 2 volumes] (2006).

Viktor Savchenko (b. 1961) is a Ukrainian historian, professor, and author of over 300 publications, mostly dealing with the history of anarchism, including Makhno (2005); Diialnist’ anarkhist’kikh organizatzii v Ukraini y 1903—1929: istorichnii aspect ta politichna praktyka [The activity of anarchist organizations in Ukraine in 1903—1929: historical aspect and political practice] (2017); and Anarkhisty Odesy, 1917—1937 [Anarchists of Odesa, 1917—1937] (2020).

Vyacheslav Azarov (b. 1964) is a Ukrainian socio-political activist, journalist, historian, and the leader of the political party Union of Anarchists of Ukraine. He is the author of Kontrrazvedka: The Story of the Makhnovist Intelligence Service (2008); Starobel’skoe soglashenie [The Starobil’s’k Agreement] (2011); Anarkhiia na iuge. Anarkhisty iuzhnyi guberniia byvshei Rossiisskoi imperii v bor’be za seobshchee samoupravlenie 1917—1918 [Anarchy in the South. Anarchists of the southern provinces of the former Russian Empire in the struggle for universal self-government, 1917—1918] (2021).

Anatolii Dubovik (b. 1972) is a Ukrainian anarchist activist, a member of the Nestor Makhno Revolutionary Confederation of Anarcho-Syndicalists, journalist, and researcher of the history of anarchism. He is the author of many articles, and a founder and participant of such online projects as Russian socialists and anarchists after October 2017, https://socialist.memo.ru/; Anarchists in the USSR and later: from ‘perestroika’ until today, https://www.facebook.com/groups/1661041757571542/; and History of anarchism on the territories of the former Russian Empire and the USSR, https://www.facebook.com/groups/2990629131201367.

Yurii Kravets (b. 1972) is an independent Ukrainian researcher and the author of many articles on the Makhnovshchyna and the history of anarchism in Zaporizhzhia.

Malcolm Archibald is a researcher of anarchism and the translator of many books in the field. He operated Black Cat Press in Edmonton, Canada, from 1972 to 2022. Archibald is the editor and translator of the first English edition of Nestor Makhno’s three-volume memoirs: The Russian Revolution in Ukraine (2007), Under the Blows of the Counterrevolution (2009), and The Ukrainian Revolution (2011).

Sean Patterson is a PhD candidate at the University of Alberta in Edmonton, Canada and an assistant editor and translator with the Forum for Ukrainian Studies. His dissertation research investigates the identity and ideology of the Makhnovist movement during the Ukrainian Revolution. Patterson is the author of Makhno and Memory: Anarchist and Mennonite Narratives of Ukraine’s Civil War, 1917–1921 (University of Manitoba Press, 2020).

[1] For example, see “Military Personnel: Nestor Makhno (1888–1934),” Pantheon, https://pantheon.world/profile/person/Nestor_Makhno#metrics.

[2] “Ideinyi vybir: ‘Chy ie Makhno natsionalʹnym heroiem Ukrainy?’” [An ideological Choice: “Is Makhno a National Hero of Ukraine?”], Shuster online, 6 July 2016, 1 hr. 30 min. 52 sec., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NAf8lU5AG1g.

[3] For an interesting discussion by historians, see “Nestor Makhno—voroh rosiian i ‘batʹko’ ukraintsiv” [Nestor Makhno—Enemy of the Russians and “Bat’ko” of the Ukrainians], Ukrains’kyi media-tsentr, 1 September, 2023, 1 hr. 10 min. 30 sec., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ho6jbqy5mnA.

[4] I am familiar with at least two plays: the first tragi-grotesque called “Nestor Makhno,” directed by I. Borys and L. Toma, opened in March 2003 at the Zaporizhzhia Academic Regional Ukrainian Music and Drama Theatre named after Volodymyr Magar; the second one entitled “Black and red, or the Mariupol Treasure of Nestor Makhno,” directed by K. Dobrunov,” was performed in November 2009 at the Donetsk Academic Regional Drama Theatre in Mariupol (subsequently destroyed by the Russians in March 2022). “Chornoe i krasnoe, ili Mariupol’skii klad Nestora Makhno,” Sergei Zabogonskii, 28 August 2015, 1 hr. 50 min. 34 sec., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JqYPlOrmANw.

[5] “V Kieve s vystavki sniali kartinu “Svoboda ili vce idut na kh*i” (Foto)” [In Kyiv the painting “Freedom or Everyone F*ck Off” was removed from exhibition], UA-Reporter.com, January 20, 2010, https://ua-reporter.com/news/v-kieve-s-vystavki-snyali-kartinu-svoboda-ili-vse-idut-na-hy-foto; T. Gonchenko, “V Dnipropetrovske otkrylas’ vystavka kartin pro Nestora Makhno” [An exhibition of paintings about Nestor Makhno opens in Dnipropetrovsk], Gorod.dp.ua, 23 January 2012,https://www.gorod.dp.ua/news/69509.

[6] “Zatochnoi tochilo + shlifoval’nyi 1500 Vatt_Nestor Makhno_Disc Sander + Bench Grinder_Nestor Makhno,” Anatolii Vostok, 16 October 2020, 12 min, 29 sec. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fFxqdi7BmPw.

[7] To list just a few examples: R. Sambuk, Makhno (Kyiv: Ukrains’kyi kultur dukhovnoi kul’tury, 1997); V. Savel’yev, Makhno. Ostannia pravda [Makhno. The Last truth] (Kyiv: Ukrains’kyi kultur dukhovnoi kul’tury, 1997); S. Reviakin, Huliaipole (Dnipropetrovsk, 2007); A. Pobazhnyi Kam’ianyi voin [Stone Warrior] (Zaporizhzhia, 2014); Yurii Pliasovytsia, Zhinocha pastoralʹ Nestora Makhna [A Women’s pastoral of Nestor Makhno] (Vinnitsia, 2020). A novel by a Polish writer was also recently translated into Ukrainian: S. Lubens’kyi, Stepovyi pirat [Steppe Pirate] (Chernivtsi: Knyhy-XXI, 2025).

[8] “Iushchenko uvidel makhnovshchinu v ukrainskikh sudakh” [Yushenko saw the Makhnovshchyna in the Ukrainian courts], Focus, 31 October 2008, https://focus.ua/politics/28806.

[9] “Makhnovshchyna,” in Russkoiazychnyi zhargon. Istoriko-etimologicheskii tolkovyi slavar’ prestupnogo mira [Russian Jargon. A Historical-Etymological Explanatory Dictionary of the Criminal World], edited by Z.M. Zugumov, (Moscow: Knizhnyi mir, 2015), 352.

[10] Novorossiia (New Russia) was a historical term used by the Russian Empire to designate a region in southern Ukraine that was annexed and colonized by Catherine II in the late-18^th century after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the region and the repression of the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks. The term has resurfaced and been invoked by Putin in the context of Russia’s current occupation of southern and eastern Ukraine in a crass attempt to claim these regions as historically “Russian.”

[11] About Huliaipole before Russia’s full-scale invasion, see “Batʹkivshchyna Makhna. Huliaipole /SELOVIE/” [The Fatherland of Makhno. Huliaipole], Hromadske TB Zaporizhzhia, 21 October 2017, 17 min. 30 sec., https://youtube.com/watch?v=OMCVDhb7cAc;Ie. Rudenko and E. Sarakhman, “Volia abo smert’. Chym zhyve Huliaipole – bat’kivshchyna anarkhista Nestora Makhna” [Freedom or death. How does Huliaipole live— the homeland of Nestor Makhno], Ukrains’ka pravda, 9 October 2020, https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2020/10/9/7269307/; N. Zvorygina,”Huliaipole. Where one man is an Island,” Decentralization, 11 May 2022, https://decentralization.ua/en/news/14913.

[12] Some Armed Forces members are inspired by the figure of Makhno to create art. The exhibition of the painting “Nestor Makhno” by Oleksandr Kanibor (call sign “Artist”), Captain of the 35^th Separate Marine Brigade named after Rear Admiral Mykhailo Ostrograds’kyi, took place in Mezhova (Dnipropetrovsk region) in 2023. The painting was presented to the residents and visitors of Mezhova region and dedicated to the 135^th anniversary of Makhno’s birth. Golred, “Makhno povertaiet’sia?!…” [Makhno returns?!…], Mezhivs’kyi meridian, 22 March 2023, https://m-merydian.com.ua/nasha-istoriya/u-mezhovij-vidbulasya-prezentacziya-kartyny-nestor-mahno-kapitana-morskoyi-pihoty-z-pozyvnym-hudozhnyk-oleksandra-kanibora/.

[13] See Sean Patterson, The life, death, and resurrection of the Nestor Makhno monument, Freedom News, 20 September 2024, https://freedomnews.org.uk/2024/09/20/the-life-death-and-resurrection-of-the-nestor-makhno-monument/.

[14] Ustym Karmaliuk (1787–1835) was the leader of peasant rebellions in Right-Bank Ukraine, a popular hero of Ukrainian folklore and literary works.

[15] Andrea Graziosi (b. 1954), Italian historian, expert on the history of the USSR, peasant movements, and the Holodomor. Author of many publications, including The Great Soviet Peasant War: Bolsheviks and Peasants, 1917–1933 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).

[16] Symon Petliura (1879–1926), Ukrainian social-democratic and nationalist politician, journalist, and chairman of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic, from November 1920 in exile.

[17] Stepan Bandera (1909–1959), Ukrainian nationalist politician, a leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, officially recognized as a “national hero” by Ukraine.

[18] The Russian terms used here are blagorodnyi pazboinik and udachlivyi pazboinik, literally “noble robber” and “lucky robber,” which roughly approximate the English archetypes of the “social bandit” and “dashing rogue.”

[19] The Nine Lives of Nestor Makhno is a Russian 12-episode series directed by Nikolai Kaptan. The title role was brilliantly played by Pavel Derevyanko. Despite a number of historical errors and inaccuracies, the series presented the ideas of anarchism and the figure of Makhno in a positive light.

[20] Valerii Volkovinskii (1948–2006) was a Soviet and Ukrainian historian and the author of Makhno i ego krakh [Makhno and his downfall] (Moscow: VZPI, 1999) and Nestor Makhno: legendi I realʹnist’[Nestor Makhno: legends and reality] (Kyiv Perlit prodakshn, 1994).

[21] Volodymyr Chop (b. 1971), Ukrainian historian, lecturer at Zaporizhzhia National Technical University, researcher of the Makhnovist movement, and the author of many monographs and articles, including Nestor Makhno: Ostannii selians’kyi heroi [Nestor Makhno: The Last Peasant Hero] (Kyiv: Mystetstvo, 2019); in co-authorship with Ihor Lyman, «Vol’nyi Berdyansk»: misto v period anarkhists’koho sotsial’noho eksperymentu (1918–1921 roky) [“Free Berdyansk”: a city in the period of the anarchist social experiment (1918–1921)] (Zaporizhzhia: Tandem-U, 2007); Mistsiamy pam’iati pro povstans’kykh peremoh u Zaporoz’komu krai: Azovs’ka operatsiia Nestora Makhna [Local memories of insurgent victories in the Zaporizhzhian region: the Azov operation of Nestor Makhno] (Zaporizhzhia, 2017); with Ihor Lyman Nashchadky zaporozhtsiv: Makhnovsʹkyi rukh u Pivnichnomu Pryazovʹi (1918–1921 rr.)[Descendants of the Zaporozhians: the Makhnovist movement in Northern Azov Region (1918–1921)] (Melitopol: TOV “VB Melitopol’s’koi mis’koi drukarni,” 2019). Unfortunately, V. Chop declined to participate in this survey.

[22] ” Metodychni rekomendatsii do 100-richchia Ukrainsʹkoi revoliutsii 1917–1921 rokiv” [Methodological Recommendations for the 100^th Anniversary of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1921], Ukrains’kyi instytut natsional’noi pam’iati, 6 March 2017, https://uinp.gov.ua/informaciyni-materialy/vchytelyam/metodychni-rekomendaciyi/metodychni-rekomendaciyi-do-100-richchya-ukrayinskoyi-revolyuciyi-1917-1921-rokiv.

[23] Volin [Vsevolod Mikhailovich Eikhenbaum] (1882–1945), outstanding anarchist theoretician and activist of Russian and Jewish origin, journalist, and editor. Author of the fundamental work La révolution inconnue, 1917–1921 (Paris: Les Amis de Voline, 1947).

[24] Bat’ko literally means “father” in Ukrainian, but often conveys a tone closer to “papa.” Historically, the Cossacks used the term for their military leaders to signify paternal authority and leadership. In Ukrainian peasant culture, it was similarly applied to respected elders and community figures, indicating wisdom and charasmatic leadership. In revolutionary Ukraine, various local military leaders were given the title Bat’ko by their supporters—the most famous of which was Bat’ko Makhno, despite only being in his early 30s at the time.

Otaman, also of Cossack military origins, was a title adopted by numerous local strongmen, roughly equivalent to “warlord.” The otamans often acted independently of—or in loose alliance with—the main armies of the civil war. As a phenomenon of the period (the so-called otamanshchyna)they were seen as an unpredictable and disruptive element.

[25] Dmytro Arkhireys’kyi, (b. 1968), Ukrainian historian, professor, researcher of the Ukrainian Revolution and insurgent movements, author of Makhnovsʹka veremiia: ternystyi shliakh Revoliutsiinoi povstans’koi armii Ukraiini (makhnovtsiv), 1918–1921 rr. [The Makhnovist whirlwind, the thorny path of the Revolutionary Insurgent Army of Ukraine (Makhnovist), 1918–1921] (Kyiv: Tempora, 2015)

[26] Pavlo Skoropads’kyi (1873–1945), Ukrainian military and political figure, or head of the Ukrainian state (or Hetmanate) as a protectorate of Austro-Hungary and Germany (April–December, 1918).

[27] During the Ukrainian Revolution, the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UPR), along with the West Ukrainian People’s Republic (WUPR), constituted the Ukrainian state as a whole, of which the Directory was the highest governing body. The UPR was headed successively by Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, and Symon Petliura.

[28] Hennadii Yefimenko (b. 1971), Ukrainian researcher, worker at the Institute of the History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. Regretfully declined to participate in this survey.

[29] The Confederation of Anarchist Groups of Ukraine Nabat (1918–1920) was the largest Ukrainian organization of anarchists cooperating with the Makhnovist movement. After its dissolution by the Bolsheviks, it operated in the underground.

[30] R. Traba, “Polska i niemiecka kultura pamięci” [Polish and German Cultures of Remembrance], Interakcje Leksykon komunikowania polsko-niemieckiego, http://www.polska-niemcy-interakcje.pl/articles/show/44.

[31] R. Traba, “Społeczne ramy czytania historii” [The Social Frameworks of Reading History], in Przemiany pamięci społecznej a teoria kultury, edited by B. Korzeniewski (Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 2007), 43–65.

[32] A. Szpociński, “O współczesnej kulturze historycznej Polaków” [On Contemporary Polish Historical Culture], in Przemiany pamięci społecznej a teoria kultury, 25–42.

[33] Viktor Ialans’kyi (1940–2003), a paternal great-nephew of Nestor Makhno. In the 1970s and 1980s, he collected materials materials related to Makhno, for which he came under the scrutiny of the KGB. Co-author of the important book, V. Ialans’kyi and L. Ver’ovka, Nestor i Halyna. Rozpovidaiut’ fotokartky [Nestor and Halyna. As Told through Photographs] (Kyiv: Iarmorok, 1999).

[34] Volodymyr Zhylins’kyi (1930–2016), publicist and resident of Huliaipole, co-author (with writer and local historian Ivan Kushnirenko, b. 1946) of numerous popularizing publications about Makhno and Huliaipole including Hop, kume, ne zhurys’: narodna tvorchist’ pro Makhna i makhnovtsiv [Hey bud, don’t worry! Folk culture about Makhno and the Makhnovists] (Zaporizhzhia: Dniprovs’kyi metalurg, 2008); Nestor Makhno i povstantsi. Slidamy makhnovtsiv [Nestor Makhno and the Insurgents. In the Footsteps of the Makhnovists] (Zaporizhzhia: Dniprovs’kyi metalurg, 2009); and Nestor Makhno i “Soiuz bidnykh khliborobiv” [Nestor Makhno and the “Union of Poor Peasants.” The Beginning of the Revolutionary Struggle](Zaporzhzhia: Dniprovs’kyi metalurg, 2010).

[35] Anatolii Serdiuk (b. 1961), musician and journalist from Zaporozhzhia, composer of a number of songs with Makhnovist themes.

[36] Mikhailo Hrushevs’kyi (1866–1934), Ukrainian historian and politician, freemason, and head of the Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1917–1918.

[37] Volodymyr Vynnychenko (1880–1951), Ukrainian politician, writer, and head of the Directory of the Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1918–1919.

[38] The Holodomor (literally “death by hunger”) was an artificial famine orchestrated by the Stalinist regime in 1932–1933 on the territory of Ukraine, leading to the death of between 3.5 and 5 million Ukrainians. It was part of the broader Soviet Famine (1930–1933), which devasted regions of Russia and Kazakhstan, leading to the death of another 4 million victims. The Holodomor can be understood as a component of the Soviet regime’s broader campaign of political repression and the forced collectivization of peasants.

[39] Andrii Ermolenko (born 1974), Ukrainian painter, best known for his projects Ziobart and Mama Anarkhiia. The latter decorated the barricades of Euromaidan.

[40] Serhii Zhadan (b. 1974), famous Ukrainian writer and musician, participant of Makhnofest, and the author of Anarchy in the UKR (Wołowiec: Wydawnictwo Czarne, 2007).

[41] Antin Mukhars’kyi (b. 1968), Ukrainian musician, writer and showman. In 2014 he recorded the album Mama-Anarkhiia with the “anarcho-band” HraBlya, which contains strong Makhnovist themes. He was the curator and creator of the Union of Free Artists “Freedom or Death.”

[42] Les Poderv’yans’kyi (b. 1952), Ukrainian writer, artist and satirist, organizer and participant in Makhnofest. In a social media post positively comparing the Makhnovshchyna to the American Wild West he proclaimed in all caps, “The Makhnovshchyna is in the blood of Ukrainians and that’s what we need: no one imposing on you, no one telling you what to do, you have a lot weapons, and you have to follow your instincts and that of your community. A sense of responsibility is awakened.” Facebook post, 3 February 2022, https://www.facebook.com/poderviansky/photos/a.808464475966835/2745762645570332/?type=3.

[43] A satirical show about Makhno from February 26, 2023 has had almost 110,000 views: “Makhno i Ukrains’ka anarkhiia | Rozkazhy Istoriiu #9” [Makhno and Ukrainian Anarchy | Tell the Story #9], Tochka Zboru, 26 February 2023, 44 min. 57 sec., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cOXYUUSjZok.

[44] The festival aimed at reviving, popularizing, and preserving Ukrainian songs, folklore, and folk art. It was started in 2007 by the then chairman of the district state administration of Huliaipole, member of the Party of Regions Oleksandr Dudka. The event was usually held on Makhno’s birthday.

[45] The musical and literary underground festival “Independence Day with Makhno” (the so-called Makhnofest) was a cultural event held under the slogan “The officials celebrate in Kiev, and true Ukrainians go to Huliaipole.” It was organized in Huliaipole from 2006 to 2009 and near Kyiv in 2010, where it hosted theater performances, film shows, concerts, performances, literary competitions, and exhibitions. The festival was criticized by anarchist circles for distorting and profaning anarchism and Makhnovist ideals, as well as attempting to nationalize Makhno and privatize the Makhnovist movement. During the event, there were public statements of a Russophobic and anti-Semitic nature.

[46] Oles Donii (born 1969), Ukrainian politician, journalist and cultural activist, deputy of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine, and head of the Creative Association “The Last Barricade.”

[47] M. Mikrut-Majeranek, “Jak mówić, żeby zainteresować młodych historią? Odpowiedzi na to pytanie szukano podczas pierwszego dnia Kongresu Pamięci Narodowej” [How to interest young people in history? Answers to this question were sought during the first day of the Congress of National Remembrance] HistMag.org, 13 April 2023, https://histmag.org/Jak-mowic-zeby-zainteresowac-mlodych-historia-Odpowiedzi-na-to-pytanie-szukano-podczas-pierwszego-dnia-Kongresu-Pamieci-Narodowej-25476.

[48] A. Assman, “Spaces of memory. Forms and transformations of cultural memory,” in Collective and cultural memory. Contemporary German perspectives, ed. M. Saryusz-Wolaka (Kraków: Towarzystwo Autorów i Wydawców Prac Naukowych “Universitas,” 2009), 115.

[49] Yurii Lutsenko (b. 1964), Ukrainian politician, deputy of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, Minister of Internal Affairs (2006, 2007–2010), and Prosecutor General of Ukraine (2016–2019).

[50] Last year, even Maryna Khonda, Deputy Head of the Kyiv City state Administration for Self-Governance, stated that a Makhno street would soon appear in Paris (!). Maria Kataieva, “U Paryzhi z’iavytʹsia vulytsia Nestora Makhna, — Maryna Khonda [A Nestor Makhno Street Will Appear in Paris—Maryna Khonda], Vechirniy Kyiv, 15 March 2023, https://vechirniy.kyiv.ua/news/80006/.

[51] Iana Osadcha, “Levko Luk’ianenko i Nestor Makhno: v Ukraini rozshyryly spysok diiachiv, imenamy iakykh rekomenduiut’ nazyvaty vulytsi” [Levko Luk’ianenko and Nestor Makhno: Ukraine has expanded the list of figures whose names are recommended for streets], Ukrains’ka pravda, 28 June 2022, https://life.pravda.com.ua/society/62baae6d8e7b9/.

[52] Protivsikhstvo refers to the phenomenon of a relatively large number of Ukrainians voting for the “against all” option on their ballots. See I. Losiev, “‘Protyvsikh’ Makhno ta ins ...” [“Against all” Makhno and others ...], Ukrains’kyi tyzhden’, February 9, 2013. https://tyzhden.ua/protyvsikh-makhno-ta-inshi/.

[53] Ievhen Petrushevych (1863–1940), Ukrainian lawyer, politician, and leader of the West Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1919.

[54] Taras Shevchenko (1814–1961), Ukrainian scholar and hero of the people, painter, and social activist.

[55] Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi (1595–1657), Zaporozhian hetman, leader of the Cossack uprising against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1648–1657, and national hero of Ukraine.

[56] Roman Shukhevych (1907–1950), Ukrainian military and political activist, one of the leaders of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, accused of military crimes and ethnic cleansing.

[57] Petro Bolbochan (1883–1919), Ukrainian soldier, commander of the Ukrainian Nationalist Army, shot for conspiracy to remove Petliura.

[58] Dmytro Korchyns’kyi (b. 1964), Ukrainian politician, writer, social activist, leader of the “Brotherhood” party, and co-founder of the far-right UNO-UNSO (Ukrainian National Assembly–Ukrainian People’s Self-Defense) party. He has often spoken positively about Makhno. On December 22, 2006 in Dnipro, without permission from the local authorities, placed a commemorative plaque on the facade of the Astoria Hotel, which in 1919 housed Makhno’s headquarters.

[59] Illia Kyva (1977 – 2023), Ukrainian politician, employee of the MSW, member of the Right Sector, and former leader of the Socialist Party of Ukraine. From 2019, he was a member of the pro-Russian Opposition Platform—For Life. After February 22 2022, he fled to Russia, where he was murdered, probably by the Security Service of Ukraine. He played Makhno in Posttravmatychna rapsodiia [Post-traumatic Rhapsody], based on D. Korchins’kyi’s 2016 theater play. See “Posttravmatychna rapsodiia,” Dmytro Korchins’kyi, 25 August 2020, 1 h. 7 min. 23 sec., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QofU8IysFHE.

[60] As a curiosity, it can be added that twenty years ago, the publishing house of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Academy of Internal Affairs in Luhansk published a book about the Makhnovshchyna and people’s legal consciousness: O. N. Atoian, Volia k pravu. Issledovaniia makhnovshchiny i narodnogo pravosoznaniia [The Desire for law. An Investigation of the Makhnovshchyna and popular legal-consciousness], Luhansk 2003.

[61] Oleksandr Korniienko (b. 1984), Ukrainian politician, leader of the Servant of the People party (2019–2021), and the first deputy chairman of President Zelens’kyi’s Servant of the People Party.

[62] “Po ulitsam L’vova proshel Marsh voli v chest’ anarkhista Nestora Makhno” [The March of freedom in honour of Nestor Makhno took place along the streets of Lviv], Strana.ua, 5 November 2017. https://strana.today/news/103028-novosti-ukrainy-po-ulitsam-lvova-proshel-marsh-voli-anarkhista-nestora-makhno-.html.

[63] V’iacheslav Lypyns’kyi (1882–1931), Ukrainian historian, publicist, and conservative thinker.

[64] V. Lartsev, “Kakaia ideologiia sposobna perezagruzit’ ukrainskuiu gosudarstvennost’? Chast’ I” [What Ideology Can Reboot Ukrainian statehood? Part I], Khvylia, 9 June 2020, https://hvylya.net/analytics/208967-kakaya-ideologiya-sposobna-perezagruzit-ukrainskuyu-gosudarstvennost-chast-i.

[65] Andrii Okara (b. 1959), Ukrainian political scientist, philosopher, and publicist. During the first Makhnofest, he gave a lectureentitled“Makhnovist anarchism as the dominant system of statehood in the future,” in which he synthesized and popularized the far-right UNA-UNSO Party, Makhno and Khmel’nyts’kyi.

[66] Anatoli Ermak (1955–2003), Ukrainian politician, officer of the KGB and SBU, deputy in the Ukrainian Parliament.

[67] Borys Oliinyk (1935–2017), Soviet and Ukrainian poet, politician, and social activist, deputy of the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian Parliament), decorated a Hero of Ukraine, and member of the Communist Party of Ukraine,.

[68] V. Ialans’kyi and L. Ver’ovka, Nestor i Halyna.

[69] Nestor Shufrych (b. 1966), Ukrainian politician and entrepreneur. In 2006–2007 and 2010 he served as Minister of the state Service of Ukraine for Emergency Situations, member of the Party of Regions (2007–2014) and Opposition Platform—For Life, and owner of the Zakarpattia Uzhhorod football club. Currently accused of state treason, he is in a pretrial detention centre.

[70] V. Azarov, “Moia Makhnovshchyna”[My Makhnovshchyna], https://www.makhno.ru/st/108.pdf.

[71] “V drake na Lidersovskom bul’vare postradal lider odesskikh anarkhistov” [The leader of the Odesa anarchists was injured in a fight on Lidersovsky Boulevard], Pervyi gorodskoi, 10 April 2016, http://web.archive.org/web/20160417062249/https://1tv.od.ua/news/14336.

[72] “Vo L’vove ul’trapravye napali na aktivistov anarkhistskoi organizatsii” [Members of the ultra-right attacked activists of an anarchist organization in Lviv], Hromadske, 24 September 2018, https://hromadske.ua/ru/posts/napadenye-ultrapravykh-na-aktyvystov-anarkhystskoi-orhanyzatsyy-vo-lvove.

[73] Ivan Nehrebitskyi (1896–1950), musician, Makhnovist, exiled by the Bolsheviks to Magadan, where he died.

[74] Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, “Istorychna Pam’iat’. Rezulʹtaty sotsiolohichnoho opytuvannia doroslykh zhyteliv Ukrainy” [Historical Memory: Results of a Sociological Survey of Adult Residents of Ukraine], KIIS, January 2023, https://www.kiis.com.ua/materials/news/20230320_d2/UCBI_History2023_rpt_UA_fin.pdf.

[75] There are two monuments in Huliaipole (2008, 2009), one in Nikipol (2009), one on the balcony of the Rudnev house in Starobil’s’k (2013), and one in front of the restaurant “Huliaipole” in the town of Novoselivka, Zaporizhzhia region (2013). Petitions (unsuccessful) to the city authorities regarding the name Makhno took place in Sumy and Zaporizhzhia (2019). There are streets named after Makhno in Huliaipole (2016), Dnipro (2015), Orikhiv (Zaporizhzhia region), the town of Borysivka (Zaporizhzhia region), and Nikopol (2023). Unsuccessful citizen petitions were also submitted to local authorities to rename streets after Makhno in Sumy (2017) and in Zaporizhzhia (2019).

[76] Leonid Voitsekhov (1955–2018), Odesa painter, activist, writer, and theoretician of art. He wrote about his project “Misteria Machny” [The Mystery of Makhno] in L. Voitsekhov, Proekty (Kyiv: Vozdvizhenka, 2016).

[77] Kuzma Apatov (1896–1919), Russian soldier, revolutionary, without being a member of the RKP(b) commanded the Mariupol Soviet Shock Battalion (later a regiment). According to Yuri Kravets, Apatov was not a Makhnovist, but operated in the zone controlled by Makhno’s Trans-Dnieper Brigade. During the formation of Apatov’s regiment, local insurgents sympathizing with Makhno ended up in it.

[78] Anatolii Zelezhniakov (1895–1919), Russian anarchist, sailor, participant in the 1917 revolution, commander of Soviet troops, died in battle with the Whites. Mistakenly considered a Bolshevik.

[79] Anna, “Na Berdyanshchyni vshanovano pamʺyatʹ makhnovtsiv, shcho zahynuly u borotʹbi z bilohvardiytsyamy” [In Berdyansk, the memory of Makhnovist residents who died in the fight against White Guards was commemorated], MIG, December 9 2019, https://mig.com.ua/na-berdjanshhini-vshanovano-pam-jat-mahnovciv-shho-zaginuli-u-borotbi-z-bilogvardijcjami/

[80] Viktor Bilash (1883–1938), Chief of Staff of the Makhnovist army, and the author of A. V. Belash and V. F. Belash, Dorogi Nestora Makhno[The Odyssey of Nestor Makhno], Kyiv 1993. Arrested and executed by the Soviets in 1938. Vasilii Kurylenko (1891–1921), anarchist, Makhnovist commander, and the head of the administrative-organizational Department of the Council of the Makhnovist army. Died in battle fighting against the Red Army. Trofim Vdovichenko (1889–1931), soldier, commander of the 2^nd Azov Corps of the Makhnovist army, shot by the Bolsheviks. Petr Havrylenko (1883–1938), anarchist, commander of the 3^rd Katerynoslav Corps of the RPAU, shot by the Bolsheviks.

[81] For example, Néstor Makhno, paysan d’Ukraine(1996)directed by Hélène Chatelain. For an English subtitled version see “A Peasant from Ukraine: A Portrait of the Anarchist Nestor Makhno,” A Radical Guide, 10 March 2022, 1 hr. 26 sec., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zFLpefjeK1g. Also see “Nestor Makhno—Petrushka russkoi revoliutsii (1997)” [Nestor Makhno—Petrushka Doll of the Russian Revolution], Otchestvennaia Dokumentalistika, 1 January 2018, 1 hr., 8 min., 37 sec., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2UGB_ZbDSco; “Neproshcheni—Nestor Makhno (2007)” [Unforgiven—Nestor Makhno], RadianskaUkraina, 11 December 2011, 50 min., 11 sec., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UHvPVodgnM0; “Istoriia Nestora Makhno. Ia nesu smert’. Dokumental’noe kino Leonida Mlechina” [The Story of Nestor Makhno: I Bring Death. A Documentary Film by Leonid Mlechin] (2012), Tsentral’noe Televidenie, 27 November 2020, 38 min. 16 sec., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ptB9CsPlL0; “Father Makhno and Ukrainian Anarchy // History Without myths,” Istoriia Bez Mifiv, 4 November 2020, 23 min., 2 sec., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DggnyP0u0tM.

[82] About this and about the journey of the famous Soviet bard to Huliaipole see D. Karapetian, Vladimir Vysotskii. Vospominaniia [Vladimir Vysotsky: Memoirs] (Moscow: Zakharov, 2002), 180–208.

[83] Lilia Bila, “Bar, khostel i muzei pid odnym dakhom. Huliaipilʹsʹkyi istoryk prydumav, iak zberehty istorychnu budivliu,”

[A Bar, hostel and museum all under one roof. A Huliaipole historian has figured out how to preserve an historical building], Huliaipole.city, 29 August 2020, https://gylyajpole.city/articles/97325/bar-hostel-i-muzej-pid-odnim-dahom-gulyajpilskij-istorik-pridumav-yak-zberegti-istorichnu-budivlyu.

[84] A. Logunov, Po sledam bat’ki Makhno: na Dnepropetrovshchine opredeleny luchshie turmarshruty

[In the footsteps of Bat’ko Makhno: the best tourist routes in the Dnipropetrovsk region], Vidkrytyi, 1 October 2021, https://opentv.media/po-sledam-batki-mahno-na-dnepropetrovshhine-opredeleny-luchshie-turmarshruty.

[85] Vlad, “V Zaporozhskoi oblasti poiavitsia ostrov batʹki Makhn”[In the Zaporozhia region an island named after Bat’ko Makhno is going to appear, MIG, 11 September 2021, https://mig.com.ua/v-zaporozhskoj-oblasti-pojavitsja-ostrov-batki-mahno/.

[86] Józef Piłsudski (1867–1935), leader of the Polish Socialist Party, and Poland’s first Chief of State from 1918–1922, played a key role in regaining Poland’s independence in 1918, and successfully defended Poland in the Polish-Soviet War (1919–1921).

[87] Maria (“Marusia”} Nikiforova (1887–1919), legendary Ukrainian anarchist, commander of a revolutionary insurgent detachment, participant of the Makhnovist movement.

[88] Witold Brzostek (1885–1919), Polish anarchist, during the civil war in Russia participated in legal and underground anarchist formations in Moscow and Ukraine, executed by the Whites in Crimea together with his wife M. Nikiforova.

[89] “Huliaipole: Nestor Makhno is the father of anarchy. A Year on the Front Line,” Thickets, 31 March 2023, 40 min. 9 sec., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cJ3MnhyGtN0.

[90] The Heavenly Hundred refer to the 107 protesters murdered by the Ukrainian government during the Maidan Revolution in 2014. Most of the casualties were caused by police snipers on February 20, which is now commemorated as the Day of Remembrance of the Heroes of the Heavenly Hundred.

The Donetsk cyborgs refers to the Ukrainian volunteer fighters who defended the Donetsk International Airport against pro-Russian forces from 26 May 2014–22 January 2015. One hundred Ukrainian soldiers died in the course of the defense operation.

[91] Armed Forces of the South of Russia (Volunteer Army), anti-Bolshevik armed forces under the command of Anton Deniken during the Civil War of 1919–1920, later transformed into the Russian Army under the command of Baron Pyotr Vrangel.

[92] “Protocol 2-go Guliai-Pol’skogo raionny s”ezd frontovikov, Sovetov, i podotdelov, sostoiavshegosia 12 fevralia 1919 g.v.s. Guliai-Pole. 19 fevralia 1919 g.” [Minutes of the 2^nd Huliaipole District Congress of Frontline Soldiers, Soviets and Subdepartments, held on February 12, 1919 in the village of Gulyai-Pole. February 19, 1919], in Nestor Makhno. Krest’ianskoe dvizhenie na Ukraine. 1918–1921: Dokumenty i materialy, ed. V. Danilov and T. Shanin (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2006), 80

[93] K. Ryzhov, 100 velikikh rossiyan [100 great Russians], (Moscow: Veche, 2000).

[94] Arina Borodina, “Nestor Makhno, Bogdan Khmel’nitskii i drugie velikie russkie [Nestor Makhno, Bogdan Khmel’nitskii and other great Russians], Kommersant, June 9 2008, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/900798

[95] Vladlen Tatarsky [real name Maksim Fomin] (1982–2023), Russian war blogger and writer born in Makiivka, member of the Donetsk People’s Republic militias. He was killed on April 2, 2023 in St. Petersburg by an explosive device. On March 13 2023, in the building of the state Duma of Russia, he participated in the signing of the so-called “memorandum on the end of the civil war in Russia.” (!) Among the signatories: Dmitrii Kuznetsov and Nikolai Novikov (A Just Russia – Patriots – For Truth Party), Roman Antonovsky (monarchists), Aleksei Chadaev (close to an unknown right-left LKPN), Herman Sadulaev (Bolsheviks), Vladlen Tatarsky (Makhnovists-anarchists—sic!), Andrei Korobov-Lalyntsev (SRs). In addition, Anastasia Udaltsova (Communist Party of the Russian Federation and Stanislav Naumov (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia) took part in the signing of the memorandum.

[96] “Makhno i ‘Makhnovshchyna’. Sledy Imperperii” [Makhno and the “Makhnovshchyna.” Traces of the Empire], Arcady Mamontov, 6 December 2022, 1 hr. 22 min. 2 sec., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q_7WZGirr-M.

[97] Dmitrii Rublev (born 1981), Russian historian and anarchist, member of the Confederation of Revolutionary Anarcho-Syndicalists, lecturer at Moscow state University, author of many scientific publications, including Russkii anarkhizm v XX veke [Russian anarchism in the 20^th century], (Moscow, Rodina, 2019); Chernaia gvardiia, Moskovskaia federatsiia anarkhicheskikh grupp v 1917–1918 gg. [The Black Guard, the Moscow federation of Anarchist Groups in 1917–1918] (Moscow: Common Place, 2020); and Diktatura intellektulov? Problema “intelligentsiia i revoliutsiia” v rossiiskoi anarkhistskoi publitsistike kontsa XIX-nachala XX veka [Dictatorship of the Intellectuals?The problem of “the intelligentsia and Revolution” in Russian anarchist discourse of the late 19^th–early 20^th Century] (Moscow: Moskovskii gosudarstvennyi universitet prirodoobustroistva 2020).

[98] D. Rublev, “N.I. Makhno i Makhnovskoe dvizhenie v otsenkakh rossiyskikh i ukrainskikh anarkhistov. 1918–1921 gg.” [N.I. Makhno and the Makhnovist movement in the assessments of Russian and Ukrainian anarchists. 1918–1921.], Russkaia istoriia, no. 6, (2023): 85–99.

[99] See the discussion by Russian historians about Makhno in 2015: “Nestor Makhno v istoricheskikh i sovremennykh obshchestvenno-politicheskikh diskussiiakh” [Memorial Society, Nestor Makhno in historical and contemporary social-political discussions], Obshchestvo “Memorial,” 22 November 2022, 2 hr., 34 min. 13 sec., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WnHxcjlRvB8.

Little Russian (malorusskii) was a historical term used in the Russian Empire to refer to Ukrainians and the Ukrainian language. It reflected an imperial perspective that framed Ukraine as a junior or regional part of a greater Russian whole. The term is now considered offensive as it implies the lack of a distinct Ukrainian national identity.

[100] “Proekt deklaratsii revoliutsionnoi povstancheskoi armii Ukrainy (Makhnovtsev)” [Draft Declaration of the Revolutionary Insurgent Army of Ukraine (Makhnovist)], in Anarkhisty. Dokumenty i materialy. T. 2. 1917–1935, eds. V. Danilov and T. Shanin (Moscow: ROSSPEN,1999), 354–361.